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SEXUAL CONSENT AND DISABILITY
JASMINE E. HARRIS*
Our nation is engaged in deep debate over sexual consent. But to date the discus-
sion has overlooked sexual consent’s implications for a key demographic: people
with mental disabilities, for whom the reported incidence of sexual violence is three
times that of the nondisabled population. Even as popular debate overlooks the
question of sexual consent for those with disabilities, contemporary legal scholars
critique governmental overregulation of this area, arguing that it diminishes the
agency and dignity of people with disabilities. Yet in defending their position, these
scholars rely on empirical data from over twenty years ago, when disability and
sexual assault laws and social norms looked quite different than those of today.
Current scholarly discussions about sexual consent and mental disability suffer
from an outdated empirical baseline that masks critical information about the pro-
file and experience of sexual violence. This Article creates a new empirical baseline
for modern scholarship on sexual assault and disability. Based on an original
survey of all fifty states and jurisprudence from the past twenty years of state sexual
assault and rape appeals where the victim has a mental disability, this Article
updates and critiques four major claims about sexual consent and disability in the
current literature. First, through a review of statutes across the country, it compli-
cates the traditional notion that statutes are unduly vague in their definition of disa-
bility, and as a result, either over- or under-emphasize disability. The author
advances a new organizing taxonomy for sexual assault statutes addressing consent
for people with mental disabilities. Second, this dataset upends the prevailing claim
by legal scholars that courts overemphasize standardized evidence such as intelli-
gence quotient (IQ) or mental age when judging a person’s functional capacity to
consent to sex. Instead, this Article shows that courts frequently look at adaptive
abilities to augment standardized evidence but, in doing so, overvalue certain kinds
of adaptive evidence that have low probative value, to the detriment of persons with
mental disabilities. Third, legislators and legal scholars focus on people in large
institutional settings in their critiques of overregulation, but this new data shows
that people in community-based settings are more often the complainants in rape
and sexual assault cases. This raises important questions about the types of relation-
ships the state regulates (formal versus informal care relationships), the location of
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these relationships (community versus institutional settings), and issues of class that
intersect with disability and sexual regulation. By not addressing the right issues
and contexts, current law leaves people with mental disabilities simultaneously
more susceptible to sexual violence and less empowered to exercise sexual agency.
Finally, the Article more deeply examines the traditional assumption that people
with disabilities rarely have access to testify by considering a rarely-mentioned risk:
whether testimony by people with disabilities skews capacity determinations
because factfinders cannot see beyond the existence of the disability—a phenom-
enon which the author terms “the aesthetics of disability.” This Article calls upon
scholars, courts, and policymakers to consider difficult questions of regulating
sexual consent in ways that are consistent with the current profile and experience of
sexual violence for people with mental disabilities reflected in this study.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 9, 2017, a New Jersey appellate court reversed the con-
viction of a former Rutgers University Professor, Anna Stubblefield,
for sexual assault of D.J., a man with significant developmental disa-
bilities found to be incapable of consent.1 The appellate court held
1 State v. Stubblefield, 162 A.3d 1074 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017).
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that the lower court committed reversible error2 by denying Stub-
blefield the opportunity to proffer evidence of D.J.’s use of “facili-
tated communication,” a form of assisted communication in which
people who cannot communicate orally point or type their messages.3
Stubblefield and D.J.’s relationship began when D.J.’s brother Wesley,
one of Stubblefield’s students at Rutgers, approached the professor
after hearing her lecture on facilitated communication. Wesley
inquired about the possibility of using this method with his brother,
who was non-verbal.4
After working with D.J., Stubblefield told Wesley and his mother
that she believed D.J. had been misdiagnosed as intellectually dis-
abled because of his inability to communicate and that his use of facil-
itated communication demonstrated his cognitive capabilities.5 Two
years after meeting, Stubblefield and D.J. approached D.J.’s family
and revealed their romantic and sexual relationship and Stubblefield’s
plans to leave her husband to start a life with D.J.6 Upon hearing this
news, Wesley and his mother, believing that D.J. could not actually
communicate in the ways described by Stubblefield, pursued criminal
prosecution for sexual assault on D.J.’s behalf.7
The trial court determined that evidence that D.J. had engaged in
“facilitated communication” with Stubblefield did not meet the rig-
orous evidentiary standards for admission as scientific evidence.8 Evi-
dence of facilitated communication was central to Stubblefield’s
2 Id. at 1082–83 (“Unfortunately, the court, in its attempt to cleanse the record of
controversial FC methodology, limited the evidence to the extent that defendant was not
given a fair opportunity to present her defense.”).
3 See, e.g., Donald N. Cardinal & Mary A. Falvey, The Maturing of Facilitated
Communication: A Means Toward Independent Communication, 39 RES. & PRAC. FOR
PEOPLE WITH SEVERE DISABILITIES 189, 190 (2014) (“[Facilitated Communication]
involves both a person who needs support or facilitation to communicate and a
communication partner. The communication partner provides support in a variety of ways.
The communication partner might provide emotional support to encourage
communication or might help the person to focus on the keyboard, array of pictures,
letters, or words[,] . . . or physical support to stabilize . . . movement, inhibit impulsive
typing, or to encourage the initiation of typing or pointing.”). See also id. at 191–92
(discussing controversy in media and scholarship surrounding the method).
4 Daniel Engber, The Strange Case of Anna Stubblefield, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/magazine/the-strange-case-of-anna-stubblefield.html.
5 Id.
6 Wesley and his mother served as co-plenary guardians for D.J. after a judge
determined that D.J. lacked the general capacity for decisionmaking under New Jersey’s
guardianship law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:12-25. Stubblefield, 162 A.3d at 1076.
7 Id. at 1076–77.
8 Id. at 1080–81. While the trial court did not exclude all mention of facilitated
communication, it effectively excluded any meaningful opportunity for Stubblefield to
offer expert testimony on its acceptance and use in her defense. Id.
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defense because it demonstrated both D.J.’s capacity9 to consent and
his affirmative consent to the sexual relationship with Stubblefield.10
Without this evidence, Stubblefield’s entire case turned on her charac-
terization of their relationship versus testimony from D.J.’s family and
doctors that he was incapable of consent on the basis of severe disabil-
ities (such as his use of “diapers”) and the jury’s observation of D.J.
(who was unable to walk, non-verbal, and prone to drool).11 Without
the use of facilitated communication, D.J. did not testify and only
appeared once during the prosecutor’s opening arguments, presum-
ably only to show to the jury the physical manifestations of his disabil-
ities.12 The jury found D.J. incapable of consent and convicted Anna
of two counts of sexual assault of a person “intellectually or mentally
incapacitated” under New Jersey law.
Dubbed “The Strange Case of Anna Stubblefield” by the New
York Times,13 this case briefly brought the question of legal capacity
to consent for people with disabilities front and center, despite the
fact that sexual assault and affirmative consent for nondisabled
people, particularly on college campuses, receives the lion’s share of
media attention and dominates the public discourse on sexual con-
sent.14 Power dynamics as well as differences in physical, mental, and
9 This Article’s use of the term legal “capacity,” as opposed to legal “competency,” is
in line with the efforts of domestic and international disability rights law scholars to
demonstrate the breadth of the former category. See, e.g., STEVEN B. BISBING, Competency
and Capacity: A Primer, in LEGAL MEDICINE 325, 325 (Shafeek S. Sanbar ed., 7th ed.
2007); Jasmine E. Harris, The Role of Support in Sexual Decision-Making for People with
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 83, 86–95
(2016) (discussing definitions and international norms of legal capacity).
10 Stubblefield, 162 A.3d at 1081 (“The jury was left with no evidence that any other lay
or expert person believed D.J. to have the intellectual capacity to consent to sexual
activity.”).
11 Id. at 1076, 1080–81.
12 See infra Section III.C (describing the prosecutor’s use of D.J. as a demonstrative
exhibit and advancing the “aesthetics of disability”).
13 See Engber, supra note 4.
14 One news reporter has described this focus as “a public reckoning with rape.”
Amanda Hess, How Movies and TV Address Rape and Revenge, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/arts/television/how-movies-and-tv-address-
rape-and-revenge.html. From campus sexual assault cases like Stanford University’s Brock
Turner and Columbia University’s Paul Nungesser to sports and celebrity icons like Bill
Cosby and Kobe Bryant, rape occupies space on the daily news docket. See, e.g., Robin
Abcarian, As We Celebrate Kobe Bryant’s Career, We Should Remember Too Its Darkest
Chapter, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/abcarian/la-
me-1210-abcarian-kobe-bryant-20151210-column.html (discussing Kobe Bryant’s rape trial
and its aftermath); Graham Bowley, Judge in Cosby Case Sets Retrial for Nov. 6, N.Y.
TIMES (July 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/arts/bill-cosby-retrial-date.html
(discussing Cosby rape retrial); Kate Taylor, Columbia Settles with Student Cast as a Rapist
in Mattress Art Project, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/14/
nyregion/columbia-settles-with-student-cast-as-a-rapist-in-mattress-art-project.html
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communication abilities and race15 generated intense public reactions;
some characterized Stubblefield as “sick” and a “predator,”16 while
others viewed her and D.J. as victims of classism, “ableism,”17 and
racism that deny them the opportunity for a loving, sexual
relationship.18
(discussing Columbia University’s management of sexual assault allegations against Paul
Nungesser by another student, Emma Sulkowicz, and their decision to carry a fifty-pound
mattress with them to protest the university’s response to her allegations); Daniel Victor,
Judge in Stanford Sexual Assault Case Is Cleared of Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/us/aaron-persky-stanford-rape-case.html
(discussing Brock Turner case). A targeted search of New York Times news articles over
the past year alone resulted in over 3400 unique news articles that discuss the issues of rape
or sexual assault. Lexis Nexis search News/U.S. News/January 1, 2017 to December 31,
2017/New York Times = 3452 search results (Jan. 7, 2018). See also Melena Ryzick, Taylor
Swift Spoke Up. Sexual Assault Survivors Were Listening, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/arts/music/taylor-swift-sexual-assault.html (discussing
impact of the pop star’s successful countersuit against radio host on young women
nationwide).
15 See Engber, supra note 4 (“Anna is white and D.J. is black.”); see also Shelley
Tremain, The Racialized Reception of the Verdict in the Trial of Anna Stubblefield,
DISCRIMINATION & DISADVANTAGE (Oct. 14, 2015), http://philosophycommons.typepad.
com/disability_and_disadvanta/2015/10/the-racialized-reception-of-the-verdict-in-the-trial-
of-anna-stubblefield.html (“Virtually no mention has been made of the fact that
Stubblefield is white and the victim is African American. . . . [A]mong the questions that
ought to be asked [are] . . . How has race configured the reception of, and responses to, the
verdict within the feminist philosophical community and within the disability studies
community?”).
16 Engber, supra note 4. See also Daniel Engber, A Second Chance for Anna
Stubblefield , SLATE (June 14, 2017, 1:46 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
health_and_science/science/2017/06/the_conviction_in_the_anna_stubblefield_facil
itated_communication_case_has.html (“[Stubblefield’s] relationship with D.J. was, if not a
predatory con, then a Ouija-board fantasy.”).
17 “Ableism” refers to a descriptive and normative concept in critical disability theory
that social institutions are designed around a fictional, able-bodied individual without
regard for those with different physical and mental abilities. See TOBIN SIEBERS,
DISABILITY THEORY 7–9 (2011) (discussing the “ideology of ability” and social design
choices); see also DAN GOODLEY, DIS/ABILITY STUDIES: THEORISING DISABLISM AND
ABLEISM 21 (2014) (explaining that ableism “privileges able-bodiedness; promotes smooth
forms of personhood and smooth health; creates space fit for normative citizens;
encourages an institutional bias towards autonomous, independent bodies; and lends
support to economic and material dependence on neoliberal and hyper-capitalist forms of
production.”); FIONA KUMARI CAMPBELL, CONTOURS OF ABLEISM: THE PRODUCTION OF
DISABILITY AND ABLEDNESS 4 (2009) (“Disablism is a set of assumptions (conscious or
unconscious) and practices that promote the differential or unequal treatment of people
because of actual or presumed disabilities.”).
18 See, e.g., Jeff McMahan & Peter Singer, Opinion, Who Is the Victim in the Anna
Stubblefield Case?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/
opinion/who-is-the-victim-in-the-anna-stubblefield-case.html (describing a very different
reaction to the case than that held by the mainstream media and the jury in this case);
Kevin Mintz, Ableism, Ambiguity, and the Anna Stubblefield Case, 32 DISABILITY & SOC’Y
1666, 1666–69 (2017) (discussing the abelist attitudes in the Stubblefield case, though
critiquing Singer’s and Jeff McMahan’s conception of harm as problematic to dignity).










      05/24/2018   08:08:34
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\93-3\NYU303.txt unknown Seq: 6 23-MAY-18 16:36
June 2018] SEXUAL CONSENT AND DISABILITY 485
Whatever visceral reaction one might have to the facts or the out-
come of this particular case,19 the Stubblefield example illustrates the
high stakes of sexual regulation in the context of cognitive disability.20
On the one hand, if the trial court correctly held that D.J. lacked the
capacity to consent, then the state has protected D.J. from predation.
However, if D.J. actually had the mental capacity to consent and it
was masked by communication impairments, as Stubblefield initially
argued,21 then the state has illegitimately (and unconstitutionally)
denied the sexual agency of two consenting adults and sent a clear
normative message about the ability of people with disabilities to
enter into romantic and sexual relationships.22
19 On March 23, 2018, Anna Stubblefield pled guilty to third degree aggravated
criminal sexual contact as part of a plea deal with the Essex County prosecutor’s office.
Colleen Flaherty, Former Professor Admits to Assaulting Disabled Man, INSIDE HIGHER
ED (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2018/03/23/former-
professor-admits-assaulting-disabled-man. She was awaiting a new trial after the appellate
court decision last year. The acceptance of a plea deal does not negate the demonstrative
value of this case, the empirical data analyzed in this Article, or the take-away lessons.
Similar stakes, difficult legal questions, and evidentiary ambiguities arise in any case where
the victim has a cognitive impairment and/or non-verbal communication.
20 This Article refers to people with “cognitive disabilities” or “mental disabilities” as
the broadest category that includes older adults with long-term cognitive impairments as
well as people with developmental disabilities and those with intellectual disabilities.
Intellectual disability is most often characterized by significant limitations in intellectual
functioning based on standardized intelligence tests and the resulting intelligence quotient
(IQ), usually a score below seventy-five; limitations in adaptive behavior (of three skill
types: conceptual skills, social skills, and practical skills); and early onset of the disability
before the age of eighteen years. RL SCHALOCK ET AL., AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON
TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION,
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS (11th ed. 2010). According to the U.S.
Census, 53.6 million people in the United States had some kind of disability in 2010. This
represents approximately 19 percent of the total non-institutionalized U.S. population.
MATTHEW W. BRAULT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 2010, at 4
(2012). Use of the umbrella term people with “mental disabilities” in this Article does not
include people with psychiatric or psychosocial disabilities. For a discussion of the sexual
rights and restrictions for this population, see generally Michael L. Perlin & Alison J.
Lynch, “All His Sexless Patients”: Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Competence to
Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257 (2014) (discussing the existence of a presumption of
incompetence in the context of mental disability and sexuality and arguing against such a
presumption); Michael L. Perlin, Everybody is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain:
Considering the Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of Mental
Disability in Forensic Hospitals and in Asia, 83 WASH. L. REV. 481, 509 (2008) (“[W]e must
take our heads out of the sand and confront the fact that institutionalized psychiatric
patients—like the rest of us—think about sex. . . . It is a fatal error to think otherwise.”).
21 See supra note 19.
22 The Ninth Circuit recently recognized the potential application of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), in cases of sexual assault where
the victim has a mental disability. See Anderson v. Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir.
2004) (Berzon, J., dissenting). Although the majority rejected Lawrence’s applicability to
the facts of the case before the court, Judge Berzon disagreed: “[The statute’s] definition of
‘mentally defective,’ which ultimately determines whether or not [the victim with a
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The Stubblefield case highlights the critical role of evidence law
in resolving legal and factual uncertainties in sexual assault cases
involving people with cognitive disabilities. The New Jersey appellate
court grounded its reversal on the lower court’s misapplication of New
Jersey’s rules on expert testimony and not in any particular policy
argument or concern.  The lower court had excluded evidence of facil-
itated communication as unreliable and, consequently, had sought to
“cleanse the record of controversial FC methodology” without due
attention to potentially exculpatory evidence not rooted in FC
(including potentially highly probative testimony from lay and expert
witnesses on D.J.’s cognitive and functional capacities).23
Furthermore, the Stubblefield case also reveals peculiarities in
the way in which legal institutions and scholars think about sexual reg-
ulation and mental disability. A fundamental descriptive claim in disa-
bility scholarship is that states overregulate the sexual agency of
people with cognitive disabilities through overly-broad sex offense
statutes and risk-averse judicial interpretations of those laws (which
assign criminal liability to sexual partners of certain people with
mental disabilities).24 However, even when these claims are made by
scholars today, this core assertion and its related prescriptions rely on
empirical data that is now two decades old.25 Though this data forms
disability] can legally consent to sex, implicates the sexual liberty interest fleshed out in
Lawrence v. Texas, and therefore does impinge directly on constitutionally protected
conduct.” Id. at 1040. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question of state
statutory definitions and the applicability of Lawrence v. Texas in the context of disability.
23 Stubblefield, 162 A.3d at 1083 (“The factual setting here was extraordinary, and it
called for a liberal admission of evidence supporting defendant’s defense . . . . The jury was
not presumptively gullible . . . [and] did not have to be shielded from employing its
common sense to fairly evaluate the testimony from both sides.”).
24 See, e.g., Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexuality and Incapacity, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201,
1213–23, 1253 (2015) (describing the current case law on incapacity and its effect as
“unduly restrictive” and “contributing to pernicious social norms”); Joseph J. Fischel &
Hilary R. O’Connell, Disabling Consent, or Reconstructing Sexual Autonomy, 30 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 428, 430 (2015) (“We worry that . . . paternalist legislation may
unjustifiably impede persons with disabilities’ wanted sexual relations, reflect the phobic
conjunction of disability with asexuality or pathological sexuality, and reiterate the
common, careless equivalence of disabled adults and children.”); Perlin & Lynch, supra
note 20, at 297 (arguing that the case law “reflects the ongoing infantilization [and
restriction of the sexuality] of women with mental disabilities”).
25 Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV.
315, 349 (surveying the legal landscape, noting that “all tests appear to judge mentally
retarded victims under a higher consent standard than nonretarded victims;”) see, e.g.,
Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexual Advance Directives, 68 ALA. L. REV. 1, 8 n.35 (2016)
(citing Professor Denno’s survey of statutory tests for consent); id. at 27 n.146 (building on
Professor Denno’s work to support conclusion on default rules in sexual consent); Boni-
Saenz, supra note 24, at 1221–22 (discussing Professor Denno’s proposed legal test based
on her survey); Russell L. Christopher & Kathryn H. Christopher, The Paradox of
Statutory Rape, 87 IND. L.J. 505, 536–37 (2012) (relying on Professor Denno’s survey to
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the foundation for much of the prevailing scholarly assumptions that
underscore claims of overregulation—in particular, over-reliance on
standardized evidence and a focus on people with disabilities living in
institutional settings as opposed to community-based settings—it is
outdated and has not been reexamined since its publication twenty
years ago. Since the last major empirical intervention twenty years ago
by Professor Deborah Denno, rape and sexual assault law26 and disa-
bility rights law27 have ushered in new regulatory priorities and nor-
opine on rape in the context of intellectual disability); Elizabeth Emens, Intimate
Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307,
1313 n.9 (2009) (explicitly incorporating empirical and normative work of Professor Denno
from 1997 study); Harris, supra note 9, at 84 (responding to Professor Boni-Saenz’s
prescription in comparison to Professor Denno’s approach in her study); Elizabeth Nevins-
Saunders, Incomprehensible Crimes: Defendants with Mental Retardation Charged with
Statutory Rape, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067, 1101 n.162 (2010) (drawing upon Professor
Denno’s survey in discussion regarding defendants with intellectual disabilities in statutory
rape cases); see also Fischel & O’Connell, supra note 24, at 485–86 (suggesting reforms to
sexual assault law building off of Denno’s work in her 1997 article).
26 Most notably, consent has become the modern bedrock principle driving sexual
assault legislation, a shift away from an earlier analytical and theoretical emphasis on force
and resistance. See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and
Resistance to Reform, 125 YALE L.J. 1940, 1943 (2016) (contextualizing the application of
Title IX to campus sexual assault within a broader history of rape law reform and its
backlash to advance argument that campus adjudication is a positive development);
Allegra M. McLeod, Regulating Sexual Harm: Strangers, Intimates, and Social Institutional
Reform, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1553, 1554–55 (2014) (discussing the regulatory landscape over
time). See also John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, “No” Still Means “Yes”: The Failure of
the “Non-Consent” Reform Movement in American Rape and Sexual Assault Law, 101 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1102–09 (2011) (discussing the requirement of resistance
for rape under the current law of most states); Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-
Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372, 1375–81 (2013) (arguing
that autonomy fails as the governing principle of modern rape law because it cannot be
reconciled with the law’s contempt for a crime of rape-by-deception); Deborah
Tuerkheimer, Rape on and off Campus, 65 EMORY L.J. 1, 40–43 (2015) (arguing that there
is a problematic disconnect between cultural norms of sex and legal definitions of rape and
proposing sexual agency as the theoretical thread); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Sex Without
Consent, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335, 335–41 (2013) [hereinafter Sex Without Consent]
(contending with Rubenfeld’s critique, agreeing with the need for a new governing norm,
but arguing that sexual agency, not “autonomy,” should be the central focus of regulation).
27 For example, twenty-seven years after the promulgation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the federal declaration that disability rights are indeed civil rights, courts
are only beginning to grapple with the notion of disaggregating legal capacity for people
with disabilities—that is, how to develop and apply legal tests for decisional capacity that
more accurately reflect recent research on the fluid and differentiated nature of mental
capacity. Institutions such as plenary guardianship are being challenged as unduly
restrictive of the rights of people with intellectual disabilities and developmental
disabilities, and theoretical conceptions of supported decisionmaking are making their
legislative debuts in statutes and doctrine in the U.S. See, e.g., Supported Decision-Making
Agreement Act, TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357 (West 2015) (recognizing supported
decisionmaking agreements as legally recognized and enforceable alternatives to
guardianship); Harris, supra note 9, at 92–93 (discussing international norms of supported
decisionmaking in U.S. law); Jasmine E. Harris, Processing Disability, 64 AM. U. L. REV.
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mative ideals that call into question the reliability of older data. Thus,
the growing field of disability rights scholarship has an entrenched
conventional wisdom that is premised on an obsolete understanding of
case law and statutes. Reliance on such outdated data has led to a
failure to appreciate how disability fits into these changing norms and
ideals, and how the law has evolved to keep pace with them.
This Article creates a new empirical baseline for modern scholar-
ship on sexual assault and disability and, in doing so, finds that claims
of overregulation—and the over-application of related normative and
prescriptive interventions—are overstated or in need of redirection.28
This Article examines fifty state statutes plus the District of Columbia
and 172 sexual assault and rape decisions (i.e., covering the waterfront
of the last twenty years of publicly available case law) related to cog-
nitive disability and capacity to consent to sex. Based on this new
empirical data, this Article examines and complicates four major
descriptive elements of contemporary legal scholarship on sexual reg-
ulation and mental disability.29
First, this Article revises the claim in existing legal scholarship,
which assumes that the definition of disability is unduly vague in state
statutes without enough legislative guidance to ensure that courts are
not substituting their own moralizing judgments for interpretative
gaps.30 States have moved in the direction of explicit definitions of
disability in incapacity statutes; however, the move to clarify has gen-
erated other problems. Rather than offer much needed guidance on
how to value and weigh functional incapacities such as self-care,
employability, or education, the statutes offer  medical definitions of
disability. A danger in entrenching medical definitions in the statute is
to make the existence of a mental disability more salient in the adjudi-
catory process rather than the more relevant inquiry as to the effects
of the impairment on incapacity to consent.
Second, this new data upends the prevailing understanding that
factfinders are overly reliant on traditional diagnostic sources, such as
intelligence quotient (IQ) or mental age, to resolve questions of con-
sent. Many scholars have claimed that courts overemphasize standard-
ized evidence and should increase reliance on evidence of adaptive
457, 511–14 (2015) [hereinafter Processing Disability] (discussing recent guardianship cases
that seek to limit plenary guardianships).
28 The empirical assessment in this Article suggests that statutory construction in some
states may actually leave people with mental disabilities more susceptible to abuse. See
infra Section III.A. Thus, statutory reforms of existing case law are welcome and
necessary, but are not the sine qua non path to greater recognition of sexual agency for
people with mental disabilities.
29 See infra Section II.C.
30 See infra Section II.A.
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capabilities.31 Results from this Article’s empirical study, however,
show that courts regularly supplement IQ scores and mental age with
evidence of adaptive capabilities, such as self-care, decisionmaking
capabilities in other areas, and communication through assistive tech-
nology.32 Though the prevailing scholarship suggests that reliance on
traditional diagnostic sources may obscure the nuance and variation in
an individual’s capacity to consent, courts that rely instead on adap-
tive capabilities may end up producing the same results. The critical
issue here is the type and weight ascribed to evidence of different
functional capacities (or the lack thereof) because overvaluing certain
kinds of adaptive evidence that have low probative value can be detri-
mental to persons with mental disabilities. For example, what is the
proper weight assigned to the fact vividly repeated to the jury that
D.J. used a “diaper” and could not independently use the restroom?
How probative of sexual consent is his inability to make independent
medical and financial decisions?
Third, this Article exposes misplaced assumptions about the con-
text in which people with mental disabilities experience sexual vio-
lence. Among the cases reviewed, approximately 76% of victims in
sexual assault and rape cases lived with family or independently in
community settings.33 Contemporary scholarship, however, focuses on
people with mental disabilities living in institutional settings or group
homes with more formal care relationships regulated by civil tort
law.34 Recently, several states have added separate criminal provisions
to account for sexual violence within formal care relationships. The
31 See infra Section II.C.
32 This type of adaptive evidence creates a more complex picture of a person’s
capabilities beyond the standardized test scores and could produce a different substantive
outcome in cases. An intelligence quotient (IQ) score measures an individual’s intellectual
functioning. John Matthew Fabian et al., Life, Death, and IQ: It’s Much More than Just a
Score: Understanding and Utilizing Forensic Psychological and Neuropsychological
Evaluations in Atkins Intellectual Disability/Mental Retardation Cases, 59 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 399, 420–26 (2011) (discussing the assessment of adaptive functioning as potential
evidence of intellectual functioning); Leigh D. Hagan et al., Assessing Adaptive
Functioning in Death Penalty Cases After Hall and DSM-5, 44 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
L. 96, 97–101 (2016) (recognizing three broad skill domains for assessment of adaptive
functioning: conceptual, social, and practical adaptive, when analyzing an individual’s
intelligence).
33 See Jasmine E. Harris, Empirical Research on Case Law and State Statutes (Apr. 2,
2018) (unpublished Excel files) (on file with author).
34 Such relationships are regulated under institutional and caregiver liability under
agency theories, malpractice, and professional liability under separate state licensing rules.
See, e.g., Perlin & Lynch, supra note 19, at 287–88 (discussing obligations under tort law
including professional licensing regulations). Sexual violence in institutional settings
presents a host of empirical challenges regarding detection and measurement of incidence
of violence. The point is not to deny the risks of violence, underreporting, and prosecution
on behalf of those in institutional settings, but rather to reveal the underappreciated risks
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cases reviewed illustrate a disconnect between the state’s perception
of sexual violence in these more structured settings and the increasing
violence occurring in more informal settings, including sexual assault
perpetrated by people who sit outside the law’s regulatory reach (e.g.,
people who are not paid caregivers, blood relatives, teachers, or, like
Stubblefield, treating therapists).35 Expanding the diagnostic
periphery in this way reveals unexplored, novel questions about the
types of relationships regulated by the state, the scope of regulation,
and the new realities of community integration, that, if unanswered,
could expose people with disabilities to greater sexual violence with
greater constraints on agency.
Finally, this Article argues that much of the scholarly focus on
whether a person with a disability is competent to testify is missing a
more fundamental question: Does a person with a disability’s decision
to testify bias capacity determinations because factfinders cannot see
beyond the existence of a disability? In direct contradiction of pre-
vailing assumptions, this new empirical data reveal that approximately
88% of persons with mental disabilities in sexual assault cases do tes-
tify.36 Even more striking is that, of those cases, 87.2% returned ver-
dicts finding the victim incapable of consent on the basis of mental
disability. The key question then becomes not whether persons with
disability have access to testify, but rather how to explain the incred-
ibly high percentage of lack of capacity findings when individuals with
disabilities do testify. At least part of the explanation is what this
Article terms the “aesthetics of disability.”37 The aesthetics of disa-
bility can be so powerful that actual testimony by the person with dis-
ability cannot overcome the biases arising from that person’s mere
presence. When the prosecution brought D.J. into the courtroom, the
only possible intended effect could be that jurors would see his signifi-
cant physical disabilities and draw inferences as to his mental capacity
and the propriety of him engaging in sexual conduct. While D.J. did
not take the stand, a particularly telling post-verdict interview with
one of the jurors suggests that the contents of his testimony might not
have mattered. The juror said, “I couldn’t understand why she did it
to those who live outside of institutions where the regulatory structures are more
established and the incidence of violence is significant.
35 Stubblefield’s relationship began within the context of treatment but at some point
she stopped working with D.J. in an official or professional capacity and interacted with
him personally. See supra text accompanying notes 4–6.
36 See infra Section II.C.
37 See infra Section III.C.
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when I did see [D.J.]. . . . I was like . . . ‘You’re going to leave your
husband and your kids for someone like this?’”38
The findings of this Article regarding sex and disability, and the
new empirical survey on which they are based, will advance a budding
field of law that directly implicates the rights of a growing and under-
served population. First, people with disabilities experience sexual
assault or rape at a rate of more than three times that of people
without disabilities.39 Second, an increasing aging population with
temporary or permanent cognitive impairments and people with con-
genital intellectual or developmental disabilities reside in integrated
community settings more often than large-scale institutions such as
nursing homes.40 This creates greater interaction with nondisabled
individuals and highlights the need for the law to properly address
these contexts of interaction.41
38 Bill Wichert, Juror Explains Why Professor Was Convicted of Sexually Assaulting
Disabled Man, NJ.COM (Oct. 3, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2015/10/
why_was_professor_convicted_of_sexual_assaulting_d.html.
39 Rate of sexual assault/rape among people with disabilities is 1.7 per 1000 compared
to 0.5 per 1000 people without disabilities. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, CRIME AGAINST PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, 2009-2014 – STATISTICAL
TABLES 4 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/capd0914st.pdf. Most recently
during an NPR interview, Erika Harrell, a leading BJS statistician and author of the 2016
report, stated that the disaggregated rate for sexual assaults committed against people with
intellectual and developmental disabilities is much higher, at seven times the rate of
nondisabled people. See The Sexual Assault Epidemic No One Talks About, NPR (Jan. 8,
2018), [hereinafter, NPR Interview] https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/
transcript.php?storyId=570224090.
40 See ADMIN. ON AGING, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A PROFILE OF
OLDER AMERICANS: 2016, at 3 (2016) (stating that the population aged sixty-five and over
has increased by thirty percent in the ten-year period from 2005-2015, approximately 47.8
million in 2015, and is projected to more than double by 2060); id. at 14 (reporting that
thirty-five percent of people sixty-five and over reported some type of disability in 2015);
SHERYL A. LARSON ET AL., NAT’L RESIDENTIAL INFO. SYS. PROJECT, UNIV. OF MINN., IN-
HOME AND RESIDENTIAL LONG-TERM SUPPORTS AND SERVICES FOR PERSONS WITH
INTELLECTUAL OR DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: STATUS AND TRENDS 2015, at 12
(2017) (noting that, of the people with Intellectual Disabilities (ID) and Developmental
Disabilities (DD) known to or served by state departments for people with ID/DD,
approximately seventy percent lived in the home of a family member or a home owned or
leased by the individual with ID/DD); JANE TILLY, PROMOTING COMMUNITY LIVING FOR
OLDER ADULTS WHO NEED LONG-TERM SERVICES AND SUPPORT 2–3 (2016) (“Most older
adults who need long-term services and supports live in the community.”).
41 15.2 million people reported some form of cognitive disability in 2010. Note that
Census tracking includes people with one or more mental, physical, or communicative
disabilities. Comorbidity may complicate the data analysis. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra
note 20, at 9. Approximately 1.2 million people had an intellectual disability in 2010;
944,000 had some other developmental disability such as Cerebral Palsy or Autism. The
Census estimates that approximately 2.4 million non-institutionalized persons have
dementia, senility, or Alzheimer’s, or other age-related cognitive disabilities and 3.9
million have some learning disability. Id. Although we do not have an exact measure of the
incidence of non-congenital cognitive disabilities, estimates indicate that approximately 3.2
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This survey and its findings can also help to inform the broader
debate on rape and sexual assault, particularly on university and col-
lege campuses. The law of consent offers a unique window into legal
status, sexual values, and social norms.42 How courts judge sex and
disability is part of a broader normative discussion of how courts
should manage the substantive and procedural imperfections and
ambiguities of consent, and discussions around this area of the law will
directly impact the ongoing national discussion regarding campus
sexual assault.43 The requisite knowledge (and the quality of that
information) to make a legally recognized sexual decision forms the
central legal inquiry for courts in determining whether someone can
consent to sex because of intoxication (a frequent question in the con-
text of college sexual assault)44 or the existence of a long-term disa-
bility.45 In this way, a legal and/or factual inquiry such as “how drunk
is too drunk” begins to look a lot like “how disabled is too disabled”
for consent purposes. The scope of legal inquiry should be one of
degree and not of categorical exclusion on the basis of the impairment
million–5.3 million persons in the United States are living with a TBI-related, non-
congenital mental disability. NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, REPORT TO CONGRESS: TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY IN
THE UNITED STATES: EPIDEMIOLOGY AND REHABILITATION 2 (2015).
42 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Many Faces of Sexual Consent, 37 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 47, 54–55 (1995) (arguing that consent is necessarily contextual and not a simple
question of volition; it is intimately tied to social values with the effect of criminalizing the
behavior that is socially disfavored; for example, sodomy laws criminalized consensual sex
when performed by socially disfavored groups—same-sex partners—but not in the case of
heterosexual partners).
43 See infra Section III.B. (discussing potential implications in the context of
nondisabled individuals with temporary impairments due to drugs or alcohol use or
physical helplessness).
44 See Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, The Conundrum of Voluntary Intoxication and
Sex, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1031, 1045–49 (2017) (discussing judges’ and juries’
misperceptions regarding voluntarily intoxicated victims because they do not fit the
“traditional script about victimhood and criminal perpetration”); Lori E. Shaw, Title IX,
Sexual Assault, and the Issue of Effective Consent: Blurred Lines—When Should “Yes”
Mean “No”?, 91 IND. L.J. 1363, 1414–21 (2016) (discussing varied approaches states have
taken to address sexual conduct that may have been induced by either drug or alcohol use).
45 Some state statutes make no distinction between temporary or permanent mental
impairment and consider intoxication and mental disability under the same incapacity to
consent provisions. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(7)(b) (2015) (“The victim is
incapable of consent by reason of mental disorder, mental defect, drugs, alcohol, sleep or
any other similar impairment . . . and such condition is known or should have reasonably
been known to the defendant. For the purposes of this subdivision, ‘mental defect’ means
the victim is unable to comprehend the distinctively sexual nature of the conduct . . . .”);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(2)(c) (2013) (“Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a
person who suffers from a mental illness or deficiency which renders that person
temporarily or permanently incapable of appraising the person’s conduct, and the
defendant knows of such condition.”); See infra Section II.B (describing the six legal tests
of incapacity used by jurisdictions throughout the country).
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itself. One key cautionary lesson for broader sexual assault discussions
is to recognize that the risk-averse approach—one that resolves the
inherent uncertainties of consent determinations in favor of victim
protection over individual agency—may unnecessarily constrain
agency and, long-term, may create greater vulnerability to sexual vio-
lence. Accordingly, a concept of capacity as fluid, temporal, and thus
contestable, among other disability rights concepts,46 can assist courts
in the resolution of both questions (intoxication and disability) and
highlight the similarities rather than the differences between these two
types of decisional impairment.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses current
claims in legal scholarship regarding sexual regulation and disability,
their empirical foundations, and why scholars have cause for concern
about the state’s regulatory reach. Part II is the empirical heart of this
paper and explores how prevailing scholarly claims fare in the context
of a new survey covering the statutory and jurisprudential landscapes
over the last two decades. Part III seeks to reframe the problem, con-
sidering how the results of the empirical analysis in Part II complicates
the traditional scholarly conversation and examining how information
deficits regarding disability and functional capacity affect the adjudi-
cation process. Reframing the central question in this way opens new
avenues for normative and prescriptive intervention, while also coun-
tering a common argument made by various disability law scholars
that greater specificity from legislatures or judges would cure con-
straints on sexual agency.47
46 Critical disability studies offer potential theoretical and normative principles to
inform judicial resolution of questions regarding consent. See, e.g., Licia Carlson & Eva
Feder Kittay, Why Philosophy and Cognitive Disability?, in COGNITIVE DISABILITY AND
ITS CHALLENGE TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 1–3 (Licia Carlson & Eva Feder Kittay, eds.,
2010) (“[P]eople with cognitive disabilities offer an opportunity to explore the nature and
limits of concepts like justice, rights, respect, care, and responsibility . . . [and also] the
difficult question of how we realize these conceptions in practice given the challenges
presented by those with cognitive disabilities.”); Abby L. Wilkerson, Normate Sex and its
Discontents, in SEX AND DISABILITY 183–207 (Robert McRuer & Anna Mollow eds., 2012)
(discussing the power of non-normative sexual conduct and expressions as an organizing
principle for sexual agency).
47 See Denno, supra note 25, at 394–95 (proposing that courts should apply a
contextual approach to determine consent and provide more specificity in jury instructions
to “limit any potential vagueness inherent in the contextual approach”); Elizabeth J. Reed,
Note, Criminal Law and the Capacity of Mentally Retarded Persons to Consent to Sexual
Activity, 83 VA. L. REV. 799, 822–27 (1997) (proposing that Virginia’s legislature should
develop and adopt an assessment tool that uses a clinical perspective to assess a person’s
capacity to consent to sexual conduct to bring consistency where there has not been clear
professional standards prior).
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I
SEXUAL REGULATION AND MENTAL DISABILITY
This Part addresses existing scholarly claims concerning the
state’s sexual regulation of people with mental disabilities and
explains why the state’s history of sexual regulation justifies present
scholarly concerns.
A preliminary note on sexual consent and criminal law: The law
seeks to protect sexual autonomy primarily through the legal con-
struct of “consent.”48 While contemporary legal scholarship seeks to
define a central governing principle for this body of law, the leading
contenders at the moment are “sexual agency” or “sexual
autonomy”—albeit problematic.49  As a procedural matter, when a
complainant alleges non-consent in sexual assault and rape cases, the
state has the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the
complainant did not consent.50 State law defines non-consent to
include incapacity to consent on the basis of age, consanguinity,
mental disability, physical helplessness, or intoxication.51 State laws do
not consistently define either “incapacity” or “mental disability” as
this study will illustrate.52 The prosecution has the burden of proving
defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s incapacity in some states as an
element of the offense, and thus, beyond a reasonable doubt. In other
states, defendants may affirmatively argue (and must prove by a lesser
standard of proof, often a preponderance of the evidence) that they
48 Feminist legal scholars have written extensively about the notion of “consent”
(implied or express) as inherently flawed based on historically gendered patterns of sexual
violence and oppression that subordinate women through unequal sexual power dynamics
vis-à-vis men. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Substantive Equality: A Perspective,
96 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2011) (discussing the need for a “substantive” approach to gender
dynamics, including examination of gender violence as form of oppression and patriarchy).
49 See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 26, at 1417–23 (asserting the theoretical flaws of
sexual autonomy as the cornerstone of modern rape doctrine); Sex Without Consent, supra
note 26, at 337–41 (asserting that a violation of “sexual agency” and not “sexual
autonomy” is an adequate understanding of rape); see also MODEL PENAL CODE
§§ 213.1–213.6 comment on mens rea for sections 213.1–213.6 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 1 2014) (noting the tension between sexual autonomy and the need for state
regulation and citing to Lawrence v. Texas).
50 See, e.g., Anne E. Melley, § 21 Generally, 31A Ill. Law and Practice Rape and
Related Offenses § 21, in ILLINOIS LAW & PRACTICE (2017) (contending the State has the
burden of proving the issue of consent beyond a reasonable doubt); ROBERT S. HUNTER ET
AL., § 14:10 Consent as Defense, in 1 TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR ILLINOIS LAWYERS -
CRIMINAL § 14:10 (9th ed. 2017) (contending that the “state has a burden of proof beyond
reasonable doubt on the issue of consent”).
51 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.1, 213.4 (AM. LAW INST. 2016).
52 See infra Section II.C (discussing state statutory definitions of incapacity on the basis
of mental disability and proposing a new taxonomy for understanding state regulation in
this area).
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lacked actual or constructive knowledge of the victim’s incapacity to
consent.53
A. The Stakes in Sexual Regulation
It is an uncommon occurrence for the state to regulate private
sexual decisions for nondisabled persons.54 For people with disabilities
whose lives are highly controlled, in part, because of receipt of public
economic supports and services,55 however, sexual regulation is often
a reflexive part of legitimate state regulation of some other area of
their lives. Disability studies scholar Michael Gill offers a personal
example of his work with people with intellectual disabilities in the
context of a “sheltered workshop.”56 The manager of the residential
home notified the private employment day program of two women
53 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-102(e) (2018) (“When criminality of conduct
depends on a victim’s being incapable of consent because he or she is mentally defective or
mentally incapacitated, it is an affirmative defense that the actor reasonably believed that
the victim was capable of consent.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-67(a) (2018) (“[I]t shall be
an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct
constituting the offense, did not know of such condition of the victim.”); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.10(1) (LexisNexis 2018) (“In any prosecution under this article in which the victim’s
lack of consent is based solely upon his or her incapacity to consent because he or she was
mentally disabled, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless, it is an affirmative defense
that the defendant, at the time he or she engaged in the conduct constituting the offense,
did not know of the facts or conditions responsible for such incapacity to consent.”).
54 See Emens, supra note 25, at 1310–11 (“Because we do not police the intimate
domain for discrimination, people are more explicit here about the distinctions they draw
along lines of race, disability, and sex. [However,] the law has required intimate
discrimination with regard to sex and disability.”); Miriam Taylor Gomez, The S Words:
Sexuality, Sensuality, Sexual Expression and People with Intellectual Disability, 30
SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 237, 238 (2012) (“Although sexuality is an integral part of all of
our lives, people with intellectual disability may find sexual expression inaccessible because
of service barriers including institutionalised living, lack of privacy, lack of knowledge
about what sexuality is and opportunities to express themselves.”).
55 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 10–14
(2004) (discussing the reliance of many individuals with disabilities upon a strong social
welfare state and the efforts of disability rights activists to structurally distance supports
and services from medical insurance and entrenchment in the medical profession); Shirli
Werner, Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities: A Review of the Literature on Decision-
Making Since the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD), 34 PUB.
HEALTH REVS. 1, 2 (2012) (“Individuals with [intellectual disabilities] are in need of
specialized, integrated treatment and are provided for by services within the health,
education, and social welfare sectors.”).
56 MICHAEL GILL, ALREADY DOING IT: INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND SEXUAL
AGENCY xi-xiv (2015). A sheltered workshop is a form of transitional employment for
people with intellectual and developmental disabilities that provides training on-site in the
course of employment. Sheltered workshops have been criticized for subminimum wages
and poor conditions serving more as a form of discriminatory employment as opposed to
transitional training. See Susan Stefan, Beyond Residential Segregation: The Application of
Olmstead to Segregated Employment Settings, 26 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 875, 879–80 (2010)
(noting that “[s]heltered workshops are outmoded vestiges of a historical perspective that
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residents who the staff suspected might be engaged in a same-sex rela-
tionship.57 Home staff and family members had raised concerns after
the women were seen holding hands and kissing in their private room
in the group home. The residential staff responded by separating the
women in different rooms, explaining to the women that this behavior
was inappropriate, and notifying the employment program staff to
take precautions and report inappropriate behavior.58 Professor Gill,
who at the time worked as an employee of the sheltered workshop
program, was charged with surveilling and managing the risk of sexual
intimacy between these two women:
Effectively, though we were supposed to provide employment for
these women labeled as intellectually disabled, we were now regu-
lating behaviors not necessarily related to work efficiency. . . . Sexu-
ality was a threat in the workshop [and] was policed based on
assumptions about not only when and where one can be sexual, but
also who can be sexual.59
Although the Supreme Court has not yet decided the constitu-
tional question of whether Lawrence v. Texas60 is applicable to state
criminal regulation of sexual consent, lower courts have recognized
the heightened stakes in cases of state regulation of sexual consent
and mental disability.61 The state has a legitimate interest in sexual
regulation for people with disabilities.62 At the same time, a healthy
body of research concludes that people with mental disabilities are
capable of sexual desires and decisionmaking.63 The central challenge,
then, is how to define the risks and stakes so as to reconcile the state’s
legitimate interests in protection with the interests in sexual agency of
people with disabilities could not be employed in the regular workforce and needed to be
‘sheltered’ in segregated settings”).
57 GILL, supra note 56, at xiii.
58 Id.
59 Id. at xiii–xv. See also PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK SEXUAL POLITICS: AFRICAN
AMERICANS, GENDER, AND THE NEW RACISM 282–89 (2004) (“[T]he cost of safety is to
deny bodily pleasure.”).
60 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
61 See, e.g., Anderson v. Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027, 1037–45 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that the sexual liberty interest established by Lawrence implicated
the mens rea requirement in an Oregon rape statute).
62 Id. at 1033 (“[T]he state [has a] legitimate interest and indeed, duty, to interpose
when consent is in doubt”); People v. Thompson, 142 Cal. App. 4th 1426, 1429 (Ct. App.
2006) (“Obviously, it is the proper business of the state to stop sexual predators from
taking advantage of developmentally disabled people.”).
63 See, e.g., GILL, supra note 56, at xiv (“Although there are active efforts to restrict or
constrain sexual activities of people with intellectual disabilities, individuals are already
sexual in . . . [existing] regulatory spaces.”); Gomez, supra note 54, at 243 (“People with
intellectual disability experience the same range of sexual needs and desires as other
people. With appropriate education and good social support, people with intellectual
disability are capable of safe, constructive sexual expression and healthy relationships.”).
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people with disabilities and their potential partners (with and without
disabilities).
Decisional agency is iterative for people with and without disabil-
ities.64 Access to opportunities to manage decisional risks—to make
good and bad decisions—assists the person in both the process of
making decisions and the outcomes of decisionmaking for the indi-
vidual, and how those decisions are publicly perceived. However,
people with disabilities often lack such access. As a general matter,
the lives of people with disabilities are often highly controlled in insti-
tutional and community settings. Criminal, civil, and professional lia-
bility structures encourage people with disabilities to be risk averse in
decisionmaking, which can itself generate learned helplessness and
vulnerability.65 Such risk aversion is encouraged notwithstanding the
fact that opportunities for decisionmaking are often mundane with
low stakes—e.g., choices of meals, television programs, or clothes to
wear.
In this context, sex is understood as an unnecessary (or less toler-
able) risk of community integration.66 Controlled environments
restrict opportunities for the exercise of sexual expression in the name
64 See, e.g., Charles R. Schwenk, Cognitive Simplification Processes in Strategic
Decision-Making, in 5 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 111 (1984) (noting the iterative process of
decisionmaking in terms of building cognitive capabilities). See Nina A. Kohn, Elder
Empowerment as a Strategy for Curbing the Hidden Abuses of Durable Powers of Attorney,
59 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 27–30 (2006) (explaining how psychologists have long recognized
that an individual’s perceived sense of control over his or her life significantly affects his or
her physical and psychological well-being); Michael L. Wehmeyer et al., Essential
Characteristics of Self Determined Behavior of Individuals with Mental Retardation, 100
AM. J. ON MENTAL RETARDATION, 632, 632–33 (1996) (proposing that self-determined
actions leads to four essential characteristics: autonomy, self-regulation, psychological
empowerment, and self-realization, after conducting interviews with individuals involved
in self-advocacy groups for individuals with mental retardation).
65 See, e.g., Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again): Substituted Decision
Making as a Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157, 167–70 (2010) (describing the loss of the right to
make one’s own decisions such as financial or medical decisions or even traveling freely
and engaging in social interactions and how it can lead to experiencing a loss of control and
a feeling of helplessness); Nandini Devi, Supported Decision-Making and Personal
Autonomy for Persons with Intellectual Disabilities: Article 12 of the UN Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 792, 794 (2013) (explaining that
adaptive behaviors include practical skills such as eating and dressing while emphasizing
the need to recognize the right to make decisions for oneself).
66 See Jacob M. Appel, Sex Rights for the Disabled?, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 152, 152 (2010)
(describing how the public discourse surrounding sex and disability has largely been
focused on protecting vulnerable populations from abuse). See also supra Section I.A and
notes 56–59 (relaying Professor Michael Gill’s experience working as a staff member at a
sheltered workshop with individuals with intellectual disabilities).
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of safety.67 In the absence of information about functional capacities
for sexual expression, the dignity of sexual risks,68 and the positive
value of those expressions to the individual with a mental disability,69
the balance seems to tip decidedly in favor of protection—particularly
given the high incidence of sexual violence against this population.70
However, without opportunities to practice informed decisionmaking
in sex and other matters, people with disabilities are situated in a dan-
gerous catch-22 where they are not afforded sufficient education or
experiential opportunities to understand sexual decisions and their
consequences, but are precluded from engaging in sexual decision-
making—on the basis of that lack of knowledge—by legislatures and
court constructions of capacity to consent. Overregulation in this
67 See Tobin Siebers, A Sexual Culture for Disabled People, in SEX AND DISABILITY 37,
45 (Robert McRuer & Anna Mollow eds., 2012) (discussing how the intimate lives of
disabled men and women in group homes, long-term care facilities, and institutions are
“monitored, documented, and discussed by others”); Appel, supra note 66, at 153 (arguing
reform for the “no sex” policies that exist in nursing facilities, mental hospitals, and group
homes under the assumption that institutionalized individuals require a higher degree of
protection than those living outside of institutions).
68 First used by Robert Perske in his 1972 article about intellectual disability, the
concept of the “dignity of risk” refers to the default risk-averse position taken by the state,
service providers, and family members with respect to the interaction with people with
disabilities. Robert Perske, The Dignity of Risk, in THE PRINCIPLE OF NORMALIZATION IN
HUMAN SERVICES 194, 194–95 (Wolf Wolfensberger ed. 1972) (advocating for
opportunities for people with mental retardation to take risks commensurate with their
functioning). Originally applied in the context of service providers, the concept of the
dignity of risk has a much broader application. Since 1972, it has become a principal
theoretical tool in the disability rights movement and legal scholarship. See, e.g., Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 921, 997–98 (2003) (discussing the “dignity of risk” as a core concept driving the
independent living movement); Denno, supra note 25, at 359 (discussing the “dignity of the
risk” as a philosophical concept in the context of people with intellectual disabilities)
(citation omitted); Fischel & O’Connell, supra note 24, at 486 n.348 (referencing Denno’s
discussion of “dignity of risk” in relation to sexual assault and mental disability); Nevins-
Saunders, supra note 25, at 1102 (referring to the “dignity of risk” in relation to defendants
with disabilities and prosecutions for statutory rape); Salzman, supra note 65, at 179
(discussing “dignity of risk” in relation to guardianship reform); Roy G. Spece, Jr., et al.,
(Implicit) Consent to Intimacy, 50 IND. L. REV. 907, 919–20 (2017) (noting that
“personhood involves the ‘dignity of risk’”); Judith Welch Wegner, The Antidiscrimination
Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 436 (1984)
(discussing the “dignity of risk” in the context of understanding overprotection as a form of
discrimination).
69 See Mitchell S. Tepper, Sexuality and Disability: The Missing Discourse of Pleasure,
18 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 283, 288–89 (2000) (noting that sexual expression is viewed as
less important than provision of services and that without a discourse of sexuality, there is
an experiential poverty that results).
70 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 39 (rate of sexual violence against people
with disabilities is three times that of non-disabled people). See also NPR Interview, supra
note 39 (noting rate of sexual assault for people with intellectual disabilities is seven times
that of nondisabled).
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sense might raise constitutional concerns under Lawrence v. Texas, for
example.71
Sexual regulation in the context of mental disability, therefore,
presents tough questions with high stakes and an abundance of legal
uncertainty for policymakers, courts, and scholars to address. Criminal
law as a site of sexual regulation has been recognized as particularly
problematic. The public safety lens is fraught with risk aversion and
paternalism. Legal scholars have decried the exclusive placement of
rape within criminal law, a site “ill suited to meet the challenges rape
poses,” namely, a deeply-rooted cultural view of “sex as antago-
nistic—something to be taken or won from a partner.”72 The next Sec-
tion discusses current scholarly claims in this area that form the basis
of the empirical study in this Article, and its redirection of the tradi-
tional assumptions.
B. Current Scholarly Claims
The central claim made by legal scholars and scholars in other
disciplines is that the state overregulates the sexual expression of
people with mental disabilities and illegitimately denies people who
should have access to sexual expression the ability to engage in sexual
conduct.73 The empirical baseline for these claims is a comprehensive
71 See Anderson v. Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., dissenting)
(discussing the applicability of Lawrence v. Texas to questions of consent for people with
disabilities).
72 Margo Kaplan, Rape Beyond Crime, 66 DUKE L.J. 1045, 1047 (2017); see also
Melissa Murray, Rights and Regulation: The Evolution of Sexual Regulation, 116 COLUM.
L. REV. 573, 584–85 (2016) (explaining the spread of the criminal framework for regulating
sex into civil law). Yet disability is part of this story of the state’s surveillance and
management of perceived sexual risks.
73 The area of sexual rights and disability is an underdeveloped area of legal
scholarship. Perlin & Lynch, supra note 20, at 300 (“[T]hese substantive topics and the
detrimental laws that do exist remain so under-discussed because we are still so
astonishingly uncomfortable thinking about the questions at hand . . . .”). However, those
scholars who have begun to occupy this space incorporate the claim of overregulation as a
foundational principle without much contestation. See, e.g., Appel, supra note 66, at
152–53 (discussing regulation through denial of sex surrogacy benefits and the, perhaps less
controversial, regulation of access to potential sexual experiences through intimacy and
relationship building); Emens, supra note 25, at 1381–82 (“With disability, the norm is of
desexualization, of isolation and exclusion from the intimate realm altogether. In this
arena, then, state efforts to lift barriers to entry to intimate relationships are in order.”).
See also Fischel & O’Connell, supra note 24, at 430 (“We worry that such paternalist
legislation may unjustifiably impede persons with disabilities’ wanted sexual relations,
reflect the phobic conjunction of disability with asexuality or pathological sexuality, and
reiterate the common, careless equivalence of disabled adults and children.”); Perlin &
Lynch, supra note 20, at 264–65 (“[W]e . . . superimpose a societal presumption of
incompetency—a damaging message[ ] when applied to any aspects of a person with a
mental disability.”). See also Jasmine E. Harris, The Role of Support in Sexual Decision-
Making for People with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 77 OHIO ST. L.J.










      05/24/2018   08:08:34
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\93-3\NYU303.txt unknown Seq: 21 23-MAY-18 16:36
500 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:480
study in 1997 of state statutes and legal tests conducted by Professor
Deborah Denno. In the study, Professor Denno concludes that
women with intellectual and developmental disabilities74 are held to a
higher consent standard than nondisabled women.75 Professor Denno
defends this claim by presenting evidence of state statutes criminal-
izing sexual conduct with a person “incapable of consent” on the basis
of mental disability, and arguing that these statutes are unduly ambig-
uous as exemplified by the failure of all but six of the states to define
consent, as well as the use of ten different terms to define intellectual
disability.76 The ambiguity and conflicting terminology, she argues,
leaves significant discretion to courts to construct legal tests and apply
statutory prohibitions in overly restrictive ways.77 Denno reviewed
twenty years of case law from the 1970s through the 1990s to under-
stand the legal tests employed by courts and the evidence relied upon
to determine incapacity in each case. Prescriptively, she offered a
“contextual approach” for courts to resolve statutory ambiguities with
greater attention to such factors as modern knowledge about intellec-
tual disability, individual attributes beyond the labels of IQ and
mental age, and the specific context of the sexual encounter.78 Statu-
torily, she recommended purging disability from the statutes to make
disability status less relevant to the adjudicative process.79 Professor
Denno’s data became the empirical fulcrum powering broader schol-
arly debates and prescriptive claims for twenty years.
Contemporary scholars continue to base normative and prescrip-
tive claims on Professor Denno’s empirical work, often beginning
FURTHERMORE 83 (2016), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2016/10/
Harris-FINAL.pdf (representing the Author’s own views before this Article regarding
overregulation, based on Denno’s study).
74 Professor Denno uses the term “mentally retarded” rather than the current language
of “individuals with [intellectual and] developmental disabilities” which has since her
article been more widely adopted. Denno, supra note 25, at 321. Professor Denno’s
subsequent work reflects the change in terminology. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, How
Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys Differ in Their Use of Neuroscience Evidence, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 462 n.59 (2016) (acknowledging author’s continued use of “mental
retardation” but acknowledging move in federal law and academia towards new
terminology); see also Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643 (2010) (replacing
references to “mental retardation” in the U.S. Code with “intellectual disabilities”). See
generally AM. ASS’N ON INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES (AAIDD),
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORT
(11th ed. 2010) (noting terminological changes while arguing that the underlying elements
of the definition of intellectual disability has remained largely consistent over time).
75 Denno, supra note 25, at 321.
76 Id. at 341.
77 Id. at 344–49.
78 Id. at 366–73.
79 Id. at 394–95.
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from a descriptive claim of overregulation and concluding with pro-
posals for statutory reforms or revision of the judicial tests to adjudi-
cate legal incapacity. Professor Elizabeth Emens, for example, relies
on the empirical survey work of Professor Denno in support of her
discussion regarding overly restrictive legal interventions in “intimate
discrimination” that shape who can have sex or marry.80 Professor
Boni-Saenz’s recent work also builds on Denno’s study to assert that
current legal tests suffer from a lack of specificity and, as a result,
constrain the sexual autonomy of some individuals with cognitive disa-
bilities who are capable of consent.81 His prescriptive intervention,
“cognition-plus,” offers courts a way to judge consent that accounts
for the existence of a network of decisional supporters who can
account for deficits in independent decisionmaking but nevertheless,
with support, can cure knowledge and processing deficits.82 While
existing interventions remain relevant in understanding the stakes and
challenging conventional wisdom regarding sexual agency and mental
disability (and approaching questions of sexual regulation in more
highly regulated institutional settings), this Article calls upon legal
scholars and decisionmakers to address difficult and underexplored
questions of sexual violence in less-regulated, community settings.
Accordingly, this Article examines the four most common schol-
arly assertions related to overregulation in the context of sexual
assault and rape law. First, scholars contend that the statutes are
unduly vague and either over- or under-emphasize disability without
sufficient legislative guidance for courts.83 The danger, they argue, is
that courts will fill the interpretative voids with illegitimate moral-
izing, such as judging incapacity ex ante based on non-normative
sexual conduct—for example, adultery, non-marital sex, or same-sex
relationships.84 Second, scholars argue that courts over-emphasize the
existence of cognitive disability in their legal and factual determina-
80 Emens, supra note 25, at 1316–17 nn.20–24.
81 Boni-Saenz, supra note 24, at 1216–23.
82 Id. at 1234–44 (discussing the “cognition-plus” test and comparing the test to
Denno’s “contextual approach”).
83 See, e.g., Denno, supra note 25, at 341 (noting that only six states mention consent in
their statutes and that in 1997 every state except Georgia used one of ten different terms to
refer to mental disability); Perlin & Lynch, supra note 20, at 300 (“First, there is no unitary
definition of competency in this area. Often, there are no definitions, and when definitions
exist, they are often circular and contradictory.”). See also Fischel & O’Connell, supra note
24, at 478 (arguing statutes are vague in the other direction, leaving some individuals with
disabilities, such as the victim in State v. Fourtin, 52 A.3d 674 (Conn. 2012), more
susceptible to sexual violence, a point addressed more broadly in this Article).
84 See, e.g., Boni-Saenz, supra note 24, at 1218 (describing New York’s approach which
includes “consideration of the moral quality of the [sexual] act as it would be measured by
society”).
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tions. Cognitive disability is the focal point of the deliberative process
either because of explicit references in the statutory language or
because of an evidentiary overreliance on proxies such as IQ and
mental age or medical diagnoses in making these determinations.85
Third, the primary demographic for current scholarly intervention is
the institutionalized individual with cognitive disabilities. Scholars
emphasize the potential for the greatest marginalization and sexual
violence experienced by individuals with significant disabilities
residing in institutional settings such as nursing homes, hospitals, and
other state-run residential institutions.86 Yet, the extent to which this
contextual setting forms the bulk of cases dealing with sexual consent
and disability may be over-emphasized.87 Fourth, the literature on
procedural justice in rape and sexual assault cases argues that people
with mental disabilities are often denied opportunities to testify in
court and criticizes the overreliance on IQ and mental age as
threshold questions for witness competency.88 More generally, this
85 See id. at 1205 (responding to the overemphasis on the disability in the context of
older adults and proposing a new legal test, “cognition-plus,” that would “grant legal
capacity to adults with cognitive impairments if they are embedded in an adequate
decision-making support network. In other words, the right to sexual expression should not
be withheld due to cognitive impairment alone.”); Nancy M. Fitzsimons, Justice for Crimes
Victims with Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System: An Examination of Barriers and
Impetus for Change, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 33, 78–82 (2016) (discussing overreliance on
IQ testing as a baseline for competency to testify and participate in legal process).
86 See, e.g., Appel, supra note 66, at 152 (“[R]eform is desperately needed [to address]
the ‘no sex’ policies that exist in American nursing facilities, mental hospitals and group
homes. . . . The assumption underlying these restrictions is that anything short of clearly
expressed wishes by a fully competent and rational individual does not fulfil a minimum
standard to consent to sexual relations.”); Hannah Hicks, To the Right to Intimacy and
Beyond: A Constitutional Argument for the Right to Sex in Mental Health Facilities, 40
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 621, 625 (2016) (“[T]here are numerous reasons for one
to conclude that people who are institutionalized on the basis of mental disability are often
more deprived of sexual freedom than people who experience mental disability, but are
not institutionalized, or people who undergo institutional treatment due to physical
disability.”). See also Boni-Saenz, supra note 24, at 1234–43 (explaining the prescriptive
“cognition-plus” legal test in the context of residential institutions); Denno, supra note 25,
at 379 (“An intriguing issue that courts have yet to confront systematically is how sexual
relations among mentally retarded individuals should be regulated in the situational
context of institutions or residential homes.”).
87 This is not to suggest that the rates of sexual violence in institutional settings are less
than that of non-institutionalized individuals. The lack of data, absence of transparency,
and problematic power dynamics create significant obstacles to accurate reporting and
prosecution in non-institutionalized environments. Scholars have cause for concern. The
point is that data now exist to show the rates of violence among those living outside of
institutional settings and that scholars, courts, and policymakers must pay attention to this
group and the regulatory challenges it presents.
88 Fitzsimons, supra note 85, at 78–82 (discussing the overreliance on IQ testing as a
baseline for competency to testify and participate in legal process). The sub-field of
therapeutic jurisprudence pioneered by David Wexler and Bruce Winick emphasizes the
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author’s prior scholarship has emphasized the ways in which the legal
process and institutional design choices deny people with disabilities
opportunities for voice and the performance of agency in public
settings.89
While some of the assertions above do cite to contemporary stat-
utes and judicial interpretations in one or more jurisdictions,90
scholars by and large rely on categorical descriptions of the universe
of statutes, legal tests, and cases from the last comprehensive empir-
ical intervention of twenty years ago.
C. The Roots of Sexual Regulation and Disability
The story of how and when states began to regulate sex and disa-
bility offers insights about the evolution of states’ risk-averse
approach in regulating risk in this area, and why disability scholarship
often roots normative and prescriptive claims skeptical of state inter-
vention.91 The two primary contextual elements that came together to
shape the bounds of state regulation were the political and economic
environments and the evolution of medical science and technology.92
importance of voice as restorative in the adjudicatory process. See, e.g., DAVID B.
WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT 4–5 (1990)
(discussing the definition and importance of therapeutic jurisprudence and its role in legal
processes). International legal scholars have produced significant scholarship on this point.
See, e.g., Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant, More Than an Empty Gesture: Enabling Women
with Mental Disabilities to Testify on a Promise to Tell the Truth, 25 CANADIAN J. WOMEN
& L. 31, 33–40 (2013) (describing the scrutiny applied to the testimony of adults whose
mental capacity is challenged under the Canada Evidence Act); Janine Benedet & Isabel
Grant, Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with Mental Disabilities: Consent,
Capacity, and Mistaken Belief, 52 MCGILL L.J. 243 (2007); Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant,
Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with Mental Disabilities: Evidentiary and
Procedural Issues, 52 MCGILL L.J. 515 (2007).
89 Harris, supra note 27, at 495–503 (arguing that participation in the legal process can
have an anti-stigma effect and generate more positive narratives of agency and disability
than what currently exists in public circulation). See also Annette R. Appell, Children’s
Voice and Justice: Lawyering for Children in the Twenty-First Century, 6 NEV. L.J. 692
(2006) (discussing the representation of children in legal proceedings and procedural
justice considerations).
90 See Boni-Saenz, supra note 24, at 1216–23 (citing to Denno’s categorical
organization of statutes and legal tests but also offering examples of more recent cases on
incapacity); Fischel & O’Connell, supra note 24, at 499 (focusing on Connecticut in an
empirical review not specific to disability).
91 “State regulation” can be direct (e.g., state statutory definitions of who can and
cannot consent to sex) or indirect (e.g., access to contraceptives, restrictions on sexual
conduct in private rooms or spaces, or gender segregation in residential and employment
settings). However, state regulation is more often indirect and less formal, and it takes
shape through attitudes about sex and disability, capabilities of people with mental
disabilities, and definition of appropriate and acceptable risks of sexual conduct. Harris,
supra note 27, at 457.
92 The infusion of evolutionary and medical science into discourse on sex and disability
extends more broadly to sexual assault and rape cases. Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and
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Without engaging in a full historical recitation of the relationship
between people with mental disabilities and the state,93 this section
identifies the interaction between ideological shifts about the nature
of intellectual and developmental disabilities,94 economic and scien-
tific developments, the role of the state, and the institutions of care
that developed in response to these evolving ideas. The state’s default
regulatory position, at least historically, has been a full denial of eco-
nomic rights, bodily autonomy,95 and political rights96 on the basis of
mental disability. State laws and policies designed to regulate the sex-
the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and Prevention, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 827, 831–32
(1999) (discussing the importance of both biological and social theories and research in
rape discourse).
93 The literature on the history of sexual regulation and disability is relatively thin,
though disability studies scholars have more recently begun to engage this history. See, e.g.,
GILL, supra note 56, at 12–22 (discussing the history of sexuality and disability in the
United States); Gomez, supra note 54, at 238 (“Historically, people with disability have
been subject to sexual segregation, sexual confinement, marital prohibition and legally-
sanctioned sterilisation under the guise of patient protection from pregnancy and sexual
abuse.”); Winifred Kempton & Emily Kahn, Sexuality and People with Intellectual
Disabilities: A Historical Perspective, 9 SEXUALITY AND DISABILITY 93 (1991); Abby L.
Wilkerson, Normate Sex and its Discontents, in SEX AND DISABILITY 5–15 (Robert McRuer
& Anna Mollow eds., 2012) (documenting the relatively recent treatment of sex and
disability, explaining the deeply political nature of this subject, and calling for greater
scholarly engagement); Tepper, supra note 69, at 287 (2000) (stating that until recently that
“sexual pleasure in people with disabilities has remained remarkably silent in the disability
advocacy”). See generally TOM SHAKESPEARE, KATH GILLESPIE-SELLS & DOMINIC
DAVIES, THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF DISABILITY 5 (1996) (“[I]t would be fair to say that
issues of sexuality, relationships, and personal identity have also been neglected . . . . It is
not just that ‘the personal is political’, but also that a key area of disabled people’s
experience has been largely ignored.”).
94 Although this Article covers a broad range of cognitive disabilities, the author also
recognizes the distinctions among individuals with the same and different disability
“classifications” included in references to “cognitive,” “mental,” “intellectual,” or
“developmental.” See supra note 20. For purposes of the historical section, this Article
refers to people with “intellectual and developmental disabilities” specifically given the
discriminatory treatment and relative insularity of the group. This history generates
particular narratives of incapacity that become part of the public consciousness and are
applied over time more broadly and without differentiation.
95 For denial of economic rights, see, Robert D. Dinerstein, Implementing Legal
Capacity Under Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities:
The Difficult Road from Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making, 19 AM. U. WASH.
C. L. no. 2, 2012, at 2 (describing how states operate under the assumption that the mere
status of having an intellectual or psychosocial disability provides a sufficient basis to
presume that the individual does not have the legal capacity to participate fully and
autonomously in society, which includes deciding where to live, who to marry if one
chooses to do so, how to spend one’s money, and for whom to vote). For denial of bodily
autonomy, see, for example, Act of March 9, 1907, 1907 Ind. Acts ch. 215 (passing the first
statute that provided for sterilization of “idiots” and “imbeciles” upon recommendation by
a board of experts); 1924 Va. Acts ch. 394 (also known as the “Virginia Sterilization Act of
1924,” which allowed for sterilization of patients afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity
or imbecility upon a board’s opinion that it was for the best interests of the patients and of
society, and was upheld in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)).
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uality of persons with mental disabilities have sought to control risk
(initially the risk of harm to society, then, most recently, a concern
about the harm to the person with a mental disability).97 The means of
control have shifted over time to reflect advances in science, political
theory, and economic developments.98
The dominant rhetoric may have shifted over time but the driving
motivation for control of sexual choices consistently reflects eugenic
fears of reproduction, contagion, and disgust.99 The state had little
interest in regulating the care of people with intellectual and develop-
mental disabilities prior to the late eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries, with the exception of people with mental disabilities who came
into possession of property (primarily land) through inquest or other-
wise.100 Families and non-secular institutions bore the responsibility of
managing the care of family members with mental disabilities.101 The
focus was on the care and management of these family members, and
not inclusion into the broader community. There was a presumption
of incapacity to engage in sex and an almost “automatic” regulation of
96 Dinerstein, supra note 95, at 2 (describing states’ presumption that intellectual
disability precludes legal capacity to participate fully in society, including voting). See, e.g.,
Rabia Belt, Contemporary Voting Rights Controversies Through the Lens of Disability, 68
STAN. L. REV. 1491, 1505–13 (2016) (discussing contemporary voting rights issues facing
people with disabilities); Benjamin O. Hoerner, Note, Unfulfilled Promise: Voting Rights
for People with Mental Disabilities and the Halving of HAVA’s Potential, 20 TEX. J. ON
C.L. & C.R. 89, 107–08 (2015) (describing how states had exclusionary provisions in their
constitutions to exclude citizens with disabilities from voting since the nineteenth century
and well into the twentieth century).
97 See, e.g., Leslie Salzman, supra note 65, at 164 (“The states, however, have often
exercised the parens patriae authority with less concern about the needs of persons with
disabilities, focusing instead on society’s desire to protect itself from those deemed
‘dangerous’ or merely different.”).
98 See id. (discussing the history of public guardianship laws—from the early focus on
control of property owned or inherited by persons deemed incapacitated, to state means of
protection of its citizens from people with disabilities, to contemporary rhetoric of parens
patriae and protection of people with disabilities from abuse and neglect in society.
99 See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Disgust or Equality? Sexual Orientation and Indian
Law, 6 J. INDIAN L. & SOC. 1 (2014) (discussing Nussbaum’s theory of disgust in the
context of a recent decision by the Indian Supreme Court regarding same sex marriage).
100 See generally Harris, supra note 27, at 507–09 (describing the development of
guardianship proceedings for the “management of the property of a person believed to be
legally incompetent”).
101 See Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 809, 816 (1966) (explaining the “older custodial attitude” which entailed
policies of segregation and shelter, and of special treatment and separate institutions). See
also Ellyn S. Kravitz & Carolyn Reinach Wolf, Who Will Stand in My Shoes? When Adult
Children Need Lifelong Support and Supervision, 83 N.Y.S.B.A. J. 37 (2011) (describing
how families of children with disabilities make decisions regarding appropriate housing for
their adult children, post-secondary education, employment, health care and
guardianship).
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sexual behaviors first by families and then, as services decentralized,
by service providers.102
To be clear, people with disabilities have always had sexual
desires and urges as part of the human biological development.103 As
states became more invested in the provision of care to people with
intellectual and developmental disabilities through large-scale institu-
tions,104 the distinction between public and private spaces blurred. Sci-
entific advances in the mid-1800s sparked curiosity about the
personhood of people with intellectual and developmental disabilities
and the potential for science to rehabilitate them as a solution to
growing workforce demands.  The argument for state-sponsored insti-
tutions was rooted in the need for laborers, and couched in terms of
national pride.105
Researchers in the late nineteenth century produced medically-
based taxonomies of mental disability and capacity for the purpose of
identifying the “educable” and “deserving poor” eligible for scarce
government resources.106 These classifications were not devised to
102 See, e.g., Michel Desjardins, The Sexualized Body of the Child: Parents and the
Politics of “Voluntary” Sterilization of People Labeled Intellectually Disabled, in McRuer
& Mollow, supra note 93 (describing how “voluntary sterilization” of people with
intellectual disabilities facilitates the family’s control of their child’s fertility); Siebers,
supra note 67, at 45 (“Group homes and long-term care facilities purposefully destroy
opportunities for disabled people to find sexual partners or to express their sexuality.”).
103 See Perlin & Lynch, supra note 20, at 258 (arguing that individuals with disabilities
“have the same needs for intimate relationships and sexual expression as everyone else”).
In some cases, developmental and comorbid physical disabilities may impair sexual
functioning. See, e.g., Nancy Murphy & Paul C. Young, Sexuality in Children and
Adolescents with Disabilities, 47 DEVELOPMENTAL MED. & CHILD NEUROLOGY 640, 640
(2005) (noting that individuals with disabilities can experience “both functional limitations
and intentional or unintentional societal barriers” to sexual development).
104 Dr. Johann Guggenbühl established Abendberg, the first known residential facility
for persons with intellectual disabilities, in 1841. Abendberg received international
attention as the prototype for institutional care for people with ID/DD. See Chas A. Lee,
Cretinism, 6 PAC. MED. & SURGICAL J. 109, 109 (1863); David Katims, Literacy Instruction
for People with Mental Retardation: Historical Highlights and Contemporary Analysis, in 35
EDUC. & TRAINING IN MENTAL RETARDATION AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 3, 4–5
(2000) (describing how Dr. Guggenbühl conducted systematic literacy instruction for
individuals with mental retardation at Abendberg).
105 Matilda F. Dana, Idiocy in Massachusetts, 15 S. LITERARY MESSENGER 367, 369
(1849), http://www.disabilitymuseum.org/dhm/lib/detail.html?id=1383&page=3. (“Other
countries have shown us that idiots may be trained to habits of industry, cleanliness and
self-respect . . . . Shall we who can transmute granite and ice into gold and silver, and think
it pleasant work, shall we shrink from the higher task of transforming brutish men back in-
to human shape?”).
106 See, e.g., Mary Elizabeth Frederick, Note, Classification of the Educable Mentally
Retarded by Intelligence Testing: A Discriminatory Effect, 30 CATH. U. L. REV. 335, 335–36
(1981) (describing the use of IQ tests to place students into different categories of
handicapped children served by special education classes, including “the educable mentally
retarded”); see also Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics, and the
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ascertain legal capacity but are instructive on the analytical and evi-
dentiary value of these categories. In 1877, the superintendents of sev-
eral public institutions for persons with mental disabilities assembled
for an annual meeting to discuss their work. They recognized the exis-
tence of cognitive disability on a continuum:
[T]he range of idiocy is a wide one. Thus, at one end of the scale is
seen almost the entire absence of manifestations of sensibility, of
intelligence and will [marked by the term ‘idiot’]. At the other end
of the series are to be found cases where, to a casual observation,
the question may arise whether any default in these particulars
exists at all [and these are marked by the terms ‘imbecile’ or ‘weak-
minded’] . . . . Of course, in the popular mind, the line between
these two classes is not well defined; but that is unavoidable, from
the insensible gradation in the mental features of the individuals
composing the whole category.107
Despite this understanding of the gradations of capacity, the
superintendents nevertheless recognized that starker, more adminis-
trable medical labels served heuristic functions for society to under-
stand how to interact with these individuals:
The term idiot, then, however originally used, has acquired a pop-
ular meaning. From my experience, I may say that it is thus used in
a generic sense, covering the whole range referred to. On the other
hand, it is also used in a specific sense, and is then applied to the
lower grades of idiocy, for the reason that in the formation of our
ideas the type of any genus is usually made up of its most marked
characteristics. There is a mental image formed of an individual
thoroughly stamped with the peculiar features of the class. Applying
this to the class before us, it is often said of an individual that he is,
or is not, a complete idiot [but an idiot nonetheless].108
Accordingly, intellectual disability, and the capacity of persons
labeled as such, became popularly understood as a much narrower
range of severe incapacity.
Mentally Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1214–15 (1990) (explaining the
“widespread agreement that mentally retarded persons may be broadly divided into four
categories,” which includes “mildly mentally retarded,” also known as “educable mentally
retarded,” who are those whose abilities are just under the “below average” or
“borderline” rankings for intellectual ability); Anita Silvers, Reconciling Equality to
Difference: Caring (F)or Justice for People with Disabilities, 10 HYPATIA 30, 44 (1995)
(distinguishing the “undeserving, willfully malfunctioning poor” from the “deserving
poor,” which encompasses disabled individuals “who would have worked but for their
unfortunate impairments”).
107 H.B. Wilbur, The Classifications of Idiocy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF
MEDICAL OFFICERS OF AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS FOR IDIOTIC AND FEEBLE-MINDED
PERSONS 29–30 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Company 1877), http://
www.disabilitymuseum.org/dhm/lib/detail.html?id=1794.
108 Id.
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U.S. courts struggled during these years to define the law’s appli-
cability to persons with intellectual disabilities. Early cases recognize
persons with intellectual disabilities as “people” subject to the law’s
protection.109 In State v. Crow, for example, the question presented
was whether the law of rape applied to people with intellectual disa-
bilities.110 The defendant argued that the law did not apply because
people with intellectual disabilities lacked the requisite “will” neces-
sary for the crime of rape. The court rejected the defendant’s argu-
ment and, drawing upon ordinary definitions and medical
understanding of the term “idiot,” reasoned that “an idiot cannot be
said to have no will, but a will weakened and impaired, a will acting,
but not acting in conformity to those rules, and motives, and views,
which control the action of the will in persons of sound mind.”111 Sim-
ilarly, in State v. Schlichter,112 as regards the defendant’s mens rea, the
court noted:
It would not be enough to show merely that [the victim] was weak-
minded, and that the defendant knew that she was so. The mere fact
that a woman is weak-minded does not disable her from consenting
to the act. So long as the woman is capable of consenting, and does
consent, the act is not rape, and this is true though the man may
know that she is of weak intellect.113
Perhaps motivated less by a concern for the suppressed agency of
the woman with a mental disability114 and more by the desire to
minimalize criminal liability for defendants who have sex with dis-
abled women, courts at this time—at least rhetorically—emphasized
the need to show, as a matter of proof, more than the existence of a
109 While common law recognized people with disabilities as subject to the law’s
protection, the cases did not address affirmative questions of legal personhood, i.e., when
people with disabilities could exercise agency without state interference, an open question
today.
110 1853 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 58, at *5 (1853).
111 Id. at *6 (emphasis removed). Interestingly, this case had to resolve whether a
statutory definition of rape that used the term “insane” included idiot. The court
distinguished “insanity” from “idiocy” based on inception and the former being a
perversion of the will, not the impairment of it. Yet the court ultimately concluded that the
term “insane” is sufficiently broad to include “idiots.” Id. But see People v. Crosswell, 13
Mich. 427, 437 (1865) (distinguishing State v. Crow by noting that not all sex with a person
with intellectual or developmental disabilities is rape because the prosecution must prove
either force or fraud to show that it was against the woman’s will).
112 263 Mo. 561 (1915).
113 Id. at 574.
114 Antiquated statutory definitions of rape were gendered and assigned criminal
liability to a male for “carnal knowledge” of a female. See generally RANDY THORNHILL &
CRAIG T. PALMER, A NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE: BIOLOGICAL BASES OF SEXUAL
COERCION 153–57 (2000) (discussing the ways in which biology and gender influenced legal
constructions of rape).
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mental disability to deny sexual agency. Over time, the cases reflect a
greater focus on special protection and inherent vulnerability because
of mental disability.115
The growth of industrialization and urbanization further
marginalized those with more significant mental disabilities who could
not participate in the workforce. Social narratives of deficient genetic
composition surrounded people with intellectual and developmental
disabilities as society associated this group with crime and degeneracy
more broadly.116 By 1912, “nature” dominated “nurture.” The work of
Henry Goddard in heredity and the societal dangers associated with
cognitive disability became increasingly popular.117 Goddard’s legacy
includes use of emerging scientific measures of intelligence, most
notably the intelligence quotient (IQ), as a means of identifying “fee-
blemindedness” and justifying the exclusion of politically undesirable
immigrants from entry into the United States.118 Later, this same
rationale (and assessment tool) was used as a justification for
assigning second-class citizenship to women, African Americans,
Latinos, Asians, and Native Americans.119
Interestingly, despite widespread use by legislators, several early
court decisions expressed a degree of skepticism about the use of
medical tests to capture legal capacity. For example, in Delafield v.
Parish, a probate matter concerning testamentary capacity, the court
115 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-102 (a) (b) (West 2016) (special protection for
“elderly” and other vulnerable individuals); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1 (West 2016)
(sexual assault by persons with supervisory or disciplinary authority); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 18-1505B (West 2017) (separate code provision for prosecution of crimes against
vulnerable adults).
116 See, e.g., A.O. WRIGHT, The Defective Classes, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTION 222 (Isabel C. Barrows, ed. 1891)
(proposing the classification of “defective classes, depending upon the three divisions of
the mental faculties which are generally accepted by psychologists,” and noting that
“[i]nsanity and idiocy are different forms of defective intellect,” “[c]rime and vice are
caused by defect of the emotions or passions,” and “pauperism is caused by defect of the
will”).
117 Two Immigrants Out of Five Feebleminded, in 38 THE SURVEY, 528, 528–30 (1917)
(discussing the results of Henry H. Goddard’s research published in the Journal of
Delinquency in September 1917).
118 See id.
119 See, e.g., LEILA ZENDERLAND, MEASURING MINDS: HENRY HERBERT GODDARD
AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE TESTING (1998) (chronicling the history of
Goddard, his work, and the controversy over measuring intelligence over time); Jay
Dolmage, Disabled upon Arrival: The Rhetorical Construction of Disability and Race at
Ellis Island, 77 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 24, 54 (2011) (“The attitudes incubated or
accelerated at Ellis Island led to the eugenic ‘racial knowledge’ that can be seen clearly in
[leading scientific texts.] . . . The use of terms such as ‘moron’ and ‘feeble-minded,’ applied
nimbly for eugenic purposes, created the rhetorical potential for . . . a lexicon of eugenics
into the American psyche.”).
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cautioned against the overreliance on medical science to determine
what is fundamentally a complex, uncertain state:
If a medical witness comes to the conclusion, from the mental mani-
festations of an individual, that his mind is disordered; that he is
insane or imbecile, and from that infers that his brain is diseased,
and then tells us that this disease of the brain must necessarily
destroy the intellectual powers, we have gained nothing whatever
from medical science: we have simply reasoned in a circle. We had
arrived at the end of the inquiry as to mental capacity, before
touching upon the connection between the mind and the brain,
which connection alone brings the question within the scope of that
science. . . . [I]n so far as [medical opinions] rest upon the evidence
going to show a want of intellect directly, and not merely as the
result of disease of the brain, they derive very little, if any, addi-
tional force from the professional education of the witnesses.120
At least some courts seemed less inclined (in the early twentieth cen-
tury) to use the existence of a disability alone as a proxy for incapacity
to consent. Ironically, some early rhetoric sounds more nuanced than
many of the modern cases.121
By the early 1900s, public justifications for the sterilization of
people identified as intellectually disabled increasingly surfaced. Med-
ical professionals and scholars suggested that sexuality exacerbates
the existing nervous system impairments of persons with intellectual
and developmental disabilities;122 that the removal of “this vicious
tendency”123 would make the individual more “docile and amenable
120 Delafield v. Parish, 25 N.Y. 9, 115–16 (1862).
121 Compare Stephenson v. State, 48 So. 2d 255, 259 (Ala. Ct. App. 1950) (reversing
lower court’s finding of incapacity to consent to sex on insufficiency grounds: “[T]he
evidence relating to the mental impairment of [twenty-seven year-old complainant] was
deducible solely from the fact that, although she attended school for a number of years, she
reached adulthood without the ability to read and write and tell the time of day . . . .”) and
Metzger v. State, 565 So. 2d 291, 292 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (affirming lower court finding
of twenty-nine year-old complainant’s incapacity to consent on sufficient evidence
including living with her mother, attendance at “school for mentally retarded” for seven
years, incapacity to spell, unemployment, and receipt of social security benefits).
Nevertheless, even early courts used mental disability as a proxy for incapacity to consent
to sexual intercourse and other forms of sexual expression deemed precursors to sex itself.
Cf. Liebscher v. State, 69 Neb. 395, 400 (1903) (“It was not the intention of the legislature
that a female under twelve years of age . . . should be protected from an accomplished act
of seduction, but left entirely unprotected from all of the defiling acts of the seducer that
lead up to her seduction.” (internal citations omitted)).
122 S.D. Risley, Is Asexualization Ever Justifiable in the Case of Imbecile Children,
DISABILITY HISTORY MUSEUM, http://www.disabilitymuseum.org/dhm/lib/detail.html?id=
1391&page=all (last visited Apr. 4, 2018) (“The baneful influence of the abnormal sexual
dominance which characterizes the lives of these persons manifests itself in aggravating the
nervous disorders already existing.”).
123 Id.
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to efficient training”;124 that sterilization would allow for greater
freedom and interaction with others;125 and that it would eliminate the
“burden” placed on the individual to be a “menace to succeeding
generations.”126
More than thirty states enacted compulsory sterilization laws in
the first three decades of the twentieth century that resulted in the
sterilization of more than 60,000 individuals labeled “mentally defi-
cient.” In addition to sterilization laws, thirty-nine states passed legis-
lation restricting the ability of persons with mental disabilities to
marry.127 In Buck v. Bell, the most widely known example of a case
discussing this issue, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of Virginia’s mandatory sterilization law.128 Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. offered his unfettered support for Virginia’s compulsory
124 Id.
125 Current debates on sterilization in bioethics and family law concern the bounds of
voluntary sterilization as a form of contraception where parents or legal guardians argue
that sterilization affords greater sexual agency to minors and adults with mental disabilities
who are freed from the burdens of reproduction and parenthood and receive the intimate
connections desired. Compare In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 486 (N.J. 1981) (articulating the
stakes in cases that are neither compulsory by the state or voluntary in a traditional sense
and noting that if the individual with a mental disability “can have a richer and more active
life only if the risk of pregnancy is permanently eliminated, then sterilization may be in her
best interests”), with In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 821 (1990) (recognizing that exercise of
state power to order the non-consensual sterilization of an individual must be carefully
scrutinized, as sterilization “destroys an important part of a person’s social and biological
identity, can be traumatic for the individual, and can have long-lasting detrimental
emotional effects” (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also Ariela R. Dubler, Sexing
Skinner: History and the Politics of the Right to Marry, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1348, 1365
(2010) (situating sterilization and birth control debates as part of the same political and
rhetorical history); Eva Feder Kittay, Forever Small: The Strange Case of Ashley X, 26
HYPATIA 610, 610–11 (discussing a case about the voluntary sterilization and reproductive
management of a six-year-old girl with cognitive disabilities by her parents).
126 Risley, supra note 122, at 97.
127 Many of these laws stayed on the books until as recently as the 1970s and remain on
the books in other contexts such as voting. See, e.g., Rabia Shahin Belt, Mental Disability
and the Right to Vote 1–2 (2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan University)
(on file with author) (nearly forty states continue to disenfranchise people with mental
disabilities based on this status and a minority of states continuing to employ archaic terms
such as “idiot” and “imbecile”); Kay Schriner & Lisa Ochs, “No Right is More Precious”:
Voting Rights and People with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 11 POL’Y
RESEARCH BRIEF 1, 4 (2000) (discussing statutory changes to purge antiquated
proscriptions on voting for “idiots” and “imbeciles” and others mental disabilities); see also
Brooke Pietrzak, Marriage Laws and People with Mental Retardation: A Continuing
History of Second Class Treatment, 17 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 1, 2 (1997) (stating that
as of 1997, thirty-three states still had laws that limited or restricted the rights of people
with mental disabilities to marry); Perlin & Lynch, supra note 20, at 279–89 (discussing
court decisions on capacity to marry and key issues in this area of law).
128 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927); see also ADAM COHEN, IMBECILES: THE SUPREME COURT,
AMERICAN EUGENICS, AND THE STERILIZATION OF CARRIE BUCK (2016) (describing the
history of and politics surrounding Buck v. Bell).
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sterilization law and the state’s broad regulatory authority over the
bodies and minds of individuals with intellectual and developmental
disabilities: “It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to exe-
cute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind.”129
Though early eugenics laws emphasized the dangers of heredity
as the primary impetus for compulsory sterilizations in public institu-
tions, the scope of constitutionally permissible sterilizations expanded
over time to include those in community, as opposed to only in institu-
tional, settings. For example, courts ratified the decisions of parents
and guardians to sterilize minors living in non-institutionalized
settings.130
The use of disability diagnoses (particularly ones related to
mental disabilities) as heuristic tools to judge the individual’s func-
tional capabilities is a part of broader etiological efforts to define disa-
bility. These etiological debates concern the relationship between an
actual physical or mental impairment and its disabling effect, that is,
how societies design choices of institutions, places of public accommo-
dations, services, programs, and resource allocation make the exis-
tence of an impairment disabling to the individual.131 This particular
history generated an almost impenetrable presumption of incapacity
based on the mere existence of a mental disability, even though “[t]he
lack of capacity often has less to do with a person’s inherent limita-
tions than with societal attitudes that limit opportunities to make
choices and to receive guidance and training in making those
choices.”132 It is this history to which current disability scholarship
129 Buck, 274 U.S. at 207; see also Smith v. Wayne, 231 Mich. 409, 415 (1925) (“Under
the existing circumstances it was not only its undoubted right, but it was [the state’s] duty
to enact some legislation that would protect the people and preserve the race from the
known effects of the procreation of children by the feeble-minded, the idiots and the
imbeciles.”).
130 See, e.g., Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 366–69 (D. Conn. 1978) (holding statute
unconstitutional by allowing parents of children in state facilities rights to sterilize not
afforded to parents of non-institutionalized children).
131 See, e.g., Harris, Processing Disability, supra note 27, at 488–89 n.133 (2015)
(discussing scholarly literature on the “social model” of disability). Harlan Hahn has
written thoughtfully and deeply about a range of conceptions of disability both imposed
upon people with disabilities and those actively adopted. See, e.g., Harlan Hahn,
Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or Biased Reasoning?, 21 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 166, 168–72 (2000) (distinguishing between “disability” and “impairment”
and economic and medical views of disability in contrast to “disability” as a social and
political identity).
132 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CRIME VICTIMS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
REPORT OF A WORKSHOP 42–43 (Joan Petersilia, Joseph Foote & Nancy A. Crowell eds.,
2001).
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responds with caution, and which motivates greater normative aware-
ness by legislatures and courts that the existence of a mental disability
alone should not dictate the law’s prohibitions on sexual consent. Part
II, which follows, tests the four common scholarly assertions discussed
in Section B above.
II
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF SEXUAL CONSENT AND
DISABILITY
This Part responds to four common claims established in Part I.
The core empirical contribution of this Article, Part II directly chal-
lenges three of the four assertions—(1) that courts over-rely on IQ or
mental age; (2) that victims reside in institutional settings; and (3) that
people with mental disabilities do not testify—and revises a fourth
assertion—(4) that the incapacity statutes are unduly vague. Part II
begins with an examination of the statutes concerning incapacity and
current legal tests to contextualize current scholarly claims. How do
state statutes define incapacity to consent on the basis of mental disa-
bility? What guidance do statutes offer courts in judging consent? The
author concludes that states have amended incapacity statutes in
search of greater specificity; however, that specificity has relied on
medical definitions of disability that raise new issues with respect to
judicial interpretation and application. Thereafter, Part II presents
select findings from the empirical review of twenty years of caselaw in
this area to refute the existing empirical baseline informing the
remaining three scholarly assertions discussed in Part I.
A. Statutory Landscape
Claims of overregulation rest on assertions of vague statutory lan-
guage regarding incapacity to consent. Thus, this study first analyzes
statutory structure and language with respect to incapacity to consent
across all states and the District of Columbia over a twenty-year
period from 1997 to the present.133 The goal was to understand the
legal definitions of incapacity and what baselines, if any, they offered
courts to judge incapacity based on mental disability.
1. A New Structural Taxonomy
States define incapacity to consent based on roughly four catego-
ries of legal impairments: age, consanguinity, physical incapacity, and
mental incapacity. The first two categories offer relatively clear,
133 The author used January 1, 1997 as the starting date for statutory analysis to account
for the last comprehensive assessment published in 1997 by Deborah Denno.
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administrable rules for court resolution: state definition of minimum
ages and degrees of familial relationships.134 The latter two categories
present the greatest challenges for legislatures and courts in both the
construction of the offense and its application to individuals. Physical
helplessness or incapacity in most states includes a state of uncon-
sciousness due to intoxication or otherwise, but also includes physical
incapacitation because of a disability. A critical question is whether
the person could voluntarily consent (and express any consent) under
case-specific circumstances. Mental incapacity is often divided
between temporary incapacitation because of intoxication (not uncon-
sciousness) or the presence of a long-term or permanent mental disa-
bility—both, with the broadest brush stroke, turn on the question of
whether the impairment (intoxication or disability) prevented the
person from making a voluntary and informed choice to engage in
sexual conduct. This Article focuses on the ways statutes capture inca-
pacity for the latter group of individuals with long-term or permanent
cognitive disabilities.135
FIGURE 1. INCAPACITY STATUTES ACROSS 50 STATES AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AS OF OCTOBER 2017
Disability-Neutral  
(6 states + D.C.) 
Disability-Specific  
(18 states) 
Disability-Defined (30 states) 
Colorado California* Alabama New Mexico 
District of Columbia Idaho (2003) Alaska New York (2000) 
Georgia Indiana (2013, 2014) Arizona (1998) North Carolina (2002) 
Illinois Iowa (1999) Arkansas (2001) Oregon (2017) 
Nebraska Kansas California* Rhode Island (1999) 
Nevada Maine Connecticut (2013) South Carolina (2006)  
Ohio* Massachusetts (2010) Delaware (2009) Tennessee 
 Missouri Florida Texas (2015) 
 New Hampshire (2012) Hawaii (2006) Utah** (2018) 
 New Jersey (2011, 2013) Kentucky (2012) Vermont (2006) 
 New Mexico  Louisiana (1997) Virginia 
 North Dakota Maryland (2016) Washington 
 Ohio* Michigan (2000) West Virginia 
 Oklahoma Minnesota Wisconsin* 
 Pennsylvania Mississippi  
 South Dakota Missouri  
 Wisconsin* Montana (2015)  
 Wyoming** (2018)   
    
* State has more than one type of statutory structure within sex offense statutes 
** Pending legislation 
(Parenthetical references refer to the year that the state changed its definition or added 
greater specificity to provisions on incapacity on the basis of mental disability if amended 
between 1997–2017) 
134 Or through a legally recognized affinity such as a step-parent through marriage.
135 See also infra Section II.B (discussing the potential for under-regulation of sexual
relationships).
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Figure 1 above provides a new organizing taxonomy for state stat-
utory provisions on incapacity to consent applicable to people with
mental disabilities.136 Structurally, state incapacity provisions can be
organized into three categories, from least disability-specific to most:
(1) disability-neutral, (2) disability-specific (enumerating disability
without defining it), and (3) disability-defined (enumerating disability
and defining it). At the broadest level, disability-neutral statutes do not
mention disability in either the substantive offenses or any separate
statutory definitions. Incapacity is defined as an inability to under-
stand the nature and/or consequences of one’s conduct regardless of
the underlying cause and temporal nature of that incapacity. For
example, Colorado’s sexual assault statute reads: “Any actor who
knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration on a victim
commits sexual assault if: . . . [t]he actor knows that the victim is inca-
pable of appraising the nature of the victim’s conduct.”137 The
emphasis is on the victim’s ability to understand the sexual act and
make an informed decision in the moment, regardless of the under-
lying reason for potential incapacity. Five states and the District of
Columbia have similar disability-neutral sex offense statutes.138
Although Professor Denno called for states to expunge disability from
the criminal sex offenses,139 most states have not adopted this pre-
scription. Instead, states have opted for more robust descriptions of
disability in the statutory provisions, with most of the statutory
amendments occurring in the past ten years.140
The second type of incapacity statute, disability-specific (enumer-
ated), mentions disability within the substantive offense but offers no
additional statutory guidance.141 California’s statute, for example,
136 Some states employ a mix of subtypes in their criminal sexual offenses. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(1) (West 2017) (rape); § 261.5 (sex with minors); § 286 (g)–(h)
(sodomy); § 243.4(b)–(c) (sexual battery).
137 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-402(b) (West 2017).
138 See id; Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1 (2011)); Illinois (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/
11-1.20(a)(2) (2016)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319(1)(a), (b) (2006); Nevada
(NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.366(1)(a) (2015)). For complete statutory analysis, see Jasmine E.
Harris, Sexual Consent and Disability, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. online app. (2018), http://
www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-93-1-Harris.pdf.
139 Denno, supra note 25, at 342–43.
140 See supra, Figure 1.
141 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(1) (West 2013); IDAHO CODE § 18-6101(3) (2016);
IND. CODE § 35-42-4-1(3) (2014); IOWA CODE tit. 17-A § 709.1(A) (2017); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-5503(a) (2018); ME. STAT. § 253(2)(C) (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 22
(a) (LexisNexis 2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(h) (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:14-2(a)(7) (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-07(1)(b) (2017); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(c) (LexisNexis 2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1114(A)(2) (2017); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121(a)(5) (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-1(3) (2016); WIS.
STAT. § 940.225(2)(g), (2)(j), (3), (3)(m), (4)(b) (2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-302(a)(iv)
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defines rape as “[when] a person is incapable, because of a mental
disorder or developmental or physical disability, of giving con-
sent . . . .”142 Similarly, Kansas’s statute enumerates disability without
separately defining it: “Rape is . . . [k]nowingly engaging in sexual
intercourse with a victim when the victim is incapable of giving con-
sent because of mental deficiency or disease. . . .”143
The third type of incapacity statute present in a majority of states,
disability-specific (defined), excludes people who meet the statutory
definition of “mentally defective” or its progeny from providing effec-
tive legal consent to sex. For example, in Alabama, “[a] person com-
mits the crime of rape in the second degree if . . . [h]e or she engages
in sexual intercourse with a member of the opposite sex who is inca-
pable of consent by reason of being mentally defective” and
“[m]entally [d]efective . . . means that a person suffers from a mental
disease or defect which renders him incapable of appraising the nature
of his conduct.”144
2. Qualitative Review of Statutes
A qualitative analysis of the statutes reveals that legislatures are
struggling to contextualize legal incapacity on the basis of disability
and, with some exceptions, have sought greater statutory clarity in the
form of additional definitions and qualitative language to direct courts
away from using the existence of disability as a proxy for incapacity.
There is no single, common construction of legal incapacity across
states. Most states do not enumerate baseline functional capacities for
(2018). Ohio and Wisconsin have a combination of subtypes within their sex offense
statutes. For complete statutory analysis, see Harris, supra note 138.
142 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(1) (2013). Note that although California references
disability specifically within its rape statute, sexual assault is a general, disability-neutral
statute. California and other states employing this subtype of incapacity provision,
particularly in defining rape, may be responding to former criticism of sexual violence
prohibitions that provided protections for particularly vulnerable groups under lesser
criminal offenses, such as “abuse,” rather than characterizing and punishing such acts as
more violent and serious criminal offenses.
143 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(a)(2) (West 2017).
144 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-62(a)(2) (2017); id. § 13A-6-60(5) (2017). The statute includes
separate provisions for temporary incapacity due to intoxication or other reasons. See, e.g.,
id. § 13-A-6-70(3)–(4) (“A person is deemed incapable of consent if he is . . . [m]entally
incapacitated . . . or . . . [p]hysically helpless.”); id. § 13-A-6-60(6) (“[M]entally
incapacitated . . . means that a person is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or
controlling his conduct owing to the influence of a narcotic or intoxicating substance
administered to him without his consent . . . .”); id. § 13-A-6-60(7) (“[P]hysically helpless
. . . means that a person is unconscious or for any other reason is physically unable to
communicate unwillingness to an act.”).
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an individual to consent to sex;145 rather, statutes articulate some skel-
etal version of the “nature and consequences test”146 and, in some
instances, functional capacities can be extracted from negative state-
ments about what incapacity looks like. Thus, an ability to understand
or appraise sexual conduct includes the ability to discern: its “dis-
tinctly sexual” nature in Arizona,147 “potential for harm to that
person” in Alaska,148 the “quality” of the conduct in Mississippi,149
“lewd and lascivious conduct” in Vermont,150 or, generally, ability to
evaluate the “nature of the person’s own conduct” in Montana.151 The
ability to give “knowing” and “voluntary” consent includes: acting
“freely and voluntarily and hav[ing] knowledge of the . . . transaction
involved” in California,152 understanding that the individual has a
right to say no or withdraw consent in Maine,153 the ability to “freely
arrive[ ] at an independent choice as to whether or not to engage in
sexual conduct” in New Hampshire,154 and the ability to “apprais[e]
145 While perhaps more administrable, this would create other problems with respect to
who has or can develop these functional capabilities and require explicit normative
statements that would likely prove politically impossible or undesirable.
146 “Nature and consequences” refers to a person’s inability because of disability or
other impairment to understand or appraise the nature and consequences of the sexual act.
See infra Part II.B (discussing the judicial tests that have developed at common law).
147 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(7)(b) (2017) (“For the purposes of this
subdivision, ‘mental defect’ means the victim is unable to comprehend the distinctively
sexual nature of the conduct or is incapable of understanding or exercising the right to
refuse to engage in the conduct with another.”).
148 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.41.470(4) (West 2017) (“‘[M]entally incapable’ means
suffering from a mental disease or defect that renders the person incapable of
understanding the nature or consequences of the person’s conduct, including the potential
for harm to that person.”).
149 MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-97(b) (West 2017) (“‘[M]entally defective person’ is one
who suffers from a mental disease, defect or condition which renders that person
temporarily or permanently incapable of knowing the nature and quality of his or her
conduct.”).
150 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3254(2)(A), (D) (West 2017) (defining a person acting
without consent as having knowledge that the other person was “mentally incapable of
resisting, or declining consent to, the sexual act or lewd and lascivious conduct, due to a
mental condition or a psychiatric or developmental disability”).
151 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(40) (West 2017) (“‘Mentally disordered’ means that a
person suffers from a mental disease or disorder that renders the person incapable of
appreciating the nature of the person’s own conduct.”).
152 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 2017) (“‘[C]onsent’ shall be defined to mean
positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will. The person must
act freely and voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction
involved.”).
153 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253(2)(C) (2017) (“‘Mental disability’ . . . which in
fact renders the other person substantially incapable of appraising the nature of the contact
involved or of understanding that the person has the right to deny or withdraw consent.”).
154 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(h) (2017) (“When . . . the victim has a disability
that renders him or her incapable of freely arriving at an independent choice as to whether
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the nature of his or her conduct,” “resist[ ],” “and communicate
unwillingness to submit to the act” in North Carolina.155 The ability to
exercise “judgment” includes: “know[ing] the right and wrong of con-
duct in sexual matters” in Iowa156 and the ability to give “a reasoned
consent” in Minnesota.157
Many state definitions of incapacity adopt a conception of mental
disability that privileges medical expertise in its assessment and identi-
fication.158 By privileging medical definitions and diagnostic catego-
ries of disability, states legislate the scope and content of relevant
evidence and preferred expertise.159 Whether an individual has a
“mental disease or defect that renders them incapable” of under-
standing the sexual decision and its consequences also generalizes the
inquiry,160 making it about whether X diagnosis manifests in impaired
or not to engage in sexual conduct, and the actor knows or has reason to know that the
victim has such a disability.”).
155 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-27.20(1) (West 2017) (“Mental disorder . . . which
temporarily or permanently renders the victim substantially incapable of appraising the
nature of his or her conduct, or of resisting the act of vaginal intercourse or a sexual act, or
of communicating unwillingness to submit to the act of vaginal intercourse or a sexual
act.”).
156 IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.1(2) (West 2017) (“Such other person is suffering from a
mental defect or incapacity which precludes giving consent, or lacks the mental capacity to
know the right and wrong of conduct in sexual matters.”).
157 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341(6) (West 2017) (“‘Mentally impaired’ means that a
person, as a result of inadequately developed or impaired intelligence or a substantial
psychiatric disorder of thought or mood, lacks the judgment to give a reasoned consent to
sexual contact or to sexual penetration.”).
158 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(a) (West 2017) (defining “cognitive
disability” as “developmental disability . . . including, but not limited to, delirium,
dementia and other organic brain disorders for which there is an identifiable pathologic
condition, as well as nonorganic brain disorders commonly called functional disorders . . .
[and] mental retardation, severe cerebral palsy, and any other condition found to be
closely related to mental retardation”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.060(1)(a) (West 2017)
(“person who is incapable of consent because he or she is an individual with an intellectual
disability”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-301(f) (West 2017) (defining a “substantially
cognitive impaired individual” as one who “suffers from an intellectual disability or a
mental disorder”).
159 See, e.g., Warren v. Kentucky, No. 2003-SC-0138-MR, 2004 WL 2364478, at *5–6 (Ky.
Oct. 21, 2004) (addressing relevance of evidence of disability diagnosis—e.g., testimony
that the victim received social security benefits and had a representative payee, and that
victim received special education services while she was a student—and finding the
evidence relevant even though the prosecution did not allege that the victim lacked the
ability to consent as it rebutted the defendant’s claim that the charge was fabricated).
160 This language reflects the operative legal inquiry in a number of states. In Alabama,
for example, a person is “incapable of consent” by being “mentally defective.” ALA. CODE
§ 13A-6-70(c)(2) (2017). The statute defines “mentally defective” as “a person [that]
suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders him incapable of appraising the
nature of his conduct.” ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(5) (2017). See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-
14-101(4) (West 2017); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-700 (2017); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 163.305(2) (West 2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-651(e) (2017).
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reasoning, judgment, and information processing rather than whether
the individual possessed the adaptive abilities to make the sexual deci-
sion at issue.161 Consider Texas’s definition of “[d]isabled individual”
for purposes of sexual offenses: “[A] person older than 13 years of age
who by reason of age or physical or mental disease, defect, or injury is
substantially unable to protect the person’s self from harm or to pro-
vide food, shelter, or medical care for the person’s self.”162 While not
a categorical prohibition such as one in Louisiana tied to a set intelli-
gence quotient (IQ),163 or one that explicitly enumerates medical
diagnoses,164 read broadly, Texas’s statutory language suggests that an
individual’s limited adaptive capabilities, such as the need for sup-
ported living or personal assistance, might qualify as proof that the
person is “disabled” for purposes of sexual decisionmaking.165
Of note is that the Texas state legislature in 2015 changed the
definition of “disabled” from a prior (and also recent) amendment
161 The privileging of medical expertise reflects a deeply-rooted history of pathologizing
non-normative differences that cut across race, class, gender, and sexual identity and
served as a state-sponsored means to disenfranchise minority groups in the United States.
It reflects a principal tension in disability rights law to wed medical science and disability in
legal definitions, particularly those in welfare benefits legislation. Cf. Bagenstos, supra
note 55, at 10–19 (discussing a shift from social welfare paradigms to civil rights).
162 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(b)(3) (West 2017).
163 See LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(A)(6) (2017) (“[V]ictim is prevented from resisting the
act because the victim suffers from a . . . mental infirmity.”); id. § 14:42(C)(2) (“‘Mental
infirmity’ means a person with an intelligence quotient of seventy or lower.”).
164 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520a(i) (West 2017) (“‘Mentally disabled’
means ‘that a person has a mental illness, is intellectually disabled, or has a developmental
disability.’”).
165 Further, such definition is directly at odds with Texas’s reform efforts in the
guardianship arena. Texas recently passed legislation, the first of its kind nationally, giving
legal recognition to supported-decisionmaking agreements between the individual with a
mental disability and a designated “supporter” as an alternative to the appointment of a
legal guardian. See Supported Decision-Making Agreement Act, TEX. EST. CODE ANN.
§§ 1357.001–1357.102 (West 2017). Legislators passed House Bill 39 and Senate Bill 1881
during the 84th Texas Legislative Session in 2015. See H.B. 39, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex.
2015); S.B. 1881, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015). Yet in the context of sexual consent,
Texas appears to use evidence of supported decisionmaking as evidence of incapacity to
make sexual decisions. On a more theoretical level, the conception of incapacity as
synonymous with requiring support runs counter to such theories as Martha Albertson
Fineman’s shared vulnerability as part of the human condition or Martha Nussbaum’s
notion of capabilities. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject:
Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 12 (2008) (“The
vulnerability approach recognizes that individuals are anchored at each end of their lives
by dependency and the absence of capacity.”); Martha C. Nussbaum, HUMAN
CAPABILITIES, FEMALE HUMAN BEINGS, in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT: A
STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 61, 78 (Martha Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover eds., 1995)
(“All human beings participate (or try to) in the planning and managing of their own lives,
asking and answering questions about what is good and how one should live. Moreover,
they wish to enact their thought in their lives—to be able to choose and evaluate, and to
function accordingly.”).
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that enumerated specific categories of disability.166 Texas currently
has a bill pending that would eliminate reference to disability in its
sexual assault statute such that people with temporary and permanent
mental impairments would be adjudged under the same section and
found incapable of consent if they were “incapable of appraising the
nature of the act.”167 Though the goal of the bill is not to address
disability, disability ends up being addressed explicitly or implicitly as
part of the broader legislative efforts to clarify and streamline the
interpretive process.168
While many states have amended statutory provisions on sexual
incapacity over the last twenty years,169 few have made substantive
166 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04 (West 2017). The new definition says that a
“disabled individual” refers to someone “(A) with one or more of the following: (i) autism
spectrum disorder. . .; (ii) developmental disability. . .; (iii) intellectual disability. . .; (iv)
severe emotional disturbance. . .; or (v) traumatic brain injury. . .; or (B) who otherwise . . .
is substantially unable to protect the person’s self from harm or to provide food, shelter, or
medical care for the person’s self.” Id.
167 H.B. 265, 85th Leg., 1st Sess. (Tex. 2017).
168 Consider the current efforts of the American Law Institute (ALI) to reform section
213 of the Model Penal Code on Rape and Sexual Assault. See Model Penal Code: Sexual
Assault and Related Offenses, AM. LAW INST., https://www.ali.org/projects/show/sexual-
assault-and-related-offenses/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2018). Though the impetus for reform is
not disability-specific, nevertheless, the overhaul includes attempts to streamline tests for
incapacity on the basis of disability. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reforming the Law of
Rape, 35 L. & INEQ. 335, 343–52 (2017) (discussing his proposed provisions involving
“prohibited kinds of force, fraud, coercion, exploitation, and vulnerability” before the ALI
in its revision of the sexual offense provisions of the Model Penal Code). The ALI
recommends returning to a bright line test for legal incapacity—chronological or mental
age of twelve years or below—essentially applying the statutory rape model to mental
disability. The proposal to use mental age as the evaluative tool is particularly problematic
given the research on its unreliability.
169 Twenty-three states have made at least one revision (or such revision is pending) to
the sex offense provisions on incapacity on the basis of mental disability: Arizona,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. See Harris, supra
note 33. Other states, such as Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey, Texas, and
Wyoming, have made more than one amendment to statutory language on incapacity to
consent over the past twenty years (broader than just incapacity on the basis of mental
disability). See id. For example, Louisiana has amended its statute on sexual offenses at
least four times ranging from shifts in the degrees of the offenses, grammatical edits, and
amendments to terminology regarding mental disability. See, e.g., H.B. 604, 2001 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (La. 2001) (removing aggravated oral battery); S.B. 659, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La.
2004) (renaming second degree sexual battery from “aggravated” to “second degree”);
H.B. 232, 36th Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2010) (changing the grammar of LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 43(2) (2017) from “[w]hen the victim is incapable, through unsoundness of mind” to
“[w]hen the victim, through unsoundness of mind, is temporarily or permanently
incapable”); H.B. 139, 41st Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2015) (changing titles of rape and sexual
assault offenses). Compare H.B. 269, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 1997) (defining “mental
infirmity” to mean “a person with an intelligence quotient of seventy or lower”), with LA.
STAT. ANN. § 43.1(A)(3) (including new language for “mental infirmity” reading
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amendments that significantly change the statutory meaning or legal
standard itself, other than to further entrench medical diagnostic cate-
gories within legal definitions of incapacity. Most of the statutory
amendments regarding incapacity reflect a decision to remove anti-
quated references to “idiocy,” “imbecility,” “feeblemindedness,” and
“mental retardation” based on a more widely held view of their stig-
matizing quality.170 Changes in terminology have significant expres-
sive value.171 Twenty-eight years after the promulgation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and eight years after President
Obama signed Rosa’s Law172 calling for federal and state expunge-
ment of stigmatizing and antiquated statutory references to intellec-
tual and developmental disabilities, only two state statutes continue to
use “mental retardation” explicitly in substantive definitions of sexual
offenses.173 However, twenty-two states continue to use “mentally
defective” or its variants including “unsoundness of mind” to show
“incapable, through unsoundness of mind, of understanding the nature of the act”)
(repealed 2015).
170 In 2013, Connecticut, for example, replaced the term “mentally defective” with
“person is impaired because of a mental disability or disease.” H.B. 6641, 2013 Gen.
Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2013); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-71(a)(2) (West
2017) (containing the updated language); Connecticut Judiciary Committee Transcript,
March 25, 2013, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2013) (statement of Rebekah
Diamond) (providing arguments in favor of the amendment, including that derogatory
language such as “mentally defective” “invite[s] the public to think of those who are
disabled . . . as less than the rest of us” and keeps people with disabilities institutionalized);
Connecticut Senate Transcript, May 16, 2013, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2013)
(statement of Sen. Eric Coleman) (recognizing the importance of this bill to strike out the
offensive terminology “mentally defective”).
171 See, e.g., Denno, supra note 25, at 342–43 (contending that terms like “mentally
defective,” “idiocy,” and “imbecility” are problematic and encourages the perception that
mental retardation is static); Robert Sandieson, A Survey on Terminology that Refers to
People with Mental Retardation/Developmental Disabilities, 33 EDUC. & TRAINING IN
MENTAL RETARDATION & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 290, 291 (1998) (discussing the
literature on the stigmatizing effect of terminology used in reference to people with
intellectual disabilities); see also Denno, supra note 25, at 342 (noting that the American
Association of Mental Deficiency changed its name to American Association on Mental
Retardation (AAMR) in 1987 “for the sole purpose of eliminating any reference to a label
it considered ‘outmoded’ and ‘pejorative’”). The AAMR subsequently changed its name to
the American Association for Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities in 2007. Press
Release, Am. Ass’n on Mental Retardation, World’s Oldest Organization on Intellectual
Disability Has a Progressive New Name (Nov. 27, 2006), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/worlds-oldest-organization-on-intellectual-disability-has-a-progressive-new-name-
56524127.html.
172 Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643 (2010) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.A., 29 U.S.C.A., and 41 U.S.C.A.).
173 See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-27.20(1) (West 2017) (“‘Mentally disabled’ means (i)
a victim who suffers from mental retardation.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(a) (West
2017) (defining “cognitive disability,” which is used in the substantive offenses, to explicitly
include “mental retardation”).
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incapacity to consent to sex.174 Other states incorporate definitions of
mental disability from social welfare statutes where definitions of disa-
bility track medical diagnoses for purposes of entitlement to public
benefits, programs, and services as discussed previously. For example,
Delaware uses the term “cognitive disability” in its criminal sexual
offenses and its definition offers a list of included medical diagnoses
including “developmental disability,” “delirium, dementia and other
organic brain disorders,” “mental retardation, severe cerebral palsy,
and any other condition found to be closely related to mental
retardation.”175
While some states have added or revised definitions of disability
(sometimes making only cosmetic changes to reflect new termi-
nology), others have included statutory language that qualifies the
degree of impairment necessary to be adjudged incapable of sexual
consent requiring that the disability render the person “substantially
incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct.”176 Still other
174 Nine states continue to use the term “mentally defective”: ALA. CODE § 13A-6-70(c)
(2018) (Alabama), ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-101(4) (2017) (Arkansas), FLA. STAT.
§ 794.011(1)(b) (2017) (Florida), HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-700 (2017) (Hawaii), MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-3-97(b) (2017) (Mississippi), OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.305(3) (2018)
(Oregon), S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-651 (2018) (South Carolina), TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
501(3) (2013) (Tennessee), and W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-1(3) (2007) (West Virginia). Two
states use “unsoundness of mind”: IDAHO CODE § 18-6101(3) (2018) (Idaho) and OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1114(A)(2) (2017) (Oklahoma). An additional eleven states use
mental “defect,” “condition,” “disorder,” or “disease”: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1401(7)(b) (2015) (Arizona), IND. CODE § 35-42-4-1(3) (2014) (Indiana), IOWA CODE
§ 709.1(2) (2017) (Iowa), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(a) (2018) (Kansas), MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 566.030 (2017) (Missouri), MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(40) (2017) (Montana), N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A)(4) (2018) (New Mexico), N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-07(1)(b)
(2017) (North Dakota), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(c) (LexisNexis 2008)
(Ohio), 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-37-2 (1) (2017) (Rhode Island), and UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-402(1) (2017) (Utah). Ohio’s definition of “sexual battery” omits reference to
mental disability as the reason for incapacity. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(2)
(LexisNexis 2017) (“No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another, not the spouse
of the offender, when any of the following apply: . . . (2) The offender knows that the other
person’s ability to appraise the nature of or control the other person’s own conduct is
substantially impaired.”). Note that Ohio’s definition of rape, however, predicates
incapacity on the presence of a mental disability that renders the person “substantially
impaired because of a mental or physical condition.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.02(A)(1)(c) (LexisNexis 2017). For complete statutory analysis, see Harris, supra
note 138.
175 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(a) (West 2017).
176 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 253 (2)(C) (2017) (“[S]ubstantially
incapable of appraising the nature of the contact”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-27.20(1)
(West 2017) (“[S]ubstantially incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct”)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(c) (West 2017) (“No person shall engage in sexual
conduct with another . . . when . . . [t]he other person’s ability to resist or consent is
substantially impaired because of a mental or physical condition . . . .”). Most recently, in
2016, Maryland amended its provision on incapacity to replace the previously defined term
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states, including Arkansas and California, have explicitly stated in the
statute that the existence of disability is not a proxy for legal inca-
pacity to consent.177
Even where there is an effort to define in more detail the degree
of impairment that is considered within the statute, states have not
provided greater clarity with respect to a defendant’s knowledge of
the victim’s incapacity to consent. Whether a state structurally defines
a defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s incapacity as an element of
the offense (including as a part of consent) or as an affirmative
defense determines who has the burden of proof in the case.178 In
thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia, the defendant’s
knowledge of the victim’s incapacity is either incorporated into the
element of consent or is an explicit element of the substantive sex
offense, assigning the burden of proof to the prosecution beyond a
reasonable doubt.179 Three states include an affirmative defense for
“mentally defective” with “substantially cognitively impaired individual.” MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 3-301(f) (West 2016) (amended 2016).
177 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-101(4) (West 2017) (“‘Mentally defective’ means that a
person suffers from a mental disease or defect that renders the person: (i) Incapable of
understanding the nature and consequences of a sexual act . . . . [D]etermination that a
person is mentally defective shall not be based solely on the person’s intelligence quotient.”)
(emphasis added); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(1) (West 2017) (“Notwithstanding the
existence of a conservatorship pursuant to the provisions of the Lanterman-Petris-Short
Act . . . , the prosecuting attorney shall prove, as an element of the crime, that a mental
disorder or developmental or physical disability rendered the alleged victim incapable of
giving consent.”).
178 Compare, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406(A) (2017) (making a defendant’s
knowledge an element of the offense by requiring the state to prove knowledge or intent
beyond a reasonable doubt), with ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-102(e) (West 2017) (“When
criminality of conduct depends on a victim’s being incapable of consent because he or she
is mentally defective or mentally incapacitated, it is an affirmative defense that the actor
reasonably believed that the victim was capable of consent.”) (emphasis added). Thus,
Arkansas prosecutors do not have to prove defendant’s knowledge to convict; rather,
defendants can raise lack of knowledge as an affirmative defense and hold the burden of
production (evidence) and persuasion (degree of certainty) by a preponderance of the
evidence. For a discussion of the impact of burdens in criminal courts versus campus
adjudication of sexual assault offenses see, for example, David DeMatteo et al., Sexual
Assault on College Campuses: A 50-State Survey of Criminal Sexual Assault Statutes and
Their Relevance to Campus Sexual Assault, 21 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 227, 229 (2015).
179 See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410(a)(3)(a) (2017) (Alaska); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1401(7)(b) (2015) (Arizona); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(1) (West 2013) (California);
COLO. REV. STAT. §18-3-402 (2013) (Colorado); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 770 (2010)
(Delaware); D.C. CODE § 22-3002-3006 (2018) (District of Columbia); FLA. STAT.
§ 794.011 (4)(e)(5) (2017) (Florida); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-730(1) (2017) (Hawaii); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1.20(a)(2) (2016) (Illinois); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-1(3) (2014)
(Indiana); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(a) (2018) (Kansas); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:41(A)
(2017) (Louisiana); ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 253 (2)(C) (2017) (Maine); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 3-303(a)(1)(ii) (LexisNexis 2017) (Maryland); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch.
265, § 22(a) (2018) (Massachusetts); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b(1)(g), (h) (2014)
(Michigan); MINN. STAT. § 609.342(1)(e)(ii) (2007) (Minnesota); MO. REV. STAT. § 566.030
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defendant’s lack of knowledge of the victim’s incapacity to consent,
assigning the burden of proof to the defendant.180 For example, in
rape cases based on incapacity to consent because of mental defective-
ness or incapacitation, a defendant in Arkansas has the burden of
proving an “affirmative defense that that the actor reasonably
believed that the victim was capable of consent” by a preponderance
of the evidence.181 In Delaware, however, a defendant’s knowledge is
an element of the offense and the legislature explicitly rejects any
affirmative defense based on defendant’s lack of knowledge of the
victim’s incapacity.182 Other notable affirmative defenses include that
(2017) (Missouri); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502 (2017) (Montana); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
319(1)(a)-(b) (2018) (Nebraska); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.366(1)(a) (2015) (Nevada); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-a:2(I)(h) (2018) (New Hampshire); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-
2(a)(7) (West 2014) (New Jersey); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(D)(2) (2009) (New Mexico);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-27.22(a) (2015) (North Carolina); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-
07(1)(b) (2017) (North Dakota); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(c) (LexisNexis
2008) (Ohio); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-37-2(1) (2017) (Rhode Island); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-654(1)(b) (2018) (South Carolina); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-1(3) (2018)
(South Dakota); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503(a)(3) (2017) (Tennessee); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(1) (West 2017) (Texas); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402(1)
(LexisNexis 2018) (Utah); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a)(1) (2018) (Vermont); WIS.
STAT. § 940.225(2)(g) (2013) (Wisconsin); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-302(a)(iv) (2018)
(Wyoming). This is compared to thirty-six states in 1997. See Denno, supra note 25, at 371.
South Dakota has since addressed defendant’s knowledge and Denno did not count the
District of Columbia in 1997 at the time of her study. For complete statutory analysis, see
Harris, supra note 138.
180 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-102(e) (West 2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
67(a) (West 2017); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.10(1) (McKinney 2017). The applicable burden
of proof is defined by statute to be less than beyond a reasonable doubt, which could be
either a preponderance of the evidence standard or a clear and convincing evidence
standard. See Wright v. State, 254 S.W.3d 755, 757–58 (Ct. App. Ark. 2007) (discussing the
appellant’s burden to prove the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence);
People v. Bjork, 163 N.Y.S.2d 472, 477–78 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 25.00(2), which states “[w]hen a defense declared by statute to be an ‘affirmative
defense’ is raised at a trial, the defendant has the burden of establishing such defense by a
preponderance of the evidence”); see also State v. Tozier, 46 A.3d 960, 970–71, 971 n.8
(App. Ct. Conn. 2012) (noting legislative intent to not include an actor’s knowledge of a
victim’s mental incapacity as an essential element of the crime).
181 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-102(e) (West 2017) (providing affirmative defense in rape
cases that the actor did not know the victim was incapable of consent); § 5-1-111(d)(1)
(requiring that affirmative defense be proven by a preponderance of the evidence). See
supra note 53; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.10(1) (McKinney 2017) (“In any
prosecution under this article in which the victim’s lack of consent is based solely upon his
or her incapacity to consent because he or she was mentally disabled, mentally
incapacitated or physically helpless, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant, at the
time he or she engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know of the facts or
conditions responsible for such incapacity to consent.”)
182 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1105(d) (West 2017) (“[I]t is no defense to an offense
or sentencing provision . . . that the accused did not know that the victim was a vulnerable
adult or that the accused reasonably believed the person was not a vulnerable adult unless
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the defendant has an intellectual or developmental disability or that
the defendant and victim are spouses.183
Despite legislative amendments, statutory ambiguity continues
within and among state incapacity statutes.184 As discussed previously,
assumptions regarding statutory ambiguity is a key feature of the
existing scholarship and its treatment of legislative standards. While
this ambiguity may raise a cautionary flag regarding the exercise of
judicial discretion, the presence of ambiguity alone does not result in
overregulation.185 Thus, despite the continued vagueness in the stat-
utes on what constitutes mental incapacity on the basis of disability,
many state legislatures are sending clearer messages about how courts
making incapacity determinations should treat disability. While the
Texas statute may premise statutory disability on the wrong markers
the statute defining the underlying offense . . . expressly provides that knowledge that the
victim is a vulnerable adult is a defense.”).
183 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.41.432(a) (West 2017) (“It is a defense . . . that the
offender is (1) mentally incapable; or (2) married to the person . . . .”) (defense to sexual
assault); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 255-A (2017) (“It is an affirmative defense to
prosecution . . . that the actor receives services for an intellectual disability or autism or is a
person with an intellectual disability . . . or autism”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 13F
(West 2017) (noting affirmative defense to indecent assault and battery by a person with an
intellectual disability upon another person with an intellectual disability).
184 Consider the current debates around affirmative consent and the role of intoxication
in impairing one’s sexual decisionmaking on university and college campuses. See, e.g.,
Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CAL. L. REV. 881, 925–31 (2016)
(discussing sexual assault definitions at colleges and universities); Aya Gruber, Consent
Confusion, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 415 (2016) (attempting to provide clarity to the legal
consent landscape); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Consent: What It Means and Why It’s Time to
Require It, 47 U. PAC. L. REV. 665, 681 (2016) (defending affirmative consent as a common
sense norm); Shaw, supra note 44, at 1410–11 (discussing state statutory responses to the
affirmative consent debate); see also Janet Napolitano, “Only Yes Means Yes”: An Essay
on University Policies Regarding Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 387, 389–90 (2015) (quoting the University of California’s affirmative consent policy
and noting that “[t]he standard provides greater clarity for both partners than the previous
‘no means no’ standard by requiring lucid, affirmative statements or actions at each step of
a sexual encounter in order to ensure consent. Put simply, only yes means yes.”).
185 Courts necessarily wrestle with statutory vagueness in other areas. See, e.g., Bernard
W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments in Interpretive Theory, 78 N.C.
L. REV. 1253, 1316 n.270 (2000) (noting the success of the Sherman Antitrust Act despite
its statutory vagueness). The claim of overregulation relies on the following reasoning:
vagueness in the context of criminal law promotes risk averse court decisions and the
deterrence of potential sexual partners of people with mental disabilities because they are
concerned about risk of error and uncertainty in the law where the stakes are particular
high. However, the problem is not the vagueness per se but the potential errors in legal
decisionmaking caused by the lack of normative shifts in understanding the full spectrum
of capabilities of people with disabilities that inject bias into the decisionmaking process.
See Harris, Processing Disability, supra note 27, at 483 (discussing the information deficit
about disability norms that infect the legal decisionmaking process); infra Section
III(A)–(B).
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(self-care),186 the legislature has sent a clear message to courts con-
cerning the use of diagnoses as proxies for incapacity to consent.  The
legislature amended the definition of “disabled individual” from a list
of diagnoses such as “autism,” “intellectual disability,” “severe emo-
tional disturbance,” or “traumatic brain injury” to a more general ref-
erence to a person “who by reason of age or physical or mental
disease, defect or injury is substantially unable to protect the person’s
self from harm. . . .”187
Courts have taken note of such legislative directives and, at least
rhetorically, their decisions have begun to reflect an awareness that
the existence of the disability is not dispositive of incapacity to con-
sent.188 Consider a Texas court’s analysis of evidence of the com-
plainant’s capacity to understand “right” from “wrong” (albeit
employing an outdated term for intellectual disability): “Appellant’s
argument that complainant has a similar concept of right and wrong as
non-retarded individuals does not offer much proof of his ability to
appraise the nature of a sexual act. Whether or not he has the same
concept of right and wrong has nothing to do with complainant’s
capacity to understand the nature of a sexual act.”189 Still, as the anal-
ysis above demonstrates, there are no clear statutory baselines for
what constitutes legal capacity across states. Judicial tests fill the statu-
tory void and are the first step in the exercise of discretion.
186 See supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text (discussing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.021(b)(3)).
187 H.B. 2589, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015) (emphasis added) (proposing a separate
subdivision for and providing a definition of disabled individuals). While the amended
language does not explicitly seek to clarify the use of diagnoses in incapacity
determinations, the statutory language, in effect, provides judges with greater clarity with
respect to the need for evidence showing degree to which a disability must impair the
person’s capacity for self-care. For legislative intent, see TEXAS COMMITTEE REPORT, S.84-
2589, Reg. Sess., at 1 (2015) (stating “H.B. 2589 seeks to prevent other victims from falling
into th[e] gap” between the age at which a juvenile is considered a disabled individual and
the age limit for statutory rape laws for purposes of certain sexual assaults).
188 See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 710 S.E.2d 339, 344 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (“But even if the
evidence was sufficient to establish ‘mental retardation[,]’ [the statute] requires not just a
diagnosis of mental retardation, but also evidence that the mental retardation is of such a
degree that it ‘temporarily or permanently renders the victim substantially incapable of
appraising the nature of his or her conduct . . . .’ [The statute] thus recognizes that there is
a wide range of abilities among those who have a diagnosis of mental retardation. Some
are able to function well in society and live independently or with minimal assistance, while
others cannot.” (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-27.20(1) (2007))), rev’d on other
grounds, 722 S.E.2d 484 (N.C. 2012).
189 Green v. State, No. 14-06-00535-CR, 2007 WL 2265787, at *3 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 9,
2007).
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B. Legal Tests
The existing literature describes six legal tests of incapacity of
consent developed through judicial interpretation of statutory lan-
guage: (1) nature of the conduct; (2) nature & consequences; (3) judg-
ment; (4) morality; (5) evidence of mental disability; and (6) totality of
the circumstances.190 The “nature of the conduct” test, described by
some scholars as the least rigorous of the tests, requires that the indi-
vidual understand the sexual nature of the conduct and be able to
express volition.191 The “evidence of mental disability” test reflects
the absence of any one test; rather, it focuses on mental disability
alone as a determinant of legal capacity to consent.192 The “judgment”
test requires an examination of the person’s general ability to exercise
judgment in the sexual decision.193 The “nature and consequences”
test focuses on the individual’s ability to understand the nature of the
sexual conduct as well as its potential consequences including sexually
190 See Denno, supra note 25, at 344–46; see also State v. Olivio, 589 A.2d 597, 602 (N.J.
1991) (discussing states’ interpretations of statutes similar to the statute at issue); Boni-
Saenz, supra note 24 (proposing a “cognition-plus” test for legal incapacity); Clarence J.
Sundram & Paul F. Stavis, Sexual Behavior and Mental Retardation, 17 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 448, 451 (1993) (identifying three tests used by courts to
define capacity to consent).
191 Denno, supra note 25, at 345–46. See, e.g., Warren v. Commonwealth, No. 2003-SC-
0138-MR, 2004 WL 2364478, at *5 n.2 (Ky. Oct. 21, 2004) (noting that the defendant likely
could not have been charged under the statute dealing with sexual assault and mental
disability as “there [was] no evidence that [the victim’s] learning disabilities precluded her
from understanding the nature of the sexual acts performed upon her”); Olivio, 589 A.2d
at 602 (“[K]nowledge that conduct is sexual surely is implicit in the court’s focus on the
ability to consent to sexual conduct.”).
192 Denno, supra note 25, at 345. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-71(a) (West
2017) (“A person is guilty of sexual assault in the second degree when such person engaged
in sexual intercourse with another person and . . . such other person is impaired because of
mental disability or disease to the extent that such other person is unable to consent to such
sexual intercourse.” (emphasis added)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-65(4) (West 2017)
(“‘Impaired because of mental disability or disease’ means that a person suffers from a
mental disability or disease which renders such person incapable of appraising the nature
of such person’s conduct.”); see also State v. Polynice, 133 A.3d 952, 960–61 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2016) (stating that “an understanding of her cognitive abilities . . . was a critical issue in
the . . . case because . . . the state bore the burden of proving” she could not consent).
193 Denno, supra note 25, at 345. See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 555 So. 2d 1134, 1137–38
(Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (holding that the victim with disabilities “could not have been
expected to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature . . . of the acts of sodomy
perpetrated upon him”); Baise v. State, 502 S.E.2d 492, 495 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (“[C]arnal
knowledge of female who, because of mental disability, is incapable of giving intelligent
assent or dissent or of exercising judgment in the matter constitutes rape.” (emphasis
added)); State v. Masuleh, No. C9-98-887, 1999 WL 55496, at *1–2 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 9,
1999) (holding that testimony from victim’s primary physician that at the time of the
incident she lacked “the ability to make reasoned decisions because of her dementia” was
sufficient to support a finding the victim was “mentally impaired”).
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transmitted infections and pregnancy.194 The “totality of the circum-
stances” and “morality” tests incorporate the “nature and conse-
quences” test but each adds a unique element. The “totality of the
circumstances” test accounts for a closer examination of the circum-
stances surrounding the alleged sexual offenses including the power
dynamics between the victim and defendant and defendant’s intent.195
Finally, the “morality” test, criticized as the most intrusive on the
sexual autonomy of the parties, requires an understanding of the
nature and consequences of the sexual conduct plus an appreciation of
the surrounding moral and social context in which that conduct
occurs.196
The six tests function today as a general taxonomy but are less
distinct than they appear or perhaps were in 1997.197 The way of
194 Denno, supra note 25, at 345. See, e.g., State v. Babb, No. 11-0564, 2012 WL 1246896,
at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2012) (“In short, [the statute] protects those who are so
mentally incompetent or incapacitated as to be unable to understand the nature and
consequences of the sex act. Such persons cannot give the meaningful ‘consent’ required by
the enactment” (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Sullivan, 298 N.W.2d 267, 272 (Iowa
1980))); State v. Ward, 903 So.2d 480, 485 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (distinguishing the
competency to testify from capacity to consent to sex by noting that “[t]here is a vast
difference between understanding the distinction between the truth and a lie and
understanding the nature and consequences of a sexual act.” (quoting State v. Peters, 441
So.2d 403, 409 (La. Ct. App. 1983))).
195 Denno, supra note 25, at 345. See, e.g., Barnett v. State, 820 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1991) (stating that “[t]he victim’s diminished mental capacity, along with all of the
other evidence, could be considered by the jury in determining the sufficiency of the
evidence upon the issue of physical force and consent” and noting that “consent is to be
determined from the totality of the circumstances”) (quoting Bannach v. State, 704 S.W.2d
331, 333 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)).
196 Denno, supra note 25, at 344–45. See, e.g., People v. Verre, No. 1-12-3252, 2014 WL
3893276, at *3 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 8, 2014) (“[W]e note that ‘[i]n regard to the theory of
liability of ‘unable to understand the nature of the acts,’ this court has said that merely
demonstrating ‘the victim understood the physical nature of sexual relations is not
sufficient to establish that the victim comprehended the social and personal costs
involved.’” (quoting People v. Vaughn, 961 N.E.2d 887, 897 (Ill. Ct. App. 2011))); People v.
Jackson, 894 N.Y.S.2d 688, 689 (App. Div. 2010) (“[T]he victim did not understand the
social and moral implications of such sexual activity.”).
197 The six legal tests described by scholars are less distinct in practice. Courts appear to
articulate one legal standard but in reasoning the holding apply another standard.
Compare, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-402(b) (West 2017) (expressing the “nature
of conduct” standard in the statute), with Denno, supra note 21, at 416 (listing Colorado’s
legal test as “morality”), and Platt v. People, 201 P.3d 545 (Colo. 2009) (describing the
“nature of conduct” standard to include morality). Michigan, for example, statutorily
enumerates “nature of the conduct” and “evidence of disability.” In 1997, Professor Denno
described the operative standard as “evidence of mental disability” alone. Denno, supra
note 25, at 419. Michigan courts have described the operative legal test as two parts—first,
evidence of the disability and second, whether the disability rendered the victim unable to
understand the nature of her conduct at issue in the case. See, e.g., People v. Abela, No.
307768, 2013 WL 5576155, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2013) (“Whether the victim’s
cognitive limitations rendered her incapable of appraising the nature of her conduct during
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thinking about the tests as more or less restrictive in terms of the evi-
dence required to show that the victim has the capacity to consent is
not that helpful today because, twenty years later, more courts under-
stand that, at least in theory, disability is not synonymous with legal
incapacity.198 What is more important, then, is to review the applica-
tion of a given state’s statute to a set of facts to determine what func-
tional capacities courts deem central to a finding of incapacity (or
capacity)—i.e., what are the threshold traits, qualities, knowledge, and
skills199—and what courts say is relevant to such inquiries.200
Despite the persistent assumption that courts may be overly
reliant on traditional measures of cognitive functioning when making
capacity decisions, it is increasingly rare to see a case that describes an
expert IQ test and score and uses such a fact to end the legal inquiry
regarding consent. There is some discussion of adaptive evidence in
the cases, and this Article’s review of the case law documents and
the charged sexual acts is a separate inquiry from her level of mental competency.”);
People v. Cox, 709 N.W.2d 152, 157 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (“‘[M]entally capable’
encompasses an understanding of both the physical and nonphysical factors of a sex act. . . .
[Here, the victim] did not understand the nonphysical aspects of the sex acts [including its
homosexual nature] and was mentally incapable of consenting to the sexual relationship
with defendant.”).
198 See, e.g., State v. Torresgrossa, 776 So. 2d 1009, 1011 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that while victim’s cognitive disability might have rendered her “more easily
manipulated . . . , she was clearly aware and capable of appraising the nature of her
conduct” and, thus, capable of consent under the statute); State v. Meyers, 799 N.W.2d 132,
143 (Iowa 2011) (“The overall purpose of Iowa’s sexual abuse statute is to protect the
freedom of choice to engage in sex acts.”); Penn v. State, No. 105,777, 2012 WL 3171813, at
*5 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2012) (“The problem is none of th[e] evidence [of N.R.’s general
impairments, medical and adaptive,] speaks to N.R.’s ability to understand the nature and
consequences of sex . . . . [J]ust because N.R. was impaired does not mean she was
incapable of knowingly consenting to sex.”); Abela, 2013 WL 5576155, at *2 (“Whether the
victim’s cognitive limitations rendered her incapable of appraising the nature of her
conduct during the charged sexual acts is a separate inquiry from her level of mental
competency.”).
199 Prescriptively, these could be established by state legislatures (not courts) as a
reflection of a normative baseline shared by the people in a particular state. They would
likely not be codified (and perhaps should not be) in the actual statute but reflected in the
legislative history or public commentary. This would be a shared baseline for sexual
consent for both disabled and nondisabled persons.
200 The two are related. Knowledge of the physical and psychological aspects of sexual
conduct, for example, may be a threshold requirement for sexual consent. Once this is set,
courts must decide as a matter of initial admissibility what evidence comes in as more
probative than prejudicial of that particular threshold requirement. The fact that the victim
took three years of sex education courses in high school, for example, would be probative
of this knowledge. A harder question is on the requisite cognitive capacity. What,
normatively, should the threshold be? Once we answer this question we can consider how
to measure it, that is, what evidence would be probative (and prejudicial) of that threshold.
I will explore these difficult questions in a future project.
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describes the kinds of adaptive evidence courts use and consider pro-
bative relative to the sexual decision.
In that vein, a review of the case law reveals that the six judicial
tests generally reduce to a two-step legal inquiry for establishing legal
incapacity to consent to sex: (1) a threshold inquiry of the existence of
a cognitive impairment201 (disability, intoxication, or other depending
on the statute) and (2) a causal analysis regarding the effect of that
impairment on the victim’s ability to meet the standard set forth in the
statute, which can be (a) nature of the conduct, (b) nature and conse-
quences, (c) morality, or (d) judgment. For example, in State v. Ash, a
Minnesota appellate court discussed the operative legal standard as
“capacity to give reasoned consent to sexual intercourse.”202 The
court first described the testimony of a special education teacher to
establish that the 17-year-old victim had an IQ of 52, took special edu-
cation classes, and was “moderately mentally impaired.”203 The court
then shifts to the main stage discussion of her ability to give “reasoned
consent” by exploring whether she understood the nature and conse-
quences of the sexual act, something more than mere understanding
of the mechanics of the sexual act, though it is not clear what else the
court considered necessary.204 In sum, the court looked to the exis-
tence of a mental disability then shifted to the effect of that disability
on her capacity to make a reasoned decision. The court never articu-
lates any actual requirements for “reasoned consent” other than an
equally amorphous ability to understand the nature and consequences
of the sexual act and opine that something more than biology is
needed.205
Disability is always the entry point to any discussion on inca-
pacity to consent. Whether courts analytically advance to step two and
discuss the nexus between the existence of disability and the conduct
at issue is the primary issue. If courts do advance, then disability is no
longer the proxy for incapacity, and a court then takes on a more
nuanced approach that considers the impact of the disability on the
person’s capacity to make a sexual decision.
201 Impairment is distinct from disability. See Michelle A. Travis, Impairment as
Protected Status: A New Universality for Disability Rights, 46 GA. L. REV. 937, 943–44
(2012) (distinguishing “impairment,” which is “a description of one’s physical or mental
condition, which is not inherently limiting outside of the social context in which it exists”
from “disability,” which is “a causal description of the source of disadvantage for
individuals with impairments”).
202 State v. Ash, No. A07-0761, 2008 WL 2965555, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2008).
203 Id. at *1.
204 See id. at *2–4.
205 See id.
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The cases reflect a mix of legal interpretations of state statutes as
courts, like legislatures, appear to struggle with the process of deter-
mining legal incapacity. Rhetorically, courts express an understanding
that the existence of a mental disability is not a proxy for incapacity
and that, as an evidentiary matter, something more is required to find
legal incapacity to consent. For example, the court in State v. Hamlin
recently wrote: “Disabilities that gravely influence one sphere of a
person’s life may not limit a person in another sphere. Consequently,
legal determinations of capacity and competency do not rely upon
sweeping generalizations.”206 However, the application of this
nuanced position has proven difficult and at odds with this rhetoric.
Consider State v. Ash discussed above.  While the court notably
articulated a more nuanced approach to incapacity determinations
beyond using the IQ score as a proxy for incapacity, closer examina-
tion of its reasoning for affirming the lower court’s finding of inca-
pacity reveals consideration of evidence with questionable probative
value such as the victim’s communication impairment and difficulty
testifying in court.207
Interestingly, while a threshold question of the existence of
impairment should, as a matter of statutory interpretation, be limited
to disability-specific jurisdictions, a review of the cases shows that
even in the handful of disability-neutral jurisdictions, courts fre-
quently begin their analysis with the existence of a cognitive impair-
ment. For example, in Georgia, a disability-neutral jurisdiction, rape is
defined as “carnal knowledge” of a female against her will.208 Yet,
courts interpret this disability-neutral statute to require an initial
showing of disability: “the State [has] the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the victim’s disability rendered her incapable of
knowing and intelligent consent [sic] to the alleged sexual act.”209
206 State v. Hamlin, 324 P.3d 1006, 1014 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014); see also Sanford v.
Commonwealth, 678 S.E.2d 842, 845 (Va. Ct. App. 2009) (“It is the confluence of IQ (or
mental age) and adaptive skills that are relevant to the establishment of mental
incapacity. . . . ‘Intellectual functioning is measured by the intelligence quotient (‘IQ’),
which is obtained using standard intelligence tests. . . . Adaptive functioning includes an
individual’s social skills, communication skills, daily living skills, personal independence,
and self-sufficiency.’” (quoting Elizabeth J. Reed, Note, Criminal Law and the Capacity of
Mentally Retarded Persons to Consent to Sexual Activity, 83 VA. L. REV. 799, 801 (1997))).
207 State v. Ash, 2008 WL 2965555, at *3 (“[The victim] had a difficult time testifying at
trial, and the jury observed her struggle to understand the questions posed to her. The jury
was entitled to draw its own conclusion that A.O.’s mental abilities rendered her incapable
of reasonably consenting to sexual activity with appellant based on her limited
communication skills, her demeanor, and her difficulty in understanding and answering
questions.”).
208 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(a)(1) (West 2017).
209 Page v. State, 610 S.E.2d 171, 174 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Durr v. State, 493
S.E.2d 210, 212 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)); see also Melton v. State, 639 S.E.2d 411, 416 (Ga. Ct.
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Similarly, in Page v. State, the appellate court’s discussion on a suffi-
ciency of the evidence claim begins with a restatement of the legal test
(which is disability-neutral) and ends with an emphasis on the exis-
tence of a mental disability.210
C. Empirical Analysis of Incapacity Cases
If courts anchor legal incapacity tests on the existence of a disa-
bility, then the evidence becomes an important site of analysis for the
purported overregulation of sexual agency. Evidentiary proffers and
decisions reveal what courts think are the critical functional capacities
to be able to consent to sex. This Section discusses the comprehensive
empirical analysis of the jurisprudence of incapacity conducted to gen-
erate a new empirical baseline for this emerging area of legal
scholarship.
1. Methodology
This empirical project began with an intent to study how courts
have and are currently applying the existing legal tests through the
evidence proffered in support of legal incapacity. In all cases
reviewed, the primary statutory offense was rape and/or sexual assault
of a person incapable of consent on the basis of mental disability.211
The dataset reflects all available appellate decisions where the trial
court adjudicated the question of legal capacity of the victim/target to
App. 2006) (“[T]he fact that the victim had never been declared legally incompetent did
not mandate a conclusion by the jury that the victim was, therefore, competent to consent
to sexual activity.”); Baise v. State, 502 S.E.2d 492, 495 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (“[C]arnal
knowledge of a female who, because of mental retardation is incapable of giving intelligent
assent or dissent or of exercising judgment in the matter constitutes rape.”).
210 Page, 610 S.E.2d at 174. But see People v. Jackson, 974 N.E.2d 855, 871 (Ill. App. Ct.
2012) (noting that despite the victim’s developmental disability, “at no time did the State
argue that J.P. was part of a class of citizens that needed extra protection”).
211 The cases reviewed involved varying degrees of rape/sexual assault with secondary
offenses such as sodomy and kidnapping. Definitions of the offense varied by state. The
dataset includes cases in disability-neutral states where disability is not specifically
enumerated in the statute but courts in those jurisdictions have nevertheless adjudicated
questions of incapacity to consent. Statutory differences did not affect the variables
tracked for purposes of this study, particularly because even in disability-neutral
jurisdictions, courts continue to ground reasoning in the existence of a diagnosed mental
disability that impairs capacity to consent in some way. Procedurally, a defendant is
accused of rape or sexual assault (sometimes in addition to other criminal charges such as
sodomy or kidnapping), tried, convicted of rape/sexual assault of a person incapable of
consent because of mental disability. The defendant appeals the conviction and at least one
ground for the appeal relates to the fact-finder’s determination of legal capacity to consent.
This study tracked appellant’s claims on appeal which included sufficiency of the evidence
of incapacity to consent, sufficiency of the evidence of defendants’ knowledge of incapacity
to consent, general evidentiary questions of admissibility, erroneous jury instructions, and
statutory vagueness.
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consent and the appellate decision addressed the fact-finder’s deter-
mination of legal incapacity.212
A review of the universe of cases produced a unique dataset of
172 state criminal appellate cases.213  The field is limited to those cases
that result in publicly available opinions,214 preserved in judicial
reporters. In all cases, such opinions are issued on appeal, largely pre-
212 Several of the opinions reviewed are marked “unpublished” which affects an
opinion’s precedential value in the litigation process but does not prohibit scholarly review
and citation.
213 To assess the primary research question, the author necessarily narrowed the
universe of case law. The author designed a broad search to return all criminal cases
involving persons with disabilities and the issue of consent. Under the umbrella of this
broad search, the author selected further filter terms to return relevant cases involving
persons with diverse disabilities, across jurisdictions, and implicating all manner of sexual
offenses. Given this Article’s focus on the criminal law, civil cases were excluded. In total,
the author evaluated 987 federal cases and 1843 state cases. The author identified as
relevant 228 cases, over 90% of which were state criminal appeals. The author sorted the
collective universe of state and federal cases by a number of factors relevant to the purpose
of the study: only criminal cases, excluding cases unrelated to the inquiry (litigation
involving child abuse and sex offender statutes—the terms “child abuse,” “Adam Walsh,”
“sex offender,” and “minor” were omitted (using the Boolean symbol: %), involving
persons with cognitive disabilities (developmental, intellectual, and specific diagnostic
categories and historical terms used to describe mental disability such as “mental
retardation” and “imbecility”)). The author made a decision to limit the inquiry to those
cases involving victims with cognitive disabilities, the demographic focus of this study.
Federal habeas cases were included when they discussed state law on incapacity, and when
the defendant was appealing a state level conviction on grounds of errors in incapacity
adjudication. Federal habeas cases, however, are not included as part of the 172-case
dataset, but are explored qualitatively in this Article. The author then narrowed the
universe of cases by year to capture those cases between 1997–2017: the time between the
last comprehensive study and the present. The relevant universe then became 172 state
cases. The author then ran an analysis of the dataset in Stata, a data analysis software, first,
to identify any coding errors but also to generate summary statistics across variables. Table
1 provides a descriptive overview. Next, the author identified the following variables for
coding: jurisdiction, jury/bench trial, origin of prosecution, whether the victim testified, the
victim’s residential status, the nature of the sexual relationship (e.g., consensual, non-
consensual, physically violent, etc.), the relationship between the victim and the defendant,
the trial court result, the questions on appeal, and the final court result. The author also
identified in each case the witnesses who were qualified to testify as experts, the expert
evidence admitted, the witnesses who provided lay testimony, and the lay evidence
admitted. Two research assistants were trained as coders to populate the selected variables.
Both coders were unaware of the working hypothesis and shielded from the literature in
this area to preserve independence and reliability. The two split the universe of cases to
code, each reviewing 114 cases independently. Coder 1 ultimately reviewed cases for
consistency and accuracy. When the Coders disagreed with the results or had questions
regarding the coding process, they flagged and discussed the question, ultimately reached a
consensus, and then consulted with the author regarding their results and coding process to
ensure consistency and accuracy. Each of the variables was then “operationalized,” a term
used to describe the assignment of a pre-defined category.
214 “Publicly available” here includes both published and those designated
“unpublished” opinions which are still relevant and available for academic study if not for
litigation precedential value. See supra note 212.
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cluding scholarly review of the trials, hearings, and occurrences that
preceded appellate review.215
This study reflects the universe of available data for review and,
as such, is limited. The methodology section reflects several limita-
tions. The data draws from research databases, which necessarily only
include cases where the state or the defendant appealed an unfavor-
able decision. It does not include the universe of state criminal trial
verdicts or preliminary evidentiary decisions in limine or during those
criminal trials, or cases resolved through plea bargains. Nor does it
include appellate cases without a publicly available decision.
Notably, there is no method to account for triage interference—
where the victim did not report to law enforcement authorities, the
victim reported to family or caregivers who declined to report the
rape/sexual assault, the victim or caregiver reported to the police but
the police exercised discretion in choosing not to make an arrest, the
state could not (because of lack of evidence) or chose not to prose-
cute, or those cases not captured by the search terms, given the
shifting terminology of intellectual and developmental disabilities
over time.216 For example, 40% of violent crimes against people with
disabilities are never reported to the police and are dealt with in
another way, and 22% of the victims chose not to report a sexual
assault because they believed the police would not help resolve the
issue. Note that the figures on the number of crimes that go unre-
ported is comparable to people without disabilities. These numbers
are for people with disabilities living in the community and not in
institutionalized settings where the numbers might be higher and with
greater reporting difficulties. The Department of Justice recognizes
the pattern of underreporting of violence that might arise.217 In the
institutionalized settings, in addition to difficulty reporting and lack of
215 Review of trial records across jurisdictions would not have been possible given the
variance among state courts regarding electronic publication of trial records and the
absence of a national clearinghouse for aggregation of cases such as Westlaw or Lexis, a
function, in part, of state resources and centralization as well as concerns regarding the
privacy interests of criminal defendants during and after trial (subsequent improper use of
convictions or other information). The Supreme Court, for example, has recognized a
criminal defendant’s privacy interest in the recording and distribution of the proceedings
even though the public has access to those proceedings in person. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 534–35 (1965); see also Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to Record, 97 B.U.
L. REV. 167, 210 (2017) (describing the privacy interests recognized by the Supreme Court
with respect to the public “even though information had already been disclosed to those
participating in the trial and even to the press”).
216 See, e.g., GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 59–61 (Wadsworth ed., 1989) (describing the
processing of rape cases over a three-year period in the 1970s in Indianapolis).
217 CRIME AGAINST PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, supra note 39, at 7–8.
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transparency in caregiving, there is the added problem of institutional
liability and individual caregivers’ professional responsibilities pur-
suant to licensing standards which may result in a more risk averse
policy/practice/approach to sexual expression/relations given the per-
ceived risks involved.
The potential universe of cases for the dataset is also limited by a
specific chain of events: a defendant gets convicted, chooses to appeal,
and the decision is published (or at least written and marked unpub-
lished).218 Yet despite these limitations, this study has significant
value. The literature currently lacks an empirical basis for several
descriptive and normative assertions. First, criminal sex offense stat-
utes and cases interpreting them offer a window into the ways in
which disability and sexual risk are understood and constructed by the
law itself. Second, much of the sexual regulation in the context of disa-
bility occurs in the shadow of criminal and civil tort law without public
transparency or scrutiny. Little data exists on the adjudication of
sexual consent, in part, because many of the legal proceedings in
which these could occur ex ante, such as conservatorship or guardian-
ship hearings, are effectively closed to the public and their decisions
unpublished.219 This study provides the first comprehensive review,
aggregation, and analysis of existing public information that can serve
as a basis for future empirical and normative work.
2. Overview
Table 1 offers a descriptive overview of the dataset in this study.
A majority of appellate courts reviewed trial findings of incapacity at
the trial level (87.2%), almost all trials resulting in convictions for
rape or sexual assault, and produced affirmances of the lower court
decisions (83.6%).  Juries sat as factfinders of incapacity to consent to
sex in 88.8% of cases reviewed.  The two primary questions on appeal
were the sufficiency of the evidence of incapacity (49%) and admissi-
218 The dataset also does not account for those cases where the defendant was acquitted.
This number may be large but the state may have chosen to let the conviction stand and
avoid an appeals process given the resources at stake or other problems related to the
alleged difficulty in prosecuting (and winning) these cases. See, e.g., Joseph Shapiro, How
Prosecutors Changed the Odds to Start Winning Some of the Toughest Rape Cases, NPR
(Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/16/577063976/its-an-easy-crime-to-get-away-
with-but-prosecutors-are-trying-to-change-that (“The rape of someone with an intellectual
disability remains one of the hardest crimes for police to investigate and one of the hardest
for prosecutors to win in court. A victim with an intellectual disability may have trouble
speaking, or may not have words at all. And when victims can speak, they may have
trouble telling precise details, which makes them easy to confuse in a courtroom.”).
219 See Processing Disability, supra note 27 (reviewing legal rules and procedures on
closed hearings and arguing that they have contributed to the absence of information
about the capabilities of people with mental disabilities in public circulation).
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bility of evidence (35.5%) (for example, expert and lay opinion testi-
mony on incapacity to consent).
TABLE 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable Percent (%) N 
Region of the U.S.220  172 
   Northeast 15.1%  
   South 32.0%  
   West 27.9%  
   Midwest 25%  
Final Outcome on Appeal (Incapacity Finding)221  171 
   Affirmed  83.6%  
   Modified/Reversed/Remanded 16.4%  
Primary Question on Appeal*  155 
   Sufficiency of the Evidence/Capacity 49.0%  
   Sufficiency of the Evidence/Mens Rea 3.9%  
   Admissibility of Evidence 35.5%  
   Constitutional Questions (State/Federal) 5.2%  
   Jury Issue 6.5%  
Determination of Target/Victim’s Legal Capacity to 
Consent Determination at Trial* 
 156 
   Capacity to Consent  12.8%  
   Incapacity to Consent  87.2%  
Result of Trial = Conviction for Rape/Sexual Assault222 97.7% 172 
Fact-Finder at Trial Level*  169 
   Jury 88.8%  
   Bench 11.2%  
   Race/Ethnicity of Defendants/Victims223 Unavailable — 
* = Removed “unknown” category 
3. Findings
This study makes three novel findings that refute or disrupt the
current scholarly literature: First, IQ scores and mental age are not the
primary evidence of incapacity; second, most complainants in the deci-
220 The four regions mirror the United States Census regional categories. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, CENSUS REGIONS AND DIVISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, https://
www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf.
221 Removed case from sample pending appeal.
222 2.3% of cases fell into the “other” category (e.g., pleas, dismissals).
223 The cases do not specifically discuss the race or ethnicity of the victim or defendant.
Although perhaps ascertainable from the party’s surname, for example, in the case of
Latinos, the process would be inherently flawed and driven by essentialist constructions
rather than well-established empirical methods.
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sions reviewed lived in community-based settings (approximately
89%); and third, victims with mental disabilities testified in 86% of the
cases reviewed. The implications of these findings are discussed in
turn.
a. Evidence of Incapacity to Consent
Contrary to existing claims in the literature, expert testimony on
standardized tests, IQ scores, and mental age are not the primary
forms of evidence of incapacity to consent for people with mental dis-
abilities.224 Evidence on incapacity to consent on the basis of mental
disability comes from both lay and expert witnesses.225 In practice,
224 Contemporary legal scholars contend that states overregulate the sexual agency of
people with mental disabilities through vague statutes on incapacity to consent to sex
coupled with legal determinations that rely on evidence of IQ scores and mental age as
proxies for incapacity. Professor Denno’s 1997 article provided empirical support for this
descriptive claim. Denno, supra note 25, at 366 (“Courts nearly always refer to a victim’s
IQ when the crime charged is rape or an assault against a mentally retarded person.
Although IQ is a convenient clinical and administrative tool, alone it has limited predictive
value . . . . ‘[M]ental age’ is [also] considered misleading and controversial.”). Many
scholars have relied upon this description in their own work to shape their prescriptive
recommendations. See, e.g., Boni-Saenz, supra note 24 (discussing an individual’s legal
capacity to make decisions in the presence of certain chronic conditions); Fischel &
O’Connell, supra note 24, at 484–85 (considering Denno’s disapproval of the use of
“mental age” as a factor for determining the presence of consent); GILL, supra note 56, at
38 (introducing assessment scales for determining ability to consent); Reed, supra note 47,
at 799 (focusing on the issues that legislatures should consider when reviewing the consent
ability of those with mental disabilities and describing clinical assessment tools).
225 Cases tend to include both expert and lay testimony on the question of incapacity to
consent, in part, because of the ability of experts to opine on the formal, diagnostic
measures of incapacity while the lay witnesses can often testify as to the adaptive deficits of
the individual. See, e.g., Page v. State, 610 S.E.2d 171, 174 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (recounting
that mother testified that victim “functions ‘like a two year old or less’” and nurse qualified
as an expert testified as to victim’s appearance of disability and physical evidence of rape).
Lay witnesses, also called fact witnesses, testify on the basis of their personal knowledge
about the events at issue in the case. In the context of sexual assault and mental disability,
lay witnesses on the question of incapacity to consent tend to be individuals with a prior
relationship to the victim such as family, friends, teachers, service providers, treating
physicians or other treating professionals who testify as to the types of functional
capabilities the victim has based on their own experience interacting with the victim
outside of the case before the court. The most frequently proffered types of primary lay
evidence are daily living skills, testimony regarding the physical appearance of disability,
and testimony from the witness about the medical diagnoses of the victim. See, e.g., Duhart
v. Vasquez, No. ED CV 12-922-GHK(E), 2012 WL 6761878, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2012)
(referencing the following lay testimony on personal hygiene: “Jane was given instruction
in hygiene, but she often came to school with an odor. She would say that she understood
personal care tasks in the abstract, but when she came to school staff could tell she was not
following good hygiene habits.”); People v. Thompson, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803, 806 (Ct. App.
2006) (referencing lay testimony from family member that the victim could not travel
independently, get a driver’s license, or, according to the mother, safely cross the street at a
crosswalk). Expert witnesses, in contrast to lay witnesses, are qualified by experience,
technical knowledge, or training to opine on a matter at issue and assist the fact-finder with
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although expert testimony on incapacity to consent is not required by
statute or common law,226 courts rely heavily upon expert testimony
to assist factfinders in consent determinations.227







































































Expert Evidence Lay Evidence
The data show that courts routinely review a mix of evidence of
IQ, mental age, and adaptive evidence in evaluating a victim’s inca-
pacity to consent. Said differently, there is no one form of evidence
that dominates. While this does not capture the fact-finder’s precise
assignment of probative weight, it does indicate that adaptive evi-
resolution of an issue of consequence in the case. The source of their authority is not
personal knowledge of the facts of the specific case, rather, their general expertise. In the
dataset, expert witnesses tend to be medical professionals (psychiatrists, psychologists,
physicians, nurses) who use formal assessment tools such as IQ tests or other standardized
measures and, at times, observations, to opine on the question of incapacity to consent to
sex and, because of their special stature as experts, may opine on the ultimate issue in
many states. See, e.g., Desper v. Commonwealth, No. 2116-10-3, 2011 WL 5346030, at *4
(Va. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2011) (noting that the State proffered Dr. Thomas Ryan, a board
certified clinical psychologist, who conducted twenty hours of testing and observation with
the victim and focused his testing and assessment on whether she had an intellectual
disability pursuant to standardized tests).
226 General consensus across jurisdictions exists that expert evidence is not required in
sexual assault and rape cases to resolve questions of incapacity on the basis of disability.
See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 722 S.E.2d 484, 491 (N.C. 2012) (holding that expert testimony is
not required on questions of mental incapacity based on disability). Courts agree that
incapacity is a question of fact to be resolved according to the fact-finders’ common base of
knowledge and experience. See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 689 N.W.2d 684, 689–90 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2004) (explaining that no expert testimony is required to prove mental incapacity
under the statute because, although undefined, mental illness or defect is within the
common knowledge base of the jury). See infra Section III (identifying this as a central
problem in the context of mental disability).
227 Experts qualified under state evidentiary rules testified in seventy-eight percent of
cases reviewed.
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dence is being considered—contrary to some of the traditional
assumptions. Given the two step analytical process courts tend to
adopt in determinations of legal incapacity to consent,228 evidence of
IQ scores and mental age, while still used, tend to fall within the
court’s first order query regarding the existence of a disability and,
depending on the jurisdiction, may be presented by a lay or expert
witness.229 As previously discussed, while some states stop the analysis
at this point, the majority of states continue to a second order analysis
as to whether the person’s disability prevented them from under-
standing the nature or consequences of the sexual conduct.
A more important question, therefore, is not whether the evi-
dence of functional, adaptive capacity comes into court, but rather,
what specific types of adaptive evidence are considered and what is
the connection between that evidence and the person’s functional
capacity to make a sexual decision. Table 2 organizes the evidence
proffered into five categories: (1) diagnostic-based; (2) receipt of wel-
fare benefits/economic or social supports; (3) functional capacities; (4)
aesthetics/physical; and (5) sexual knowledge/understanding.
Reviewing the examples below without the specific facts of the case is
somewhat of an abstract exercise, but is useful to see what connection
each one of these categories has (or should have) to the legal stan-
dards set forth in statutory and common law.
While some of the examples of evidence proffered in each cate-
gory appear appropriate when considering whether someone had the
capacity to understand their sexual decision, such as whether the
person received sex education and can answer very basic questions
about the mechanics and consequences of sex, other examples such as
understanding the social and moral context of a decision to engage in
homosexual conduct move into the zone of illegitimate moralizing and
raise concerns about overregulation and constitutionality.230
The primary evidence connecting the existence of a disability with
incapacity to consent is necessarily circumstantial as it goes to the
victim’s state of mind. The illustration below raises the central ques-
228 See supra Section II.B (discussing judicial tests and new taxonomy).
229 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fuller, 845 N.E.2d 434, 439 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006)
(stating that expert testimony is not required to prove mental disability when lay testimony
from state service provider testified that people with an IQ of 76 and below qualify to
receive services and victim had an IQ of 33) (citing Commonwealth v. Aitahmedlamara,
823 N.E.2d 408 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005)).
230 The development of a detailed normative taxonomy of appropriate functional
capacities examined by courts is beyond the scope of this Article. The goal of this Article is
to extract from recent cases what courts deem both relevant and highly probative of
incapacity to consent such that scholars, including this author in a future Article, can assess
the normative value of current functional capacities used by courts to judge consent.
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TABLE 2. EXAMPLES OF EVIDENCE PROFFERED TO SHOW
INCAPACITY TO CONSENT
Diagnostic-Based IQ scores ranging from unreadable to 75 
Developmental/Mental Ages from 11 months to 15 years 
Diagnoses of Cerebral Palsy, Down Syndrome, Intellectual Disability, 
Hydrocephalus, Dementia, Anxiety, Learning Disabilities, Deaf 
Receipt of Welfare  
Benefits/Social  
Supports 
Receipt of Supplemental Security Income Benefits, State Department of 
Disability Services 




Has a conservator or guardian (plenary or limited) who makes financial and 
medical decisions 
Communication impairments, nonverbal communication including grunting 
sounds, and behavioral responses to verbal cues 
Inability to write name or recite address correctly 
(Un)Employment or employment in sheltered workshop 
Non-specific testimony of impairments from family members, friends, support 
worker, case or social worker, teachers, school administrators, employers, law 
enforcement officers 
Inability to live independently without family, roommates, care or support 
workers 
Illiteracy 
Inability to make financial decisions such as manage monthly bills, pay rent, 
write checks, own a home 
Inability to drive a car, navigate public transportation independently 
Self-care skills such as inability to brush teeth, cook dinner, clean 
apartment/home, shower/bathe, eat, use the bathroom 
Lack of friends, social or romantic relationships 
Susceptible to suggestion 
Wants to please others and makes decisions based on earning affection or 
positive response from external sources 
Unable to express volition 
Poor personal hygiene and body odor 
Cannot engage in “reasoned judgment” 
Cannot understand how homosexual sexual conduct would be perceived 
negatively 
Cannot understand consequences of non-marital sex and social implications of 
“provocative dancing” 
Has slow, poor information processing as shown by taking a long time to 
respond to questions and giving answers that are not always responsive to the 
prompt 
Cannot exercise “good judgment” 
Aesthetics/Physical  
Appearance 
Testimony from the victim from which the factfinder was able to observe 
“appearance of disability” (with this specific goal) 
Observations of the victim’s physical appearance and adaptive abilities from 
experts retained for purpose of trial and experts qualified based on ongoing 
treatment relationship with the victim 
Sexual Knowledge/  
Understanding 
(Non)Receipt of sex education in school 
(In)Ability to use biologically accurate terms to describe sex, female and male 
sexual organs 
Cannot understand sex and its risks including pregnancy and sexually 
transmitted infections 
Cannot comprehend moral nature of sex or its social implications 
Lacks knowledge of the “social, medical, and practical” consequences of sexual 
conduct 
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tion of relevance of the evidence proffered in support of incapacity to
consent to sex and affords an opportunity to critically examine the
probative weight of some examples.  The very types of evidence that,
as a relative matter, seem most probative of an individual’s capacity to
consent to sex include knowledge of sexual activity and its biological
consequences, the ability to communicate (by any means), receipt of
sex education, prior decisionmaking experience, as well as prior rela-
tionships and opportunities for sexual expression.231
FIGURE 3. RELEVANCE: PROBATIVE WEIGHT OF PROFFERED
 EVIDENCE OF INCAPACITY
 
Evidence of disability is also much more detailed and defined in
the cases than the evidence establishing its connection to incapacity to
consent. In other words, the cases show less clarity and comfort with
establishing the nexus between the disability and the nature of con-
duct, or nature and consequences of the sexual conduct—in part a
function of the lack of political consensus on what someone needs to
know or be able to do to shield sexual decisions from government
intervention.
231 Interestingly, evidence of past relationships including sexual relationships would
likely be excluded by the prosecution pursuant to rape shield laws yet this evidence is
highly probative, not of whether the individual consented in the case before the court, but
on the question of capacity to consent to sex.
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b. Profile of the Victim
TABLE 3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS RE: VICTIM AND DEFENDANT
Variable Percent  N 
Profile of the Victim  172 
V has a mental disability232 99.4%  
V described as female 89.5%  
V described as male 10.5%  
Profile of the Defendant  172 
Non-Disabled D 97.7%  
D described as male 97.7%  
D described as female 2.3%  
Victim’s Residence*  147 
Facility 10.9%  
Group Home 12.9%  
Independent 12.9%  
Parent/Family 63.3%  
Relationship Between Victim and Defendant*  160 
Friend/Acquaintance of the Person with a Disability 28.8%  
Family (Consanguine) 0.9%  
Formal Position of Authority/Access 26.3%  
Stranger 12.5%  
Family Friend/Close Relationship with Family 23.8%  
* Removed “unknown” category. 
An analysis of the victim descriptions in the case law demon-
strates a second inconsistency between the traditional assumptions in
the scholarship, and the reality of how these cases are brought in
courts today. While many scholars assume that most victims of sexual
assault and rape are in institutionalized settings and focus their inter-
ventions accordingly,233 over 76% of victims in this study actually
lived independently or with a parent or family member.234 Only 11%
of victims lived in institutional settings, with a majority of these indi-
viduals being older adults. Yet current scholarship focuses almost
exclusively on people in residential institutions. Such focus is justifi-
able given the severity of disabilities experienced by people in institu-
232 Only one victim was suspected of having a disability but without a diagnosis or
discussion of medical conditions.
233 See, e.g., Boni-Saenz, supra note 24 (focusing on nursing homes); Denno, supra note
25 (focusing on women with disabilities in institutional settings); Perlin & Lynch, supra
note 20 (focusing on psychiatric hospitals and institutional settings).
234 See supra Table 3.
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tional settings,235 the level of state regulation of their lives, and, as a
result, the possibility of complete denial of sexual expression in the
name of risk management as well as the documented assault, neglect,
and abuse in institutional settings.236 However, this literature is
lacking discussion of the experience of people with mental disabilities
living in community settings (including with family, friends, indepen-
dently, or in group homes). This group represents the majority of
complainants in the cases reviewed. While this does not mean that
institutionalized individuals are at higher risk for abuse or experience
abuse more or less than those individuals living in the community,
what it does suggest is that scholars and lawmakers must pay attention
to this group of people and consider how their experiences with sexual
violence might be different than those in institutionalized settings.
Therefore, this study identifies a need to devote additional schol-
arly attention to sexual regulation, rape, and sexual assault of people
outside of more formally regulated institutionalized settings. The shift
from residential centers as the site of support services to a disaggre-
gated model of care in the community was the result of legal and
policy advances documenting the conditions of abuse and neglect in
state-funded institutions and framing unnecessary segregation in insti-
tutional settings as discrimination.237 The regulation of sexual agency
235 But see S.A. Larson et al., In-Home and Residential Long-Term Supports and
Services for Persons with Intellectual or Developmental Disabilities: Status and Trends
Through 2012, U. OF MINN., NAT’L RESIDENTIAL INFO. SYS. PROJECT (2014), https://
iacc.hhs.gov/publications/general/2012/residential_Information_systems_project.pdf
(finding that people in institutional settings are not necessarily the most severely disabled
and that people in community placements have similar or some more severe physical and
cognitive impairments than those in the most restrictive institutional environments).
236 See Denno, supra note 25, at 379–95 (devoting last part of paper entirely to the
question of sexual agency for people in institutionalized settings). See generally
Boni-Saenz, supra note 24 (devoting entire Article to older adults in institutionalized
settings with headliner case, State v. Rayhons, No. 04211FECR01078, 2014 WL 12594215
(Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 14, 2014)); Fischel & O’Connell, supra note 24 (recommending
reformulation of the law to account for relational autonomy and dependency that leaves,
according to the authors, the most severely disabled vulnerable to abuse and sexual
violence); Perlin, supra note 20 (focusing on people with psychosocial and psychiatric
disabilities but references and analogizes the situation to people with intellectual and
developmental disabilities in institutional settings).
237 E.g. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (1990) (amended
2008), with accompanying DOJ regulations on integrated services under Title II, 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.203; Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112 (amended 1974); Olmstead v. L.C.
ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999) (holding that unjustified isolation is discrimination
based on disability and confinement to an institution diminishes the everyday life activities
of individuals, including family relations, social contracts, cultural enrichment, etc., but also
recognizing the States’ need to have a range of facilities for the care and treatment of
people with diverse mental disabilities); see also Jefferson D.E. Smith & Steve P.
Calandrillo, Forward to Fundamental Alteration: Addressing ADA Title II Integration
Lawsuits After Olmstead v. L.C., 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 703 (contending that
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in community settings can be quite complex (and the law even less
developed) given the more limited reach of the state when people
with mental disabilities reside with family members.238 These com-
plexities should only attract greater scholarly attention to this issue.
c. Victim’s Participation in Legal Process
TABLE 4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS RE: VICTIM’S
TESTIMONY AT TRIAL
Variable  Percent (%) N 
Victim Testified at Trial*  159 
Yes 86.2%  
No 8.8%  
Unable to Communicate239  5.0%  
* = Removed “unknown” category. 
This study finds that victims with mental disabilities—even with
significant communication impairments—testified in over 86% of the
cases reviewed.240 The astonishingly high rate of participation in
sexual assault and rape proceedings tempers current descriptive and
normative claims on procedural due process and mental disability.
Recent scholarship criticizes procedural hurdles preventing victims
with mental disabilities from accessing the criminal justice system.241
alternative care programs are not only more effective and less costly than mental
hospitalization, but have also universally provided more positive results).
238 See infra Part III (discussing the changing nature of familial relationships in the
community that create informal caregiving networks that are unregulated by the state); see
also Fischel & O’Connell, supra note 24, at 497–98.
239 Referring to cases where the record specifically notes that the victim could not
communicate.
240 While no empirical data exists regarding the percentages or rates of victims with
mental disabilities testifying in sexual assault cases as a baseline, or data on the
percentages of nondisabled victims testifying in sexual assault cases, there is some
information on child or adolescent victims of sexual abuse with intellectual disabilities who
testify in rape and sexual assault cases. See Bette L. Bottoms et al., Jurors’ Perceptions of
Adolescent Sexual Assault Victims Who Have Intellectual Disabilities, 27 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 205, 205 (2003) (noting that children and adolescents with intellectual disabilities
have high rates of sexual violence and abuse but low rates of prosecution, possibly due to
an assumption that the victims with mental disabilities would be poor witnesses and could
not testify in court as jurors would be unlikely to believe them).
241 See Courtney S. Bedell, Comment, Vulnerable Victims: Guaranteeing Procedural
Protections to Child and Developmentally Disabled Victims in Establishing Probable Cause
for Search and Arrest Warrants, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 729, 746–47 (2014) (arguing that
Congress and state legislatures need to enact affirmative legislation addressing the
testimony of witnesses with developmental disabilities to balance procedural justice with
the defendant’s constitutional rights to confrontation and a fair trial); Fitzsimons, supra
note 85, at 81–82 (“Rather than focusing effort to discredit and disqualify people with
disabilities from giving testimony, every attempt should be made to find reasons why a
person should be permitted to give evidence, with supports provided to maximize
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However, state and federal evidentiary rules begin from a presump-
tion of witness competency in all cases.242 Courts have interpreted
these rules to require a low threshold to competency to testify, rea-
soning that the factfinder can properly assess a witness’s credibility
and assign the proper evidentiary weight.243 Of note is how courts
managed the question of witness competency particularly in relation
to a central issue of fact: the victim’s capacity to consent. Contrary to
the existing scholarship, analysis of the case law demonstrates that
courts regularly disaggregate the two questions and recognize that a
person’s competency to testify is a relatively lower legal threshold
than whether they are capable of consenting to sex. For example, in
State v. Peters, the fact that a victim with a mental disability was found
competent to testify did not mean that she was also capable of under-
standing the nature of the sexual act, since there is a vast difference
between understanding the distinction between truths and lies and
understanding the nature and consequences of sexual assault.244 While
there were instances where courts found the victim incapable of testi-
fying, there were many more where neither the court nor the parties
competency.”). Cf. Kristine I. Erickson & Nitza B. Perlman, Knowledge of Legal
Terminology and Court Proceedings in Adults with Developmental Disabilities, 25 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 529, 540–41 (2001) (recognizing increasing participation in the justice system
of people with intellectual and developmental disabilities but a lack of understanding of
technical legal terminology by those individuals, and calling for greater education to make
participation meaningful).
242 E.g. FED. R. EVID. 601 (“Every person is competent to be a witness unless these
rules provide otherwise.”); CAL. EVID. CODE § 700 (West 2017) (“Except as otherwise
provided by statute, every person, irrespective of age, is qualified to be a witness and no
person is disqualified to testify to any matter.”). But see CAL. EVID. CODE § 701 (West
2017) (disqualifying a witness who is “(1) Incapable of expressing himself or herself
concerning the matter so as to be understood, either directly or through interpretation by
one who can understand him; or (2) Incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to
tell the truth.”).
243 See, e.g., Mathis v. State, 682 So. 2d 175, 180–81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (“Children
having a chronological age younger than the alleged victim’s ‘mental and developmental
age’ have been found to possess a sufficient understanding of the difference between the
truth and a lie, and the moral obligation to relate the former . . . so as to be competent to
testify in court.”); see also FED. R. EVID. 601 advisory committee’s notes (“Discretion is
regularly exercised in favor of allowing the testimony. A witness wholly without capacity is
difficult to imagine. The question is one particularly suited to the jury as one of weight and
credibility, subject to judicial authority to review the sufficiency of the evidence.”) (citing 2
WIGMORE §§ 501, 509).
244 441 So. 2d 403, 409 (La. Ct. App. 1983); see also State v. Jones, No. W2073-00335-
CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 3002808, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2014) (“[T]he fact that
the victim was allowed to testify does not undercut the finding that the victim was mentally
defective.”).
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raised questions about competency to testify, even where factfinders
ultimately found that person incapable of consent.245
The operative question, therefore, is not whether people with dis-
abilities participate in legal process, but when the person does partici-
pate, how difficult or easy is it for them to do so meaningfully.
Existing scholarship makes compelling arguments about the need for
additional scrutiny of the trial process itself and its legal methods,
such as cross-examination, that are ill suited for the ways in which
people with mental disabilities process and recall information.246
Data in this empirical study challenge certain existing claims and
push scholars to reframe others. The next section takes stock of the
overall findings and explains how and why reframing the problem
reveals previously unidentified regulatory problems as well as novel
prescriptive interventions for discussion.
III
REFRAMING THE PROBLEM
This Part draws upon the empirical data in Part II to reframe the
problem as one of a deficit in experience and information on the epis-
temological nature of mental incapacity and disability that affects how
states regulate, how judges construct and apply legal tests, and how
juries decide legal incapacity. The problem is not vagueness per se,
but rather, how these statutes capture the experience of disability in
the first instance and how courts make sense of that language.
Reframing the problem in this way exposes unexplored challenges at
each institutional level (legislatures, courts, and juries) and clears a
245 See, e.g., Bowman v. State, 760 So. 2d 1053, 1053–55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (“The
fact that . . . a child is competent to testify . . . is not inconsistent with being mentally
defective under . . . Florida Statutes. Unlike telling the truth, the inappropriateness of
[certain] type[s] of sexual activity . . . is not necessarily something which is normally
discussed with a person who is mentally only five years old.”).
246 See, e.g., D. Andre-Barron et al., What to Tell and How to Tell: A Qualitative Study
of Information Sharing in Research for Adults with Intellectual Disability, 34 J. MED.
ETHICS 501, 505 (2008) (discussing the ways in which people with intellectual disabilities
may process information differently, requiring accommodations in the information sharing
process to make medical consent meaningful); Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of
Criminal Defendants with Mental Retardation to Participate in Their Own Defense, 81 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 419, 423–424 (1990) (proposing two corrective arrangements:
assuring the client is carefully and thoroughly interviewed about the alleged offense by a
properly trained person to assess “legal incompetence” and providing adjunctive assistance
through judicially designated “representatives” or “consultants”); Ronda Cress et al.,
Mental Health Courts and Title II of the ADA: Accessibility to State Court Systems for
Individuals with Mental Disabilities and the Need for Diversion, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 307, 333–39 (2006) (explaining the development of mental health courts to address
the criminal justice system’s response to the challenges of participation by people with
mental disabilities).
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path for prescriptive responses reflecting the current state of the law
and the experiences of people with disabilities.
A. Legislatures: New Regulatory Realities of Integration
The data show that it is not just a question of poorly drafted,
vague statutes that are interpreted too broadly by overzealous, risk
averse judges who fail to exercise discretion. Such an overly simplistic
construction of the problem misses a critical first order challenge: that
legislatures and judges do not have a handle on the experiences of
people with mental disability living in the community. Not surpris-
ingly, then, statutes will be unable to capture the way in which people
with disabilities encounter and respond to sexual violence. Some
degree of statutory vagueness will always exist in sex offense statutes
and beyond.
First, current statutes do not account for the experiences of indi-
viduals like D.J. in the Stubblefield case who have significant physical
and communication impairments and nevertheless may have the
mental capacity for consent but are unable to communicate that
capacity in normatively typical ways.247 What is the basis for state nul-
lification of consent in this context and how does the law capture it? A
recent Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. James, confronted a
related question of when someone with a disability is physically inca-
pable of consent as opposed to physically helpless,248 an issue of first
impression at the federal level.249 The district court set aside a jury
verdict to convict the defendant of sexually assaulting his step-niece,
T.C., construing the federal statute under which the defendant was
charged narrowly to require complete physical helplessness. Because
the record reflected T.C.’s ability to communicate preferences, even if
impaired, the district court argued that the state had not met its
burden of proving incapacity based on the statutory language. The
Ninth Circuit overturned the district court’s ruling and held that the
legal standard of physical incapacitation on the basis of disability was
different from physical helplessness, but that the language should be
construed broadly in accordance with congressional intent to protect
247 See supra Part II.
248 810 F.3d 674, 679 (9th Cir. 2016) (“This case turns on the breadth of the ‘physically
incapable’ standard in § 2242(2)(B) for punishing a sexual act with an individual with the
physical incapacity to decline participation in or communicate unwillingness to engage in
the act.”).
249 While an issue of first impression at the federal level, state courts have recently faced
similar questions. See, e.g., State v. Fourtin, 52 A.3d 674, 687 (Conn. 2012) (distinguishing
physical helplessness from ability to communicate consent); Fischel & O’Connell, supra
note 24, at 473–86 (responding to the Fourtin case).
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helpless and vulnerable victims.250 In the course of a (rather uninten-
tionally) scathing dissent, Judge Kozinski highlights a central problem
with the current statutory framework:
Because the government chose to prosecute James under subsection
(2)(B) (dealing with physical incapacity) rather than subsection
(2)(A) (dealing with mental incapacity), we must assume that T.C.
was capable of understanding and consenting to sexual intercourse
with James. The only question is whether she was able to communi-
cate lack of consent if she chose not to participate. . . . It’s possible
that T.C. didn’t comprehend the situation, either when she was with
James or with the nurse. . . . But because the government didn’t
charge James under section 2242(2)(A), T.C.’s mental capacity to
“apprais[e] the nature of the conduct” was never at issue before the
jury and is not at issue now. We therefore must presume her limita-
tions were purely physical, and that her comprehension of the situa-
tion was no different from that of any other adult woman. The
majority’s periodic references to T.C.’s mental capacity betray its
effort to justify James’s conviction under a provision he was not
charged with violating.251
Here, unlike in the Stubblefield case where Anna proferred evi-
dence of consent, direct and circumstantial evidence pointed to non-
consent. Yet the principal challenge is the same: How should statutes
capture the experiences of D.J. and T.C. that point to communication
barriers and not necessarily mental incapacity as the critical impair-
ment at issue?252 Under the federal statutory scheme, the state will
have to prove that individuals like T.C. could not physically say no in
order to convict, which moves backwards in time in rape law reform.
The two statutory alternatives are insufficient to capture her experi-
ence. The state can argue that she was physically helpless akin to
unconsciousness or that T.C. was mentally incapable of consent, which
may or may not be the case.
Second, state legislatures, aware of the high incidence of sexual
violence experienced by people with cognitive disabilities, have
250 James, 810 F.3d at 683 (“The law in its majesty protects from assault those who are
too weak and feeble to protect themselves. No society worthy of being called civilized may
do any less.”); see also D. Aaron Lacy, Am I My Brother’s Keeper: Disabilities,
Paternalism, and Threats to Self, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 55, 59–72 (2003) (describing
congressional history in addressing imbedded prejudices against people with disabilities
that have affected people with disabilities in every aspect of their lives to “protect the
rights of the oppressed minority groups”).
251 James, 810 F.3d at 684–86 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
252 Consider State v. Fourtin, 52 A.3d 674 (Conn. 2012), in which a Connecticut court
found a woman with physical (mobility and communication) impairments did not meet the
statutory definition of “physically helpless” such that the prosecution could not secure a
conviction for rape. See also Fischel & O’Connell, supra note 24, at 473–86 (describing the
Fourtin case and its aftermath).
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extended criminal sexual regulation to caregivers in positions of
authority.253 While regulation in this area may be justifiable, the statu-
tory structure focuses on formal caregiving relationships that are dis-
connected from emerging informal caregiving relationships that sit at
the intersection of class and disability. The dataset from this Article
suggests that a sizable number of defendants in these cases have
informal, intimate relationships with the victim’s family (relationships
with the victim’s consanguine relatives such as dating, and
cohabitating without being married to the victim’s parent) and current
statutes do not capture these intimate but informal caregiving
networks.
For example, in Michigan, a person is incapable of sexual consent
if the individual is, among other categories, “mentally incapable” or
“mentally disabled.”254 The latter means having a medical diagnosis of
an intellectual or developmental disability and being under the
“authoritative care” of another, categorically excluding those who
meet the legal definition of consenting to sex. The former category,
“mentally incapable,” ties the legal definition, irrespective of disa-
bility, to the person’s inability to appraise the nature of the indi-
vidual’s conduct. Prosecutors’ charging decisions dictate the scope of
relevant evidence in relation to the alleged facts of the case. If the
state opts to charge under the latter category, “mentally disabled,”
then the question of legal consent turns on the existence of a diagnosis
of mental disability, the defendant’s “position of authority” over the
victim, and whether the defendant “used this authority to coerce the
victim to submit.”255
There is some confusion in the case law as to when and how these
provisions operate in relation to each other. In People v. Graves, the
defendant lived next door to the victim and her mother at an extended
stay motel.256 The victim’s mother engaged in sexual conduct with the
253 This is in addition to civil tort and professional liability for formal, non-family
caregivers. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-5.1(d) (West 2017) (“[A licensed caregiver]
commits sexual assault when he or she engages in sexual contact with another individual
who the actor knew or should have known had been admitted to or is receiving services
from [a licensed] facility or the actor.”), (e) (“Consent of the victim shall not be a defense
to prosecution.”); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-1505B (2017) (Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of a
Vulnerable Adult), 18-919 (Sexual Exploitation by a Medical Care Provider); MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-604(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2018) (“A caregiver, a parent, or other person
who has permanent or temporary care or responsibility for the supervision of a vulnerable
adult may not cause abuse or neglect of the vulnerable adult that: . . . (iii) involves sexual
abuse of the vulnerable adult.”), (a)(3) (defining “caregiver” as “a person under a duty to
care for a vulnerable adult because of a contractual undertaking to provide care”).
254 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520a(j) (2017), (i) (respectively).
255 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520(b).
256 People v. Graves, No. 287730, 2009 WL 3683379, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2009).
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defendant on a number of occasions but was not “dating” him.257 As a
result of his interaction with the mother and his residential proximity,
the defendant had access to the victim on a number of occasions, one
of which included the incident in the case.258 The victim, mother, and
defendant were all together in one of the rooms when defendant
began to engage in sexual acts with the then fifteen-year-old victim
(such as kissing and groping and eventually, penetration) in front of
her mother. The appellate court held that sufficient evidence existed
to meet the definition of “mentally incapable” based on the victim’s
failure to comprehend that engaging in such acts as she did was not
“normal” and reflected her inability to understand the normative
nature of sexual conduct.259 The record also reflected evidence of
functional capacities such as her ability to independently cook
(including grocery shopping, reading a recipe, preparing meals, com-
puter proficiency, and self-care such as showering, dressing, and
toileting) and evidence of functional incapacities (including her
inability to read or write, receipt of special education services, and
existence of a “very low” IQ score).260
The court held that the mother’s description of her daughter’s
IQ—“her functioning at a level of half of her age, her inability to read
and write, and her apparent deficits in ability to recollect—[was] ade-
quate evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the complainant
was ‘mentally disabled’ because she was ‘mentally retarded.’”261
While the court held that sufficient evidence of “mental retardation”
existed on this record, it reasoned that the state did not present suffi-
cient evidence of the defendant’s “authority” over the victim or use of
that authority as part of the sexual offense.262 The court noted that
although the statute did not require formal, “legal authority” over the
victim (saying teachers or pastors or counselors would count) some-
thing more was required.263 This is not a question of statutory vague-
ness that results in overregulation; rather, Graves provides an
example of how vagueness may actually move in the direction of
potential under-regulation based on whether courts read the statutes
narrowly or expansively.
257 Id. at *1.
258 Id. (referencing the victim’s mother’s testimony that the victim knew the defendant
“‘[j]ust as the man next door and she knew I liked him and she thought he was a good
guy’”).
259 Id. at *3.
260 Id. at *2.
261 Id. at *3.
262 Id. at *5.
263 Id.
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The statutory vagueness, then, stems from the inability of the
statute to capture the intersection of disability with class and changing
familial structures like the facts in Graves illustrate: a single mother
living in transient housing, a non-consanguine individual in close resi-
dential proximity with no typical “authority” over the victim in the
sense intended by the statutory scheme. In turn, courts are faced with
a no-win situation: read the statute broadly to protect on facts that
display vulnerability (and perhaps cognizant of the law’s limitations,
as expressed by Judge Kozinski in the James case)264 or narrowly, con-
sistent with the letter of the law, but significantly removed from the
realities of sexual violence. Juries, unfamiliar with the continuum of
functional capacities that exist for a person with a cognitive disability,
despite the existence of a diagnostic label, continue to gravitate
toward the power of the label. In Graves, the jury had significant evi-
dence of functional capacity that would suggest the individual, despite
being in possession of a medical label of intellectual disability, might
not actually meet the legal definition of “mentally disabled.”  In this
respect, the facts of this case may better fall within “mentally inca-
pable” with proof of functional incapacities assigned varying degrees
of probative weight based on their connection to the nature of the
sexual conduct.
B. Judges: Hierarchies of Legal Incapacity
Experiential and informational deficits about the nature of
mental incapacity and disability also permeate the ways in which
courts decide questions of legal incapacity to consent. For courts, the
central question is how to disaggregate functional capacities to better
correlate with the particular legal decision at hand. Functional inca-
pacities in one area do not necessarily relate to or reflect decisional
capacities in other areas. For example, one’s ability to independently
make financial decisions does not mean that the same person is not or
should not be recognized as capable of making decisions about mar-
riage or whether or not to have children.
The problem for judges is how to manage epistemological uncer-
tainties about mental incapacity in the legal process and interpretation
of statutes that, currently, do not offer much guidance on how to
determine legal incapacity. The central question is how judges should
decide which functional capacities matter in determinations of legal
capacity. Judicial rhetoric reflects an increasing intellectual under-
standing that the existence of a mental disability does not equate with
264 United States v. James, 810 F.3d 674, 683–88 (9th Cir. 2016) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).










      05/24/2018   08:08:34
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\93-3\NYU303.txt unknown Seq: 73 23-MAY-18 16:36
552 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:480
a finding of legal incapacity to consent.265 However, judges must
grapple with two issues regarding epistemological uncertainty. First,
how does the capacity to consent to sex relate to the broader develop-
ment of jurisprudence on incapacity? Judges have clearly established
the low threshold required for witnesses with disabilities to testify in
court. Relative to this, courts have found that sexual consent requires
greater functional capacities than testifying, though which ones
remains an open question. Are there particular hierarchies of legal
capacity that exist or should be developed more intentionally? For
example, should decisions about marriage (which in many cases could
include decisions about sex) require more or less, different, or the
same functional capacities as sexual consent? Where does the decision
to enter into financial contracts lie?
Second, in the search for greater epistemological clarity, what is
the proper scope of expertise in sexual consent cases and how should
courts judge the validity and reliability of non-traditional scientific
evidence? Expert evidence is a part of nearly 80% of cases reviewed
as part of this study,266 yet this evidence is almost uniformly medical
expertise from experts hired to do intelligence testing for purposes of
the proceeding or those with existing treating relationships with the
victim. The cases do not reflect any significant dispute about the quali-
fications or relevance of these medical experts. As courts expand the
types of evidence of functional capacities deemed relevant to the
sexual consent inquiry, non-medical scientific evidence will come
before the court—as in the Stubblefield case and in many of the cases
discussed in Part II. As a result, judges will have to determine whether
such evidence is sufficiently relevant and reliable under the rules of
evidence to be considered by factfinders. The Stubblefield case must
resolve the evidentiary questions as the foundation of inquiries into
sexual consent. How much uncertainty about “facilitated communica-
tion” is acceptable? Is facilitated communication a Ouija board to be
manipulated by predatory individuals or a technologically experi-
265 See supra Part II; see also, e.g., State v. Schaller, 975 S.W.2d 313, 317 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1997) (holding the State’s evidence of mental disability insufficient, including
testimony from a detective that the victim “appeared to be mentally challenged” when he
interviewed her and testimony from a family counselor for the victim at a therapeutic day
program that the victim was in a special education program, received psychiatric
counseling, and was “mentally challenged”). Of note is the court’s nuanced reasoning:
“Neither an emotional problem, psychiatric counseling, nor admission to special education
programs equates with being mentally defective. . . . Her testimony reflects a person who
was conscious of her surroundings and capable of appraising the nature of her conduct.”
Id. at 317–18.
266 See Harris, supra note 33; see also supra note 227 (citing experts that testified in
cases reviewed).
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mental process that unlocks the key to distinguishing between mental
incapacity and communication impairments? The appellate court’s
decision in the Stubblefield case suggests greater openness to non-
traditional expertise in the context of disability but this is very much
an open and live question.267
C. Juries: The Aesthetics of Disability
Jurors’ lack of experience with and knowledge of the differenti-
ated nature of mental disability negatively affect the fact-finding mis-
sion. The question of functional capacity to consent is firmly rooted in
the jury’s purview for both disabled and nondisabled victims.268 The
jury is charged with deciding (and deemed qualified to decide) this
extremely complex question based on the existence of a common base
of knowledge and experience.269 The average lay juror may have
experience determining whether someone’s intoxication level ren-
dered the individual temporarily incapacitated under a statute based
on experience or other sources of information.270 There is a relatively
more established baseline of common knowledge and experience
related to intoxication.271 However, most lay jurors will enter the jury
room with no experience interacting with a person with a cognitive
disability (particularly intellectual disabilities) and limited under-
267 State v. Stubblefield, 162 A.2d 1074 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017).
268 See, e.g., State v. Cone, 3 S.W.3d 833, 840 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (“Generally, [certain
cases] stand for the proposition that ‘weak-mindedness,’ ‘unsound mind’ or ‘imbecility of
mind,’ as it related to one’s ability to know or comprehend the nature of the act, was a
question for the jury to determine.”); Hacker v. State, 118 P.2d 408, 412 (Okla. Crim. App.
1941) (“In many jurisdictions, including this one, it has been held that whether the female
possesses mental capacity sufficient to give legal consent must, save in exceptional cases,
remain a question of fact for the jury.”).
269 See State v. Perkins, 689 N.W.2d 684, 689 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that no
expert testimony is required to prove mental incapacity under the statute because,
although undefined, mental illness or defect is within the common knowledge base of the
jury: “The jury is not asked to diagnose the victim’s mental illness or deficiency—the State
only has to prove that the victim suffered from a mental illness or deficiency that rendered
the victim incapable of appraising his or her conduct.”); see also John H. Mansfield, Jury
Notice, 74 GEO. L.J. 395, 395 (1985) (considering the purpose of a jury trial and the
background information a jury should be able to consider); Donna Shestowsky, Where is
the Common Knowledge? Empirical Support for Requiring Expert Testimony in Sexual
Harassment Trials, 51 STAN. L. REV. 357, 359 (1999) (asking whether there can be a
common body of knowledge that accurately reflects the reality of sexual harassment).
270 See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 98 P.3d 1258, 1263 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (“The effects of
alcohol are commonly known and jurors can draw reasonable inferences from testimony
about alcohol use.”).
271 Though even in this context legal scholars have questioned the existence of a clear
baseline.
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standing that the existence of a mental disability does not on its own
mean that the person lacks general decisional agency.272
The juror’s comment post-verdict in the Stubblefield case most
clearly illustrates the challenge of moving beyond the stigma of
mental disability to effectively and fairly execute fact-finding responsi-
bilities.273 This is not to suggest that she did not fairly complete her
jury service; rather, her comment reflects the danger of information
deficits in decisionmaking and the potential of jurors to rely on more
stereotypical notions of what disability looks like and what that actu-
ally means—a phenomenon this author calls “the aesthetics of
disability.”274
In the absence of differentiated information on the capabilities of
people with mental disabilities, the aesthetics of disability serve as
sensory triggers of heuristics about existing normative perceptions and
constructions of the lives of people with mental disabilities. In other
words, it captures the look and sounds of incapacity by reference to a
set of existing social norms about mental disability. It implies that
there are specific, visible physical and auditory markers that uniquely
identify someone as incapacitated or disabled.275
For example, the aesthetics of autism might include the ways in
which certain atypical social (lack of eye contact), communicative
(non-verbal or speech and language deficits) and behavioral (rocking
or aggressive) manifestations are interpreted by factfinders in court
proceedings: “The construct of autism, never located as inherent to
272 See David L. Westling et al., College Students’ Attitudes About an Inclusive
Postsecondary Education Program for Individuals with Intellectual Disability, 48 EDUC. &
TRAINING IN AUTISM & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 306, 317 (2013) (in study of
college students’ attitudes towards students with intellectual and developmental
disabilities, evidence of prior contact with individuals with intellectual or developmental
disabilities correlated with more positive attitudes towards the participation of students
with these disabilities in college programs).
273 The social science literature on the power of stigma as a singular identity is well-
developed. See, e.g., IRVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF
SPOILED IDENTITY 2 (1963) (characterizing stigma as “assumptions as to what the
individual before us ought to be”); Brenda Major & Laurie T. O’Brien, The Social
Psychology of Stigma, 56 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 393, 394–96 (2005) (describing the effect of
stigma as reducing a person “from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one”).
274 The “aesthetics of disability” refer to socially and medically constructed visual,
behavioral, and auditory markers of mental disability that serve as proxies for incapacity.
These aesthetic markers are relational and take shape in comparison to culturally defined
neuro-typical conventions. The author develops the theoretical and normative implications
of the “aesthetics of disability” in a related Article. See Jasmine E. Harris, The Aesthetics
of Disability (Mar. 24, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
275 Disability studies scholars such as Rosemarie Garland Thompson contend that
“particular identities are produced and located within a hierarchy of bodily traits that
determines the distribution of privilege, status, and power.” Jessica N. Lester & Trena M.
Paulus, Performative Acts of Autism, 23 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 259, 265 (2012).
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the [person], is only made real when it is negotiated between the key
social actors (i.e., diagnosticians) and the [person’s] very performance
of the ‘autistic look.’”276
The empirical data in this study support this author’s concerns
about the role of stigma in jury deliberations. Although courts have
diversified the types of evidence allowed to reach the jury—moving
from a focus on IQ and mental age to expert and lay evidence of func-
tional capacity—juries continue to struggle with establishing a clear
nexus between the mental impairment and its effect on the person’s
ability to consent. Factfinders appear to overvalue certain types of evi-
dence of functional incapacity that are more clearly tied to general
disability and impairment—such as living in a group home or
receiving state entitlements designed for people with cognitive disabil-
ities—and less connected to the individual’s ability to exercise sexual
agency.
The fact that almost 88% of complainants with mental disabilities
testify in rape and sexual assault cases raises concerns about how
jurors are processing the visual and substantive information about
mental disability. Is the witness’s presence and appearance a demon-
strative, like D.J. in the Stubblefield case, or are juries analyzing the
substantive content of the testimony? Social science research suggests
that jurors perceive witnesses with intellectual and developmental dis-
abilities as honest and credible but significantly discount the substance
of their testimony in cases where the conduct of the person is not at
issue.277 Without sufficient information about functional capacities,
jurors like the juror in the Stubblefield case risk overreliance on the
aesthetics of disability.
While a detailed prescriptive analysis is beyond the scope of this
paper, courts should consider ways to buttress the effects of the aes-
thetics of disability by addressing a root cause, the lack of normative
shifts in the understanding of disability has several implications for
legal decision-makers.  This phenomenon is much broader than sexual
assault trials where the victim has a mental disability, including, most
immediately, the impending Stubblefield trial. First, courts have an
affirmative duty to address the aesthetics of disability in legal deci-
sionmaking. The rules of evidence, such as the rules on expertise, can
276 Id. at 266; see also Tombroek v. State, 217 P.3d 806, 814 (Wyo. 2009) (noting that the
jury heard testimony concerning the victim’s low IQ and other signs of mental disability,
observed the victim, and could subsequently evaluate her testimony in light of those
statements and observations).
277 See, e.g., Georgina Stobbs & Mark Rhys Kebbell, Jurors’ Perception of Witnesses
with Intellectual Disabilities and the Influence of Expert Evidence, 16 J. APPLIED RES. IN
INTELL. DISABILITIES 107, 112 (2003).
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address the information deficit among legal decision-makers.  More
specifically, given the relative scarcity of financial resources in crim-
inal defense,278 courts sua sponte should consider appointing an expert
on mental disability and legal incapacity questions generally to con-
textualize the capacity decision before the court and provide the nec-
essary nuance.279  Second, courts should consider jury instructions
addressing the aesthetics of disability and directing juries on the treat-
ment and potential biases of aesthetic evidence.  Courts must balance
these instructions with the need for juries to assign due probative
weight to the evidence and the nature of the adversarial system to
drive the presentation of evidence.  In criminal sexual assault cases,
however, where the stakes are particularly high for a criminal defen-
dant, courts have heightened duties to guard against potential bias
infecting due process. These initial prescriptions target the informa-
tion deficit and decisionmaking process.  Future legal scholarship and
social science research should consider lessons from other areas of
implicit bias in legal decisionmaking such as in the contexts of race,
gender, and sexual orientation. This includes qualitative studies of
juror and judicial perceptions of individuals with intellectual disabili-
ties who are victims in these cases as well as quantitative explorations
of the aesthetics of disability in the outcome of cases, for example.
CONCLUSION
For the 15 million people with mental disabilities in the United
States,280 legislators and judges must carefully balance the prospect of
denying someone the ability to engage in consensual sexual activities
against the risk of sexual harm or abuse. The gravity of these stakes
requires informed public discussions about acceptable levels of risk
and uncertainty in this context. How much uncertainty are we willing
to tolerate to support the exercise of sexual rights? How much risk is
too much? Honest discussions will require confrontation of a sordid
278 See, e.g., Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases,
A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1096–1100 (2006) (noting the lack of resources
available to court-appointed defense counsel or public defenders to investigate cases and
retain experts to challenge the state’s cadre of experts); Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming
Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense Reform, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (2013) (noting
and citing to literature regarding the “inadequate or nonexistent expert and investigative
resources for defense counsel”); Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense
Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 222 (2004) (noting
that “parity of resources is not the current reality in criminal justice funding” with
prosecutors receiving larger salaries, smaller caseloads, and access to investigative and trial
resources such as expert witnesses).
279 Federal and state rules of evidence afford judges significant discretion to appoint
experts on special matters. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 706.
280 BRAULT, supra note 20.
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history of the treatment of individuals with mental disabilities tainted
by eugenics, fear, and disgust that underwrites current sexual
regulation.
This Article offers contemporary data as a baseline for informed
debates about consent and mental disability. It highlights the sizable
information deficits about what it means to have a mental disability
and how functional capacities differ across contexts. The Stubblefield
case may be the most recent, but it is certainly not the last public
reckoning with these questions. The new realities of integration and
care only increase the urgency of the conversation. The time has come
for the law to recognize this fact and confront these difficult questions.
APPENDIX A 
STATE STATUTORY DEFINITIONS AND ELEMENTS OF SEX OFFENSES RELATED TO VICTIMS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 
 
State    Statutory Provision(s)/Definition(s)       
Alabama   Offenses & Degrees: 
     Rape (first & second): ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-61, -62 (LexisNexis 2018) 
     Sodomy (first & second): ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-63, -64 (LexisNexis 2018) 
     Sexual Misconduct: ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65 (LexisNexis 2018)1 
     Sexual Abuse (first & second): ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-66, -67 (LexisNexis 2018) 
    Consent: ALA. CODE § 13A-6-70 (LexisNexis 2018) (“consent” not defined) 
“[I]ncapable of consent” by being “[m]entally defective”: ALA. CODE § 13A-6-70(c)(2) 
(LexisNexis 2018); ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(5) (LexisNexis 2018) 
    Defendant’s Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity: Not mentioned  
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
     
Alaska    Offenses & Degrees: 
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410(a)(3) (2017) (first degree)  
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.420(a)(2)–(3) (2017) (second degree)  
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.425(a)(1) (2017) (third degree) 
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.427 (2017) (fourth degree)2 
Consent: not defined 
 “[M]entally incapable” of consent: ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(4) (2017) 
Affirmative Defenses: 
To Sexual Assault: ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432(a)(1) (2017) (providing for a defense to a sexual 
assault crime if the offender is mentally incapable) 
Defendant’s Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity:  
Element of the offense. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410(a)(3)(A) (2017) (first degree) 
(“with another person . . . who the offender knows is mentally incapable”), 11.41.420(a)(2)(A) 
(2017) (second degree) (“with a person . . . who the offender knows is mentally incapable”), 
11.41.420(a)(3)(A) (2017) (second degree) (“with a person who the offender knows is mentally 
incapable”), and 11.41.425(a)(1)(A) (2017) (third degree)(“with a person who the offender knows 
is mentally incapable”) 
1 But see Williams v. State, 184 So. 3d 1064, 1072 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015) (holding the statute to be unconstitutional in part, as applied to a specific defendant in a particular 
situation).  
2 While this section does not specifically mention people with disabilities, it can be more generally applied to any persons in custody or probationary supervision.  
 A-i 
                                                          
 
 
Arizona    Offenses & Degrees: 
     Sexual Abuse: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1404 (2018) (separate offenses for abuse of minors)  
     Sexual Assault: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406 (2018) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”, “[w]ithout consent” defined: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b) (2018) 
“[M]ental defect”: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b) (2018) 
    Defendant’s Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b) (2018) 
    Affirmative Defenses: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407 (2018)3 (providing for various affirmative 
defenses) 
        
Arkansas   Offenses & Degrees:  
     Rape: ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103(a)(2) (2017) 
Sexual Assault (first through fourth degrees): ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-124 to -127 (2017) 
Definitions:  
“Consent”: Not defined 
“Mentally defective”: ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-101(4) (2017) 
Defendant’s Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity: Not mentioned in the statute 
Affirmative Defense: Rape: ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-102(e) (2017) (providing for an affirmative defense 
if “the actor reasonably believed that the victim was capable of consent”) 
 
 
California   Offenses & Degrees: 
Rape: CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(1) (West 2018) 
Other Sexual Offenses: See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 2018) (sex with a minor); § 
286(g)–(h) (West 2018) (sodomy); § 288a(d)(1) (West 2018) (oral copulation); § 243.4(b), (d) 
(West 2018) (sexual battery) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 2018) 
“Mental disorder” and “developmental . . . disability”: undefined 
“Seriously disabled”: CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4(g)(3) (West 2018) 
Defendant’s Mens Rea (Incapacity to Consent): element of the offense  
3 But see May v. Ryan, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1171 (D. Ariz. 2017) (holding that the burden-shifting scheme of § 13-1407(E) as applied in this case violates the Constitution's 
guarantee of due process of law). 
 A-ii 
                                                          
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned  
 
Colorado   Offenses & Degrees:  
     Sexual Assault: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-402 (West 2018) 
     Unlawful Sexual Contact: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-404 (1)(b), (c), (f) (West 2018) 
Note: no reference to mental disability by name.  
    Definitions:  
Consent:  Not defined in statute but see caselaw. See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 296 P.3d 285, 291–92 
(Colo. App. 2012). 
    Defendant’s Mens Rea (Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent): Element of the offense 
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned  
 
Connecticut   Offenses & Degrees: 
Sexual Assault in the first degree (Class B or A felony): CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70 (West 
2018) 
Aggravated Sexual Assault in the first degree (Class B or A felony): CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
53a-70a (West 2018) 
Sexual assault in the second degree (Class C or B felony): CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-71 
(West 2018) 
Sexual assault in the fourth degree (Class A misdemeanor or class D felony): CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 53a-73a (West 2018) 
    Definitions:  
Consent: Not defined 
“Impaired because of mental disability or disease”: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-65(4) (West 
2018) 
Defendant’s Mens Rea (Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent): Not mentioned in statute 
Affirmative Defenses: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67(a) (West 2018) (providing for a defense if the 
actor did not know of the victim’s condition) 
 
Delaware   Offenses & Degrees:  
Rape: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 770 (2018) (fourth degree), § 771 (2018) (third degree), § 772 
(2018) (second degree), § 773 (2018) (first degree) 
Sexual Harassment: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763 (2018) 
Unlawful Sexual Contact: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 767 (2018) (third degree), § 768 (2018) 
(second degree), § 769 (2018) (first degree) 
Crime Against a Vulnerable Adult: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1105 (2018) 
 A-iii 
Other Sexual Offenses: See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 764–765 (2018) (indecent exposure 
first and second degrees), § 766 (2018) (Incest) 
    Definitions:  
“Without consent”: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(j) (2018) 
“Cognitive disability”: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(a) (2018) 
“Vulnerable adult”: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1105(c) (2018) 
“Significant intellectual or developmental disabilities”: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1100(9) (2018)  
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(f)–(i) (2018) (respectively, defining “sexual contact,” “sexual 
intercourse,” “sexual offense,” and “sexual penetration”); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 
1100(7)(a)–(l) (2018): “Prohibited Sexual Act[s against vulnerable persons]” (enumerating 
prohibitions including sexual intercourse, sodomy, etc.)  
Defendant’s Mens Rea (Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent): Element of the offense 
Affirmative Defenses: See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1105(d) (2018) (stating it is not a defense that the 
accused did not know the victim was a vulnerable adult or that the accused reasonably believed the 
person was not a vulnerable adult, unless the statute expressly provides that knowledge that the victim is 
a vulnerable adult is a defense)  
 
District of Columbia  Offenses & Degrees:  
Sexual Abuse: D.C. CODE §§ 22-3002–3006 (2018) (respectively, first degree, second, third, 
fourth, and misdemeanor), § 22-3003(2) (2018) (second degree sexual abuse), § 22-3005(2) (2018) 
(fourth degree sexual abuse) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: D.C. CODE § 22-3001(4) (2018). See also D.C. CODE § 22-3001(8) & (9) (defining, 
respectively, “sexual act” and “sexual contact”) 
    Defendant’s Mens Rea (Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent): Element of the offense 
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Florida    Offenses & Degrees:  
Sexual Battery: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (LexisNexis 2018) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2018) 
“Mentally defective”: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2018) 
Defendant’s Mens Rea (Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent): Element of the offense, see FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 794.011(4)(e)(5) (LexisNexis 2018) 
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
 A-iv 
Georgia    Offenses & Degrees:  
     Rape: GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1 (West 2018) 
     Sexual Battery: GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-22.1 (West 2018) 
Sodomy: GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (West 2018)4 
Protection of Elder Persons: GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-102(a), (b) (West 2018) 
Other Sexual Offenses: See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3 (West 2018) (statutory rape); GA. 
CODE ANN.           § 16-6-5.1 (West 2018) (sexual assault by persons “who has supervisory or 
disciplinary authority…”) 
    Definitions: (only for Protection of Elder Persons in Separate Title of Code) 
“Disabled adult”: GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-100(3) (West 2018) 
“Mentally or physically incapacitated”: GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-100(7.1) (West 2018) 
“Dementia”: Persons: GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-100(2)(A), (B) (West 2018) 
Defendant’s Mens Rea (Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent): For Protection of Elder Persons 
Offenses: element of the crime, see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-102(a), (b) (West 2018) (“knowingly and 
willfully”) 
Affirmative Defenses: Under the Protection of Elder Persons Offenses, see GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-103 
(West 2018) (vicarious liability for agent’s offenses, but only if the “owner, officer, administrator, board 
member, employee, or agent was a knowing and willful party to or conspirator to the abuse or neglect”) 
 
Hawaii    Offenses & Degrees:  
Sexual Assault (first degree): HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-730(1) (LexisNexis 2017) 
     Sexual Assault (second degree): HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-731(1) (LexisNexis 2017) 
Sexual Assault (third degree): HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-732(1) (LexisNexis 2017) 
    Definitions:  
“Mentally defective”: HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-700 (LexisNexis 2017) 
    Defendant’s Mens Rea (Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent): Element of the offense  
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Idaho    Offenses & Degrees:  
Rape: IDAHO CODE § 18-6101(3) (2018) 
     Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of a Vulnerable Adult: IDAHO CODE § 18-1505B (2018) 
     Other: See, e.g., IDAHO CODE  § 18-919 (2018) (Sexual Exploitation by a Medical Care  
4 But see Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998) (holding that § 16-6-2 infringes upon a constitutional provision “insofar as it criminalizes the performance of private, 
unforced, non-commercial acts of sexual intimacy between persons legally able to consent”). 
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Provider) 
    Definitions:  
“Legal consent”: Undefined 
“Vulnerable adult”: IDAHO CODE § 18-1505 (2018) 
     Defendant’s Mens Rea (Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent): Not mentioned 
     Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Illinois    Offenses & Degrees:  
Criminal Sexual Assault: 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 11-1.20(a)(2) (West 2018) 
Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault: 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 11-1.30(c) (West 2018) 
Criminal Sexual Abuse: 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 11-1.50(a)(2) (West 2018) 
Aggravated Criminal Sexual Abuse: 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 11-1.60(e) (West 2018) 
    Definitions:  
“Knowing consent”: Not defined 
Defendant’s Mens Rea (Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent): Element of the offense  
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Indiana    Offenses & Degrees:  
Rape: IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1(a)(3) (West 2018) 
Sexual Battery: IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-8(a)(1)(B) (West 2018) 
Other Offenses: IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-4-4(c)(1)(B), (c)(2)(B), (e)(1)(B), (e)(2)(B) (West 
2018) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: Not defined 
“Mentally disabled or deficient”: Undefined 
Defendant’s Mens Rea (Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent): Element of the offense 
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Iowa    Offenses & Degrees:  
Sexual abuse defined: IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.1(2) (West 2018) 
Sexual abuse in the first degree: IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.2 (West 2018) 
Sexual abuse in the second degree: IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.3 (West 2018) 
Sexual abuse in the third degree: IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4(1)(b)(1) (West 2018) 
Other Sexual Offenses: See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.15 (West 2018) (Sexual Exploitation by 
a Counselor, Therapist, or School Employee) 
    Definitions:  
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“Consent”: not defined.  
“Incapacitation”: IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.1A (West 2018) 
    Defendant’s Mens Rea (Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent): Not mentioned 
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Kansas    Offenses & Degrees:  
Rape: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(a)(2) (2018) 
Aggravated Sexual Battery: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5505(b)(3) (2018) 
Aggravated Criminal Sodomy: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5504(b)(3)(C) (2018) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: Not defined 
“Mental deficiency or disease”: Not defined 
Defendant’s Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense  
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Kentucky   Offenses & Degrees: 
Rape in the third degree: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.060(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2018) 
Sodomy in the third degree: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.090(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2018) 
Sexual abuse in the second degree: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.120(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2018) 
    Definitions:  
“Lack of consent”: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.020(1), (2)(b), (3)(b) (LexisNexis 2018) 
 “Individual with an intellectual disability”: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(4) (LexisNexis 2018) 
Defendant’s Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent: Not mentioned 
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Louisiana    Offenses & Degrees: 
     Rape: LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:41(A) (2017) 
Rape in the first degree: LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(A)(6) (2017)5 
Rape in the third degree: LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:43(A)(2) (2017) 
Sexual Battery: LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.1(A)(1) (2017) 
Sexual Battery in the second degree: LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:43.2(A), (C)(3)(b) (2017) 
Other Sexual Offenses: See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.1.1(A) (2017) (Misdemeanor Sexual 
Battery) and LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:43.3(A)(2)(a)(ii), (C)(3) (2017) (Oral Sexual Battery)  
5 But see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (holding that this statute is unconstitutional and the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty “for the rape of a 
child where the crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in death of the victim”). 
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    Definitions:  
“Consent”: Not defined. Rape (and related sexual offenses) is defined as “without the person’s 
lawful consent.” LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:41(A) (2017); see also Sexual Battery (“without the consent 
of the victim”) LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.1(A)(1) (2017) 
“Mental infirmity”: LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(C)(2) (2017) 
“Unsoundness of Mind”: Not defined specifically; a condition of incapacity to consent 
enumerated in substantive sexual offenses. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:43(A)(2) (2017) 
Defendant’s Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense 
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Maine    Offenses & Degrees: 
Gross Sexual Assault: ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 253(2)(C) (2018) 
Unlawful Sexual Contact: ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 255-A (2018) 
Unlawful Sexual Touching: ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 260 (2018)  
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: not specifically defined; rather, noted that “consent is a defense. . .” ME. STAT. tit. 17-
A,        § 109(3) (2018) 
“Legally incompetent”: Not defined 
“Mental defect”: Not defined 
“Mental disability”: Not defined 
“Cognitive impairments”: Not defined 
“Autism”: ME. STAT. tit. 34-B, § 6002(2) (2018) 
“Intellectual disability”: ME. STAT. tit. 34-B, § 5001(3) (2018) 
    Defendant’s Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense 
Affirmative Defenses:  See ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 109 (2018) (providing a defense if consent was provided, 
but also defines when consent is not a defense) 
 
Maryland   Offenses & Degrees: 
Rape: MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 3-303(a)(1)(ii) (2018) (first degree), 3-304(a)(1), (2) 
(2018) (second degree) 
Sexual Offense in the third degree: MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-307(a)(2) (2018) 
Sexual Offense in the fourth degree: MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-308(b)(1) (2018) 
Other Sexual Offenses: See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-321(2018) (sodomy); § 3-322 
(2018) (unnatural or perverted sexual practice); and §§ 3-309–310 (2018) (Attempted rape in the 
first and second degree). See also § 3-604(a)(10) (2018) (Abuse or neglect of a vulnerable adult in 
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the first degree),           § 3-605 (2018) (Abuse or neglect of a vulnerable adult in the second 
degree) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: Not defined 
“Substantially cognitively impaired individual”: MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-301(f) (2018) 
“Intellectual disability”: Not defined. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-301(f) (2018) 
“Mental disorder”: Not defined. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-301(f) (2018) 
“Vulnerable adult”: MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-604(a)(10). [abuse and neglect of 
vulnerable adult; different chapter of criminal code] 
Defendant’s Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense  
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Massachusetts   Offenses & Degrees: 
Rape: MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 22(a) (LexisNexis 2018) 
Assault and battery or indecent assault and battery on mentally retarded person: MASS. ANN. 
LAWS ch. 265, § 13F (LexisNexis 2018) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: Not mentioned in statute 
“Intellectual disability”: Not defined in statute 
Defendant’s Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense 
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Michigan    Offenses & Degrees: 
Criminal Sexual Conduct 
First degree: MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.520b(1)(g), (h) (LexisNexis 2018) 
Second degree: MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.520c(1)(g), (h) (LexisNexis 2018) 
Third degree: MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.520d(1)(c) (LexisNexis 2018) 
Fourth degree: MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.520e(1)(c) (LexisNexis 2018) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: Not defined in statute 
“Developmental disability”: MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.520a(b) (LexisNexis 2018) 
“Intellectual disability”: MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.520a(d) (LexisNexis 2018) 
“Mental illness”: MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.520a(h) (LexisNexis 2018) 
“Mentally disabled”: MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.520a(i) (LexisNexis 2018) 
“Mentally incapable”: MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.520a(j) (LexisNexis 2018) 
“Mentally incapacitated”: MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.520a(k) (LexisNexis 2018) 
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Defendant’s Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense  
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Minnesota    Offenses & Degrees: 
     Criminal Sexual Conduct 
First degree: MINN. STAT. § 609.342(1)(e)(ii) (2018)6 
Second degree: MINN. STAT. § 609.343(1)(e)(ii) (2018) 
Third degree: MINN. STAT. § 609.344(1)(d) (2018)7  
Fourth degree: MINN. STAT. § 609.345(1)(d) (2018)    
Other Sex Crimes: See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.293 (2018) (sodomy), MINN. STAT. § 609.294 
(2018) (bestiality)  
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: MINN. STAT. § 609.341(4) (2018) 
“Sexual Contact”: MINN. STAT. § 609.341(11) (2018) 
“Mentally impaired”: MINN. STAT. § 609.341(6) (2018) 
Defendant’s Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of offense 
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Mississippi   Offenses & Degrees: 
Sexual Battery: MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-3-95 (1)(b) (West 2018) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: Not defined 
“[M]entally defective person”: MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-3-97(b) (West 2018) 
    Defendant’s Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent: Not mentioned in statute 
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Missouri   Offenses & Degrees: 
Rape  
Forcible rape and attempted forcible rape: MO. REV. STAT. § 566.030 (2018); See also MO. 
REV. STAT. § 566.031 (2018) (second degree rape)  
Sexual Abuse  
First degree: MO. REV. STAT. § 566.100 (2018); See also MO. REV. STAT. § 566.101 (2018) 
6 But see In re Welfare of B.A.H., 829 N.W.2d 431, 438 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (holding § 609.342(1)(g) violated appellant’s due process and equal protection as applied).  
7 But see State v. Wenthe, 822 N.W.2d 822, 830 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012) (holding § 609.344(k)(1) unconstitutional in part as applied in this case). 
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Sexual Conduct with a Nursing Facility Resident or Vulnerable Person (first and second degrees): 
MO. REV. STAT. § 566.115 (2018) (first degree), 566.116 (2018) (second degree)  
Other Sexual Offenses: See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 566.060 (2018) (Sodomy in the first degree), 
MO. REV. STAT. § 566.061 (2018) (Sodomy in the second degree) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: MO. REV. STAT. § 556.061(14)(a) (2018)  
“Mental disease or defect”: Undefined 
Defendant’s Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense  
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Montana   Offenses & Degrees: 
Sexual Assault: MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502 (2017) 
Sexual Intercourse Without Consent: MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503 (2017) 
    Definitions:  
“[C]onsent”: MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501 (2017) 
“[I]ncapable of consent”: MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501 (2017) 
“Consent” (as a defense): MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-211 (2017) 
“Mentally disordered”: MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(40) (2017) 
Defendant’s Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense  
Affirmative Defenses: See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-211 (2017) (providing for consent as a defense, but 
also provides when consent is ineffective) 
 
Nebraska   Offenses & Degrees: 
     Sexual Assault 
First degree: NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-319(1)(a), (b) (LexisNexis 2018) 
Second or third degree: NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-320(1)(a), (b) (LexisNexis 2018) 
See also NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-322.04 (LexisNexis 2018) (sexual abuse of a protected 
individual) 
    Definitions:  
“Without consent”: NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-318(8)(a) (LexisNexis 2018) [not specific to 
mental disability] 
    Defendant’s Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense(s) 
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Nevada    Offenses & Degrees: 
     Sexual Assault: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2017) 
 A-xi 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: Not mentioned (uses “against the will” which is also undefined) 
“[M]entally . . . incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of his or her conduct”: Used in 
substantive definition of “sexual assault” but not defined. 
Defendant’s Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense (“perpetrator knows or 
should know”) 
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
New Hampshire   Offenses & Degrees: 
Aggravated felonious sexual assault: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(h) (2018) 
See also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:3(I) (2018) (defining “Felonious Sexual Assault”)  
    Definitions:  
“Consent” (as a defense):  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:6 (2018) 
“[D]isability” is undefined and simply an element of the definition of “sexual assault” 
Defendant’s Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense  
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
New Jersey   Offenses & Degrees: 
Sexual Assault: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(a)(7) (West 2018) 
Criminal Sexual Contact: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-3(a) (West 2018) 
Lewdness: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-4(b)(2) (West 2018) 
    Definitions:  
“[C]onsent”: Not defined. 
“[I]ntellectually. . . incapacitated”: Not defined 
“[M]ental disease or defect”: Not currently defined. Previous statutory references and definitions 
of “mentally defective” contained in Section 2C:14-1(h) (amended 2012) 
Defendant’s Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense 
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
New Mexico    Offenses & Degrees: 
Criminal Sexual Penetration (first, second, and third degrees, respectively): N.M. STAT. ANN. § 
30-9-11(D)(2), (E)(3), (F) (LexisNexis 2018) 
     Criminal Sexual Contact: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-12(A) (LexisNexis 2018) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: Not defined 
“[F]orce or coercion”: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A)(4) (LexisNexis 2018) 
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“Mental condition”: Undefined 
Defendant’s Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent: Part of definition of “force or coercion” which is 
an element of the offense(s)  
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
New York   Offenses & Degrees: 
Rape in the second degree: N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.30(A)(2) (LexisNexis 2018) 
Criminal Sexual Act in the second degree: N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.45(A)(2) (LexisNexis 2018) 
Sexual Abuse in the third degree: N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.55 (LexisNexis 2018) 
Aggravated Sexual Abuse in the third degree: N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.66(2) (LexisNexis 2018) 
Other Sexual Offenses: See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.52 (LexisNexis 2018) (forcible touching); 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20 (LexisNexis 2018) (sexual misconduct)  
    Definitions:  
“Lack of consent”: N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (LexisNexis 2018) 
“Mentally disabled”: N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(5) (LexisNexis 2018) 
Defendant’s Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent: Not mentioned in the statute but see affirmative 
defense below 
Affirmative Defenses: N.Y. PENAL LAW §130.10(1) (LexisNexis 2018) (providing for an affirmative 
defense if the defendant “did not know of the facts or conditions responsible for such incapacity to 
consent” at the time of the conduct) 
 
North Carolina   Offenses & Degrees: 
Second degree forcible rape: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.22(a)(2) (2017) 
Sexual battery: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.33(a)(2) (2017) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: Not mentioned in statute, rather “against the will” statutory term 
“Mentally disabled”: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.20(1) (2017) 
Defendant’s Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense  
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
North Dakota   Offenses & Degrees: 
Sexual Assault: N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-07(1)(b) (2017) 
Gross Sexual Imposition: N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03(1)(e) (2017) 
See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-06 (2017) (sexual abuse of wards) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: Not mentioned in statute 
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“[M]ental disease or defect”: Not defined in statute, rather, part of the definition of the offense(s) 
above.  
Defendant’s Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense  
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Ohio    Offenses & Degrees: 
Rape: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(c) (West 2018) 
Sexual Battery: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(2) (West 2018) 
Gross Sexual Imposition: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05(A)(5) (West 2018). See also OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.06(A)(5) (West 2018) (sexual imposition) (assignment liability to 
professionals where the victim is a patient) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”:  mentioned in the substantive offenses without definition.  See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(c) (West 2018) (“ability . . . to consent”) 
“Mental…condition”: Not defined 
Defendant’s Knowledge of V’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense 
    Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Oklahoma   Offenses & Degrees: 
Rape (first and second degrees): OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1114(A)(2) (West 2018) (first 
degree)  
    Definitions: 
“Rape”: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111(A)(2) (West 2018) 
“Consent”: Not defined. 
Defendant’s Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent: Not mentioned 
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Oregon     Offenses & Degrees: 
Rape in the first degree: OR. REV. STAT. § 163.375(1)(d) (2018) 
Sexual Abuse in the first degree: OR. REV. STAT. § 163.427(1)(a)(C) (2018) 
Unlawful Sexual Penetration in the first degree: OR. REV. STAT. §163.411(1)(c) (2018) 
Sodomy in the first degree: OR. REV. STAT. §163.405(1)(d) (2018) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: Not defined but referenced in substantive criminal offenses 
See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.315(1)(b) (2018) (defining “capability to consent”) 
“Mentally defective”: OR. REV. STAT. § 163.305(3) (2018) 
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“Mental defect”: Undefined, noted in substantive definition of sex offenses; also part of definition 
of “mentally defective” 
Defendant’s Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent: Not mentioned 
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Pennsylvania    Offenses & Degrees: 
Rape: 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121(a)(5) (2018) 
Sexual Assault: 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3124.1 (2018) 
Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse: 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3123(a)(5) (2018)  
Aggravated Indecent Assault: 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3125(a)(6) (2018) 
Indecent Assault: 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3126(a)(6) (2018) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: Undefined in the statute but an element of the sexual offenses  
“Mental disability”: Undefined but an element of all defined sexual offenses except “sexual 
assault” 
Defendant’s Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent: Not mentioned 
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
  
Rhode Island    Offenses & Degrees: 
Sexual Assault:  
First degree: 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2(1) (West 2017) 
      Second degree: 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-4(1) (West 2017) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: Undefined. 
“Mentally disabled”: 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-1(4) (West 2017) 
Defendant’s Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense 
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
South Carolina   Offenses & Degrees: 
     Criminal sexual conduct in the third degree: S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-654(1)(b) (2018) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: Used but undefined; another statutory phrase used is “nonconsensual touching” to 
trigger assault. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-600(C) (2018) 
“Mentally defective”: S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-651 (2018) 
“Mental disease or defect”: Undefined 
Defendant’s Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense  
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Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
South Dakota    Offenses & Degrees: 
Rape: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-1.3 (2018) 
Sexual contact with a person incapable of consenting—felony: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.2 
(2018)  
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: Undefined 
“Mental incapacity”: Undefined 
Defendant’s Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense 
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Tennessee   Offenses & Degrees: 
Rape: TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503(a)(3) (West 2018) 
Sexual battery: TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-505(a)(3) (West 2018) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: Not defined 
“Mentally defective”: TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(3) (West 2018) 
“Mental disease or defect”: Undefined 
Defendant’s Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense 
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Texas    Offenses & Degrees: 
Sexual Assault: TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.011(a)(1), (b)(4), (b)(9) (West 2017) 
Aggravated Sexual Assault: TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(2)(C) (West 2017) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: Undefined 
“Mental disease or defect”: Undefined 
“Disabled individual”: TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(b)(3) (West 2017) 
“Mental health services provider”: TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(c)(4)(G) (West 2017) 
Defendant’s Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense 
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Utah     Offenses & Degrees: 
Rape: UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402(1) (LexisNexis 2017) 
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Forcible sexual abuse: UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404(1) (LexisNexis 2017)8 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: not affirmatively defined; operative language is “without consent of the victim.” See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(6) (LexisNexis 2017)9 
“Mental disease or defect”: Undefined 
Defendant’s Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent: element of the offense 
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Vermont   Offenses & Degrees: 
Sexual Assault: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a)(1) (West 2018)  
Other Sexual Offenses: See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3253 (West 2018) (aggravated sexual assault); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1306 (West 2018) (mistreatment of persons with impaired cognitive function) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3251(3) (West 2018) 
“[W]ithout the consent of the other”: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3254(2) (West 2018) 
Defendant’s Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense  
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Virginia   Offenses & Degrees: 
Rape: VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A)(ii) (West 2018) 
Forcible sodomy: VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.1(A)(2) (West 2018) 
Other Sexual Offenses: See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.3(A)(2) (West 2018) (aggravated sexual 
battery); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.2(A)(2) (West 2018) (object sexual penetration)  
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: Undefined.  “against the will” is operative term, also undefined. 
“Mental incapacity”: VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.10(3) (West 2018) 
Defendant’s Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense 
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Washington   Offenses & Degrees: 
     Rape (second degree): WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.050(1) (West 2018) 
Rape (third degree): WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.060(1) (West 2018) 
Indecent liberties: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.100(1) (West 2018) 
8 This section has more than one version with varying effective dates. The new version will be effective May 8, 2018. There are no substantive changes in the new version.  
9 This section has more than one version with varying effective dates. The new version will be effective May 8, 2018. There are no substantive changes in the new version. 
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    Definitions:  
“Consent”: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(7) (West 2018) 
“Mental incapacity”: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(4) (West 2018) 
“Person with a developmental disability,” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(10) (West 2018) 
“Person with supervisory authority,” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(11) (West 2018) 
“Person with a mental disorder” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(11) (West 2018) 
“Health care provider” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(14) (West 2018) 
“Frail elder or vulnerable adult” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(16) (West 2018) 
“Mentally defective”: Undefined 
Defendant’s Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense 
Affirmative Defenses: In statute 
 
West Virginia   Offenses & Degrees: 
Sexual assault (third degree): W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-5(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2018) 
Sexual abuse (second degree): W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-8(a) (LexisNexis 2018) 
    Definitions:  
“Lack of Consent”: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-2(a), (b)(2) (LexisNexis 2018) 
“Incapable of Consent”: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-2(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2018) 
“Mentally defective”: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-1(3) (LexisNexis 2018) 
Defendant’s Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent: Not mentioned 
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Wisconsin   Offenses & Degrees: 
     Sexual Assault: WIS. STAT. § 940.225(2)(g), (2)(j), (3), (3m), (4)(b) (2018) 
Second degree: WIS. STAT. § 940.225(2)(c) (2018); See also WIS. STAT. § 940.225(3) (2018) 
(third degree sexual assault), (3m) (2018) (fourth degree sexual assault) 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: “words or overt actions by a person who is competent to give informed consent 
indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact. Consent is not an 
issue in alleged violations of subsections (2)(c), (cm), (d), (g), (h), and (i). The following persons 
are presumed incapable of consent but the presumption may be rebutted by competent evidence, 
subject to the provisions of section 972.11(2): (b) A person suffering from a mental illness or 
defect which impairs capacity to appraise personal conduct.” WIS. STAT. § 940.225(4)–(4)(b) 
(2018) 
“Mental illness or defect”: Undefined 
Defendant’s Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense 
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Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
 
Wyoming    Offenses & Degrees: 
Sexual Assault:  
First degree: WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-302(a)(iv) (West 2018) 
Second degree: WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(vi) (West 2018)10 
    Definitions:  
“Consent”: Not defined 
“Mental illness”: Not defined 
“Mental deficiency”: Not defined 
“Developmental disability”: Not defined 
“Position of Authority”: WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-301(a)(iv) (West 2018) 
Defendant’s Knowledge of Victim’s Incapacity to Consent: Element of the offense 
Affirmative Defenses: Not mentioned 
10 This section has more than one version with varying effective dates. The new version will be effective July 1, 2018. The new version adds that a person is guilty of sexual 
assault in the second degree when he subjects a person to sexual contact or sexual intrusion while serving as a health care provider. 
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